

# ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: WHITE MALE TOP MANAGER ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND HELPING BEHAVIOR TOWARD OTHER EXECUTIVES FOLLOWING THE APPOINTMENT OF A FEMALE OR RACIAL MINORITY CEO

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**In this paper, we examine white male managers' intrapsychic and behavioral responses to the appointment of a female or a racial minority CEO at their firm. Drawing from intergroup relations literatures, we theorize how and why the appointment of a minority-status CEO is likely to impact the amount of help that white male top managers provide to their fellow executives. We first explain how white male managers' negatively biased perceptions of racial minority and female CEOs lead them to experience a diminished sense of organizational identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO. We then examine how this diminished sense of organizational identification is likely to reduce white male managers' general propensities to provide help to other executives at the firm. We finally consider how reduced identification might have especially strong negative implications for the amount of help that white male managers provide to colleagues who are racial minorities or women. Our results consistently support our theoretical expectations that, following the appointment of a female or racial minority CEO, white male top managers tend to experience a diminished sense of organizational identification, and, in turn, provide less help to colleagues, with this reduction particularly pronounced for help provided to *minority-status* colleagues.**

Although racial minorities and women have historically been substantially underrepresented in positions of corporate leadership, over the past decade, an increasing number of minority-status individuals have succeeded in attaining positions in the executive suite, including the chief executive officer (CEO) position (Eagly & Carli, 2007; Helfat, Harris, & Wolfson, 2006; Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Zhu, Shen, & Hillman, 2014; Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2011). As a result, scholars have recently begun to systematically study female and racial minority top managers, including minority-status CEOs (e.g., Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016; Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski,

2014). Studies in this nascent literature have given some consideration to how external stakeholders (e.g., investors) respond to, and treat, racial minority and female CEOs. This research indicates that external stakeholders tend to respond less positively to minority-status CEOs and afford them less favorable treatment than white male CEOs. For example, findings indicate that equity investors respond less positively to the naming of a minority-status CEO (Dixon-Fowler, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 2013; Gaughan, Smith, & Pierce, 2016; Lee & James, 2007; Martin, Nishikawa, & Williams, 2009) and corporate leaders at other firms ascribe greater blame for shortfalls in firm performance to minority-status CEOs in their communications with journalists (Park & Westphal, 2013). This differential treatment has been explained in terms of negative biases in external stakeholders' perceptions of those minority-status individuals who manage to attain the CEO position.

While these studies provide important insights into how *external* stakeholders respond to minority-status

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CEOs, we know much less about the responses of key *internal* stakeholders. There is particularly limited study of the reactions of incumbent top managers, whose responses are of particular importance, given their well-established impact on firm behavior and performance (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Given the symbolic significance of the CEO position (Fombrun, 1996; Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987), salient characteristics of the individual occupying this position are likely to have a significant impact on how members of the top management team (TMT) view the organization as a whole. The lack of prior consideration of the reactions of top managers to the appointment of a minority-status CEO is especially noteworthy given that the direct reports of minority-status CEOs are likely to be disproportionately white males (Eagly & Carli, 2007; Helfat et al., 2006), with such demographic differences liable to significantly influence white managers' intrapsychic and behavioral responses (Flynn, Chatman, & Spataro, 2001; Kanter, 1977; O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In light of prior discussion, it would be reasonable to expect that white male top managers might manifest negative biases in their assessments of a recently appointed minority-status CEO, yet this possibility, and its ultimate implications, have not been systematically considered. Moreover, while the nascent literature on minority-status CEOs suggests how biases in perceptions of minority-status CEOs' leadership abilities may result in them being treated in less favorable ways than their white male counterparts, there has been little systematic consideration of the implications that such biases might have for *other* executives at a focal firm, including, and perhaps especially, other *minority-status* executives.

Our study begins to address these issues. We examine how internal members react to the appointment of a female or racial minority CEO, by theorizing and empirically examining the intrapsychic and behavioral responses of white male top managers. The first component of our theoretical framework draws from the social psychological literature on intergroup relations (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010), and the closely connected literature on organizational identification (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994), to theorize how and why the appointment of a minority-status CEO is likely to influence the identification of white male top managers with their firm. Representing the degree to which individuals think of themselves in

terms of their organizational membership, organizational identification can constitute a key component of an individual's self-concept (Ashforth et al., 2008; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1994). Our theory first explains how white male top managers' negatively biased perceptions of a new minority-status CEO are likely to lead them to experience a diminished sense of identification with their firm following the appointment of a minority-status CEO, relative to the appointment of a white male CEO.

In the second portion of our theoretical framework, we continue to draw from the intergroup relations literature to theorize why white male top managers are likely to provide less work-related help to their executive-level colleagues at their firm following the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO. Our theory specifically explains why reduced organizational identification will mediate this relationship, and, in our analysis, we consider four forms of work-related help: (1) task-related help provided to fellow TMT members, (2) recommendations for board appointments provided to fellow TMT members, (3) task-related help provided to lower-level executives, and (4) mentoring of lower-level executives. Our selection of these forms of help was guided by the organizational behavior literature, which routinely distinguishes between task-related help and career assistance, and further distinguishes between mentoring and recommendations for attractive positions as major categories of career assistance (e.g., Allen, Eby, Poteet, Lentz, & Lima, 2004). Moreover, while the provision of help among corporate executives has not been studied extensively, extant work suggests that task-related help (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2003), mentoring (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2013), and recommendations for board appointments (e.g., Westphal & Stern, 2006) are important to the success of corporate leaders and the overall leadership capabilities of their firms, and encompass a large portion of the work-related help that top managers provide to their fellow executives.

In the final portion of our theory, we consider how the effect of reduced organizational identification on a white male manager's help-giving behavior might be moderated by the race and gender of the white male manager's colleagues. We extend our intergroup relations perspective to develop our third prediction, that reduced organizational identification among white male managers following the appointment of a minority-status CEO will have particularly negative effects on the levels of help that they provide to fellow executives *who are racial minorities or women*. Taken together with our

expectation that the appointment of a minority-status CEO will have negative indirect effects on help giving by white male top managers through its negative effects on organizational identification, this line of argument leads to the prediction of a moderated mediation effect, such that these indirect effects will be more pronounced for white male top managers' racial minority and female executive colleagues. Thus, our theory suggests how biased perceptions of minority-status CEOs can ultimately have especially negative implications for other executives who are also minority-status individuals.

Our study contributes to the multidisciplinary literature on racial minorities and women in corporate leadership (e.g., Dezsö & Ross, 2012; McDonald & Westphal, 2013; Park & Westphal, 2013) by examining how important internal members of the organization respond to the appointment of a minority-status individual to the CEO position. Although scholars have begun to consider biased reactions to racial minorities and women who reach the CEO position, this research has focused on the reactions of individuals external to the firm. In this paper, we develop theory and provide empirical evidence that suggests how biases can lead to unfortunate intrapsychic and behavioral reactions among an especially critical set of *insiders*, white male top managers. Moreover, while prior studies have focused on how the negatively biased perceptions of external stakeholders toward a minority-status CEO results in the CEO getting treated less favorably, our theory suggests how biased perceptions toward a minority-status CEO can result in less favorable treatment of *other* organizational members.

This study also contributes to the nascent literature on social discrimination in the corporate elite by highlighting how the reductions in helping behaviors of white males following the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO disproportionately impact other racial minority and female executives. While it might be presumed that female and racial minority managers will typically benefit from the appointment of racial minorities and women to prominent leadership positions (see Cohen & Broschak, 2013, for discussion on the increased proportion of minority-status managers more broadly), our study identifies an important mechanism by which such appointments may, counterintuitively, harm the career prospects of other female and racial minority managers through the receipt of less help from their white male colleagues. This tendency for white males to provide less help to their minority-status colleagues

following the appointment of a female or a racial minority CEO is particularly unfortunate, given evidence that minority-status leaders already tend to be disadvantaged in receiving help from their peers (e.g., Ibarra, 1995; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003; Thomas, 1993).

From a more sociological perspective, this paper also contributes by illustrating how organizational decisions that appear to represent meritocracy in an organization can elicit intrapsychic and behavioral reactions from majority-status individuals that ironically compromise meritocracy in corporate leadership by disadvantaging minority-status managers (Castilla & Benard, 2010). Classic sociological work on status suggests that, when an individual member of a particular social group acquires a high-status position, the benefits can "trickle down" to other members of the group who occupy lower-status positions (Cole & Cole, 1973; Graffin, Wade, Porac, & McNamee, 2008). Cole and Cole (1973: 201; Cole, 1979) referred to this phenomenon as a kind of "generalized Matthew effect." This study provides evidence for a kind of *reverse* generalized Matthew effect in which the appointment of an individual to a prominent high-status position can actually disadvantage other category members (i.e., fellow racial minority and female executives) who occupy lower-status positions in the hierarchy, due to the biased responses of white male top managers.

## THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

### The Appointment of a Racial Minority or Female CEO and White Male Top Manager Organizational Identification

In this section, we draw on intergroup relations theory to explain why white male top managers are likely to experience reduced organizational identification following the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO. The literature on intergroup relations highlights several interrelated biases that could lead white male top managers to hold less positive assessments of a minority-status CEO. White male TMT members will be susceptible to "generic" out-group biases as they assess a minority-status CEO's capabilities and effectiveness. Race and gender are highly salient as people preconsciously categorize themselves and others, and consequently people routinely categorize those who are of a different race or gender as out-group members (e.g., Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glas, 1992; see Brewer & Brown, 1998, and Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010, for reviews). White

male top managers will, therefore, tend to pre-consciously categorize racial minority and female CEOs as out-group members. There is extensive evidence that people view out-group members in a less positive light and as comparatively less capable and effective than in-group members (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010, and Fiske, 1998, for reviews). This suggests that white male TMT members will manifest preconscious negative biases as they make judgments about the strategic leadership capabilities and effectiveness of racial minority and female CEOs, causing them to understate their abilities and performance. Research further indicates that, in addition to the "generic" intergroup biases just described, white male executives also tend to manifest negative biases specific to racial minorities and women and their leadership abilities. There is evidence that white males tend to look upon racial minorities and women as less qualified for and less effective in leadership positions, including executive leadership positions (Carton & Rosette, 2011; Eagly & Carli, 2007; Rosette, Leonardelli, & Phillips, 2008; Stoker, van der Velde, & Lammers, 2012). These negative biases are largely a manifestation of existing stereotypes of the prototypical business leader as being a white male (Rosette et al., 2008).

Intergroup bias also regularly manifests as a tendency to discount the achievements and career accomplishments of out-group members, with people tending to overstate the degree to which out-group members' successes are due to special treatment (Hewstone, 1990; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Drout, 1994; Pettigrew, 1979). Relevant research suggests that whites tend to believe that successful African Americans have succeeded in part due to preferential selection processes such as affirmative action; men tend to hold similar beliefs regarding the career successes of women (Jackman, 1994; Kane & Whipkey, 2009; Kluegel & Smith, 1986). These predominately subconscious assumptions will contribute further to the tendency for white males to underestimate the capabilities of a racial minority or female CEO.

The negative biases in white male managers' assessment of racial minority and female CEOs' executive leadership capabilities outlined above will tend to lead white male top managers to hold less favorable views of important aspects of their firm and its future prospects following the appointment of a minority-status CEO. Top managers' expectations regarding their firm and its future prospects are particularly likely to be influenced by their assessment of a CEO's capabilities, given considerable evidence that

people tend to exaggerate the influence that a firm's leader has on overall firm performance (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985; see Bligh, Kohles, & Pillai, 2011, for a review). Moreover, it seems likely that negative assessments of out-group members will routinely extend to their ideas, proposals, and initiatives. This would suggest how negative biases would likely lead white male top managers to hold less favorable views of the overarching strategy that a new minority-status CEO is pursuing.

Work on organizational identification suggests why white male managers' less favorable views of their firm and its leadership following the appointment of a minority-status CEO will leave them less strongly identified with their firm. "Organizational identification" has been conceptualized as the extent to which organizational members think of themselves in terms of their membership in the organization and its defining attributes (Ashforth et al., 2008; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1994). The organizational identification concept is grounded in the wider social psychological literature on social identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which highlights that people define themselves partly in terms of their membership in different kinds of social groups they belong to, including work organizations (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Organizational identification scholars have given considerable attention to the determinants of organizational identification, and research in this area consistently indicates that people identify more strongly with their organization to the extent that they view it in a positive light (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). A foundational premise of social identity theory is that people have a fundamental motivation to create and maintain positive views of themselves (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and one broad consequence of this motive is that people tend to identify more strongly with social groups, including organizations, to the extent that doing so helps them to create and sustain positive self-views (e.g., Dutton et al., 1994; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Identifying with a particular organization is more supportive of the creation and maintenance of positive self-views to the extent that the organization is viewed favorably (e.g., Dutton et al., 1994; Tyler & Blader, 2000). In contrast, to the extent that organizational members see their organization less favorably, they will tend to identify less strongly with the organization because doing so contributes less effectively to the creation and maintenance of positive self-views. There is specific evidence that

organizational identification is diminished when organizational performance is relatively low (Carmeli, Gilat, & Waldman, 2007), and a recent study by Lange, Boivie, and Westphal (2015) found evidence for this relationship among top executives. Thus, to the extent that white male top managers become less optimistic about the performance prospects of their firm following the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO, due to the preconscious biases discussed above, the appointment of a minority-status CEO should tend to weaken white male top managers' identification with their firms.

White male top managers may also experience reduced identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO because they hold negatively biased perceptions regarding the degree to which they are valued and respected by a new minority-status CEO. Research suggests that people identify more strongly with organizations to the extent that they believe that they are treated with respect and valued by other organizational members, especially those in positions of higher authority (see, in particular, work by Tyler, Blader, and colleagues, such as Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). Respectful treatment by other organizational members signals that a person is a valued member of the organization and is held in high esteem (Bartel, Wrzesniewski, & Wiesenfeld, 2012; Blader & Tyler, 2009; Fuller, Hester, Barnett, Frey, Relyea, & Beu, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003), and thus respectful treatment serves organizational members' previously discussed motive to sustain positive self-views. People tend to be particularly focused on the treatment that they receive from their immediate superior (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). Thus, white male top managers' perceptions of the treatment that they receive from their CEO are likely to impact their assessments of whether they are respected and valued within their firm, which will influence organizational identification. Moreover, given that top managers tend to hold especially positive views of themselves and their executive leadership capabilities (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Park, Westphal, & Stern, 2011), they may react negatively to even subtle indicators that fail to affirm their highly positive self-views.

Further research on intergroup biases suggests why white male top managers will tend to hold negatively biased perceptions of the degree to which they are respected and valued by a racial minority or female CEO. Relevant work in social psychology indicates that people show a largely preconscious general expectation that those whom they categorize

as out-group members will tend to treat them in less favorable ways (e.g., Judd, Park, Yzerbyt, Gordijn, & Muller, 2005). Insko and Schopler (Insko & Schopler, 1987; Schopler & Insko, 1992) and their colleagues have suggested that these kinds of beliefs and expectations are core elements of a widely held generic mental model of out-groups, which they refer to as a "group schema." Their research suggests that this schema is routinely activated during interactions with those categorized as out-group members (e.g., Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). In a review of the intergroup relations literature, Brewer and Brown (1998) noted that seminal work on intergroup relations (e.g., Campbell, 1967; Tajfel, 1970) offers similar ideas, suggesting that people hold a general expectation that they will be treated less favorably by out-group members. These negative expectations tend to color interpretations of interactions with out-group members, such that treatment by out-group members tends to be interpreted less positively.

Since white male top managers will be prone to categorizing recently appointed racial minority and female CEOs as out-group members, they will tend to interpret the treatment that they receive from minority-status CEOs through the lens of the generic schema of out-groups discussed above. Given that many aspects of the treatment that managers receive from the CEO will be marked by ambiguity, prior expectations are likely to negatively bias their assessments of the extent to which they are valued and respected. For example, white male CEOs will tend to interpret a minority-status CEO's reactions to their views on strategic issues through the lens of the out-group schema. As there will often be ambiguity in a CEO's reactions, the content of the out-group schema will tend to "fill in the gaps" (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), such that white male managers will believe that the CEO holds a less favorable view of their opinions on strategic issues. As a result, many white male managers are likely to feel that their views on strategic issues are not fully valued by a new minority-status CEO and this will contribute to a sense that they are less valued as members of the TMT under the new minority-status CEO, in turn reducing their identification with the organization.

To summarize the arguments in this section of the paper, following the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO, intergroup biases will lead white male top managers to hold less positive opinions of their organization and feel less respected and valued by the new minority-status CEO. As

a result, they will tend to experience lower levels of organizational identification. This leads to the following prediction:

*Hypothesis 1. White male top managers will experience lower levels of organizational identification following the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO at their firm, relative to the appointment of a white male CEO.*

### **The Appointment of a Racial Minority or Female CEO and White Male Top Manager Helping Behaviors**

In the second component of our theoretical framework, we continue to draw on the intergroup relations literature to examine how reduced organizational identification, following the appointment of a female or racial minority CEO, influences the amount of work-related help, (including task-related help and career assistance) that white male top managers provide to fellow executives in general, and minority-status fellow executives in particular. Our theoretical framework draws from theory and research on helping and other prosocial behaviors (e.g., Levine & Crowther, 2008; Simon, Stürmer, & Steffens, 2000; Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005) to suggest that top managers who experience lower levels of organizational identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO will display a general tendency to provide less work-related help to other executives at their firm. Research on helping and other prosocial behaviors (Levine & Crowther, 2008; Simon et al., 2000; Stürmer et al., 2005; see Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014, for a recent meta-analysis) points to a number of interrelated mechanisms that are likely to lead top managers who experience reduced organizational identification to provide less help to other executives at their firm.

Top managers who feel less strongly identified with their firm will provide less help in part because they will experience less interpersonal attraction (i.e., liking) toward their fellow executives. Studies of helping in social psychology (e.g., Kelley & Byrne, 1976; Stürmer et al., 2005) indicate that people show a greater willingness to help others to the extent that they find them personally appealing (i.e., they like them). Research suggests that, as people identify more strongly with a particular social group, they experience a heightened sense of similarity with fellow group members (e.g., in terms of attitudes and behaviors), a phenomenon that has been termed the “in-group homogeneity effect”

(Brewer & Brown, 1998; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). Greater feelings of similarity, in turn, enhance interpersonal attraction toward other group members via the well-known “similarity-attraction effect” (Byrne, 1971). This discussion suggests that top managers who experience a reduced sense of organizational identification in the wake of the appointment of a minority-status CEO will experience a reduced sense of similarity with, and therefore lower levels of interpersonal attraction toward, fellow executives, and will consequently be less willing to provide their colleagues with work-related help.

Top managers who experience lower levels of identification with their firm are also likely to provide less help to their fellow executives because they will feel lower levels of empathy toward them. Research suggests that empathy arises in part from being able to take the perspective of another person (i.e., understanding another person’s situation from that person’s point of view) (Zaki, 2014). Psychological research on help giving suggests that empathy is an important motivator of the provision of help and that empathy is positively related to help giving because it is associated with an enhanced recognition and appreciation of others’ *need for help* (Batson, 1998; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990; Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen, 1988; Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006; see Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005, for a review). Intergroup relations research indicates that people experience greater empathy toward others to the extent that they feel a common sense of social identity with those others (e.g., Stürmer et al., 2005; Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, 2009). Greater empathy can result as a by-product of a phenomenon that self-categorization theorists have termed “de-individuation” (Hogg & Terry, 2000): as people become more strongly identified with a social group, they increasingly come to see themselves, on some level, as cognitively interchangeable with other group members. Thus, de-individuation facilitates perspective taking (i.e., it facilitates understanding a situation from another’s point of view), which enhances feelings of empathy (Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson, 1997). This discussion suggests that top managers who identify less strongly with their firm following the appointment of a minority-status CEO will experience less empathy toward their fellow executives, which will render them less attuned to and appreciative of their colleagues’ need for help. They will provide fellow executives with less work-related help as a result.

Intergroup relations research on helping (e.g., Levine, Cassidy, & Jentsch, 2010) and related work on the link between organizational identification and organizational citizenship behaviors (e.g., Dukerich, Golden, & Shortell, 2002; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003) suggest another way in which (lower) de-individuation can influence help giving by top managers. These studies suggest that the enhanced sense of de-individuation associated with increased organizational identification promotes help giving because it increases the sense that the successes of other organization members are one's own successes. Thus, helping fellow organization members is experienced, on some level, as helping oneself (Dukerich et al., 2002; Levine et al., 2010; Tyler & Blader, 2000). This discussion suggests that top managers who manifest reduced organizational identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO will be less prone to seeing the potential successes of their fellow executives as their own, and will provide them with less help as a result.

In summary, our argument suggests that top managers who experience lower levels of organizational identification due to the appointment of a female or racial minority CEO will provide less help to their executive-level peers and subordinates. Taken together with Hypothesis 1, which explained why the appointment of a minority-status CEO results in lower levels of organizational identification among white male top managers, the argument presented here suggests that the appointment of a minority-status CEO will negatively affect the amount of work-related help that white male top managers provide to their executive-level colleagues by lowering the executive's organizational identification. Stated differently, the appointment of a minority-status CEO will have indirect negative effects on help giving by white male top managers through reduced organizational identification.<sup>1</sup> This leads to the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2. The appointment of a racial minority or female CEO will have a negative effect on the amount of work-related help that white male top managers provide to their executive-level colleagues; this effect will be mediated by reduced organizational identification among white male top managers.*

<sup>1</sup> In light of conceptual and statistical difficulties in distinguishing between full and partial mediation (see Hayes, 2013: 170–172), we do not make a prediction regarding full versus partial mediation of this relationship.

We now extend our intergroup relations perspective to consider how the relationships indicated in Hypothesis 2 might be moderated by the demographic characteristics of white male top managers' fellow executives, who are potential recipients of their help. We specifically theorize why reduced organizational identification among white male managers following the appointment of a minority-status CEO will have especially negative effects on their propensity to provide help to their colleagues who are *racial minorities and women*. Research on in-group/out-group categorization highlights that people have multiple social identities, including salient demographic characteristics such as race and gender, as well as common organizational membership, with each identity providing a possible basis for in-group versus out-group classification by other individuals (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Urban & Miller, 1998). Research adopting the "common in-group identity model" (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) and the "cross-categorization tie model" (e.g., Crisp & Hewstone, 1999, 2000) suggests that the basis by which an individual preconsciously categorizes others is influenced by the strength with which the individual identifies with the particular category. This research indicates that a strongly held, shared category can mitigate tendencies to treat people who are different in terms of another salient characteristic, such as race or gender, as out-group members (Gaertner et al., 1993; Zhu et al., 2014). Accordingly, this research would suggest that a relatively strong sense of common identity in terms of shared organizational membership is likely to mitigate the tendency for an individual to treat demographically different others as out-group members. By contrast, if organizational identification declines, the salience of this common identity is reduced, leaving salient demographic characteristics as the primary basis of in-group/out-group classification. Therefore, white male top managers will be more likely to classify racial minority and female colleagues as out-group members to the extent that they experience lower levels of organizational identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO.

Our previous theoretical argument suggesting how helping behavior is influenced by perceived social similarity (resulting from enhanced empathy and a greater tendency to experience success of a similar other as one's own) also suggests that white male top managers will display a reduced tendency to provide help to fellow executives who

are classified as out-group members. Thus, while reduced organizational identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO should tend to diminish the helping behavior of white male managers toward all other managers (including other white males), the decline in helping behavior will be particularly great toward female and racial minority managers, because reductions in organizational identification will also have the unfortunate effect of increasing the likelihood that these minority-status colleagues will be classified as out-group members based on race or gender.

Taken together with Hypothesis 2, the above argument indicates a moderated mediation relationship: the indirect negative effects that the appointment of a minority-status CEO has on help giving by white male top managers through the mediator of reduced organizational identification will be moderated by the demographic characteristics of white male top managers' colleagues. The tendency for such an appointment to reduce help giving by reducing organizational identification will be stronger for the help provided by white male top managers to their racial minority and female colleagues, in comparison to the help that they provide to their white male colleagues. We formalize this reasoning in the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 3. There will be a moderated mediation effect such that the indirect negative effects that the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO has on help giving by white male top managers through reduced organizational identification will be stronger for white male top managers' racial minority and female colleagues.*

## METHODS

### Data Collection

The sample frame for this study included top executives at 1,000 large- and mid-sized public U.S. companies with more than \$50 million in sales. At least one top executive at each of these firms had participated in one or more prior studies by the third author. Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests indicated that these firms were representative of companies in the larger population on each of the firm-level archival variables discussed below. At each firm, we surveyed up to six executives one level below the CEO with the title of officer, senior vice president, or executive vice president. To maximize the survey participation rate, we

conducted a qualitative pretest of the questionnaire during in-depth interviews with 23 current or former top executives at firms in the population.<sup>2</sup> Thirty-nine percent of top executives in the sample frame agreed to participate in the study, which involved responding to survey questions about organizational identification, mentoring, task-related help, and board recommendations each year from 2006 to 2011. As discussed further below, our analysis was restricted to periods in this time frame when there was a CEO succession. We also surveyed managers who reported directly to the participating top executives each year of the study period. The average response rate for these surveys was 38%. The unit of analysis for models of organizational identification was the focal executive. In other models, the unit of analysis was the executive dyad, comprising the focal executive, who was the potential help provider, and “alter,” the potential help recipient. In models of mentoring, alter was a subordinate manager, and, in models of board recommendations, alter was a peer executive at the same level. In models of task-related help, alter was a subordinate or peer executive.

We used Heckman two-step models to test for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). The selection equation estimated the likelihood of participating in the study, and the inverse Mills ratio was included in a second-stage equation that tested the hypothesized relationships. The selection parameter was not statistically significant in these models, and the hypothesized results were not different in statistical significance from those presented below, suggesting that non-response bias does not compromise the validity of our findings.

Data on race and gender of top executives were provided by a large management consulting firm.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> We followed other practices that have been shown to maximize survey response rates from executives, such as obtaining an endorsement for the survey from a well-known corporate leader, highlighting in the invitation to participate that the survey was part of an ongoing program of research on firm leadership conducted by faculty at leading business schools, and that hundreds of executives had participated in previous surveys (Greer, Chuchinprakarn, & Seshadri, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> We validated the race and gender classifications for the subsample of executives for whom pictures could be obtained from company publications or other online sources (Livingston & Pearce, 2009). There was a high level of consistency between race and gender classifications derived from our primary source and those derived from other sources (94%).



We obtained other demographic information and board membership data from multiple sources including BoardEx, Capital IQ, the *Dun & Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management*, *Marquis Who's Who*, the *Social Register*, annual reports, and proxy statements. Firm financial data came from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices. To measure the valence of journalist reporting about participating executives' firms, articles about firms in the sample were collected from major U.S. news and business publications as listed in Factiva and LexisNexis. Executive compensation data came from the ExecuComp database and proxy statements.<sup>4</sup>

### Measures

To preclude single source bias, in the primary tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3, which offer predictions about the effects of organizational identification on the provision of help, we derived the independent and dependent survey measures from different respondents. While organizational identification was based on responses of focal top executives, mentoring, recommendations for board appointments, and task-related help were based on the responses of a focal executive's lower-level and same-level colleagues. Moreover, in the primary analyses, organizational identification was measured at time  $t$  and the dependent variables were measured for the subsequent, 12-month period using responses at time  $t + 1$ . The results were also robust to measuring each dependent variable over shorter or longer time windows (six months or two years). Both the primary analysis and robustness checks included controls for prior levels of the outcomes of interest (i.e., prior levels of task-related help, board recommendations, and mentoring).

**Demographic categories.** To assess the hypothesized effects of racial minority or female CEO appointments on white male top managers' organizational

identification and helping behavior, we created a dummy variable coded "1" if the focal executive was a white male and the CEO was a woman, and a second dummy variable coded "1" if the executive was a white male and the CEO was a racial minority. The appropriate reference category for our analysis was cases in which the focal executive and the CEO were both white males. Thus, we also controlled for a series of dummy variables that represented all other dyadic combinations of race and gender in the sample.<sup>5</sup> We followed a similar approach in testing the hypothesized, moderating effects of demographic differences between the focal executive and potential help recipients. Again, since the appropriate reference category was cases in which the focal executive and potential help recipient were both white males, we controlled for dummy variables that represented all other dyadic combinations of race and gender in the sample.

**Organizational identification.** Our survey measure of organizational identification was developed and validated by Boivie, Lange, McDonald, and Westphal (2011) (see Appendix). Items in the scale were adapted for use with executives from earlier measures developed by Mael and Ashforth (1992) and Bergami and Bagozzi (2000), which have been extensively validated in different samples (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dukerich et al., 2002; Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006). Factor analysis indicated that the survey items loaded on a single factor as expected, without loading on other factors in the measurement model. Inter-item reliability was high ( $\alpha = .88$ ), and the standardized validity coefficients (lambdas) were highly significant for all items in the scale. We used the regression method to estimate factor scores for all survey measures; results were robust to the Bartlett method.

**Work-related help.** As discussed above, we focused on particularly consequential forms of help that have been the subject of prior research on help giving among executive leaders, and we considered

<sup>4</sup> There is a small degree of overlap between the data used for the present study and Park and Westphal (2013). All of the independent variables and dependent variables (i.e., all the variables in the hypotheses) in the present study, including all the survey data, are new to this study. The data on CEO race and gender used in Park and Westphal (2013) were used to construct the relational demography variables in the current study, and the data on CEO status and management experience used in Park and Westphal (2013) were used for control variables in the current study.

<sup>5</sup> These include the following combinations: white female top manager and white male CEO; racial minority male top manager and white male CEO; racial minority female top manager and white male CEO; white female top manager and racial minority CEO; racial minority male top manager and female CEO; white female top manager and female CEO; and racial minority male top manager and racial minority CEO (there were no racial minority female CEOs in our sample; as discussed below, such "dual minority" CEOs were extremely rare during the time period of our study [Livingston, Rosette, & Washington, 2012]).

help provided to both peer (i.e., same-level) and subordinate executives. We examined two forms of help provided to peers: (1) task-related help and (2) recommendations for board appointments. Extant research (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2003) indicates that executive leader effectiveness depends in part on the ability to obtain task-related assistance (e.g., advice and counsel regarding strategic and other kinds of management issues) from fellow executives. Existing research (e.g., Westphal & Stern, 2006) also demonstrates the importance of board appointments to executive career success. Executives gain social status within corporate leadership to the extent that they sit on corporate boards, and they also gain valuable experience from such appointments (Khanna, Jones, & Boivie, 2014; Palmer & Barber, 2001; Useem, 1984). The primary means of obtaining such appointments is the recommendation of a fellow executive. With respect to help provided to lower-level executives, we considered mentoring as well as task-related help. Extant research (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2013) has shown the important role that mentoring can play in the career success of corporate leaders.

**Task-related help.** Our measure of task-related help is adapted from survey items developed and validated by McDonald and Westphal (2010) (see Appendix). Specific questions asked responding executives about the extent to which a focal top manager had provided advice and counsel to them over the prior 12-month period (e.g., “On how many occasions did [the focal executive] give you advice on a management issue [during the past 12 months]?”). Other questions asked responding executives about the frequency with which the focal top manager had helped them solve management problems, and the amount of time spent providing such help (e.g., “How many times did [the focal executive] help you develop a solution to a management issue that you were facing?”). Top executives and alters answered these questions for the most recent 12-month period (i.e., since the prior survey). Answers to a separate, open-ended question suggested that the scale items were comprehensive in covering the most common forms of task-related help provided among executives. Factor analysis indicated that the survey items loaded on a single factor, without loading on other factors in the model. Inter-item reliability was high ( $\alpha = .90$ ), lambdas were highly significant for all scale items, and there was evidence of interrater reliability between responding executives (intraclass correlation coefficients ranged from .85 to .93).

**Recommendations for board appointments.** Our measure of recommendations for board appointments was developed by Westphal and Stern (2006), and has been validated for multiple samples of executives and directors (McDonald & Westphal, 2013; Stern & Westphal, 2010). The survey scale asked respondents to indicate whether they had recommended someone for an outside director appointment during the prior 12 months, and, if so, whom they had recommended and for which board. A parallel scale asked respondents whether another executive had recommended them for an outside director appointment, and for which board. There was a high level of interrater agreement for these scale items (95%), indicating that executives were generally aware when another top manager had recommended them for a board appointment. We created a dichotomous variable coded “1” if the focal executive recommended alter for an appointment during the subsequent 12 months. As noted above, the results were robust to measuring recommendations over shorter and longer time windows.<sup>6</sup>

**Mentoring provided to lower-level executives.** Our measure of mentoring to lower-level executives is adapted from a scale developed by McDonald and Westphal (2011), which, in turn, was based on survey questions developed and validated in the leader-member exchange literature (Scandura & Schriesheim, 1994) (see Appendix). The McDonald and Westphal (2011) measure was validated for a large sample of top executives, and CFA for our sample indicated that the survey items loaded on a single factor as expected. Inter-item reliability was adequately high ( $\alpha = .86$ ), and the standardized validity coefficients (lambdas) were highly significant for all scale items. We examined interrater reliability by comparing responses of the focal top executives with their direct reports. Intraclass correlation coefficients for the items ranged from .87 to .93, providing strong evidence

<sup>6</sup> We ran separate models that estimated the strength with which the focal executive recommended alter for a board appointment using responses to a 6-point Likert-type scale (“How strongly did [focal executive] recommend [alter] for a board position?”; *not at all . . . somewhat strongly . . . very strongly*), and a count variable that indicated the number of times the focal executive recommended alter for a board position. We estimated the former measure with ordered logit regression, and the latter measure with negative binomial regression. The hypothesized results were very similar to those for the dichotomous measure reported below in each of these analyses.

for the interrater reliability of the scale (McGraw & Wong, 1996). In the primary analyses, we measured mentoring for the 12-month period subsequent to the time at which organizational identification was measured; as noted above, the results were robust to shorter or longer time windows (six months or two years).

**Control variables.** We controlled for variables that have been shown to predict organizational identification at the executive level (Lange et al., 2015), including the performance-contingent component of executive compensation, which is measured as the total value of long-term incentives granted to the focal executive in the prior year divided by total direct compensation (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004); the tenor of press coverage about the executive's firm, based on the content analysis procedure described by Lange et al. (2015); firm performance, measured as return on assets, market-to-book value of equity, and total stock returns (factor analysis indicated that these measures loaded on a single construct in the measurement model—we estimated factor scores using the regression method); and unrelated diversification, using the measure developed by Palepu (1985) (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel, 1993). We also included the following as control variables: a dichotomous variable indicating whether the new CEO is an outsider; the CEO's top management experience, measured as the number of years the CEO had served in a top executive position at one or more companies in the population; and the CEO's status in the corporate elite, measured as the number of appointments held at corporate and nonprofit boards, elite education, and memberships in prestigious social clubs (again, factor analysis indicated that these measures loaded on a single construct) (Belliveau, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1996; Palmer & Barber, 2001; Useem & Karabel, 1986). Moreover, we controlled for the CEO's tenure in office (measured in months) at the time organizational identification was measured, and we included two dummy variables that controlled for whether the prior CEO was a woman or a racial minority.<sup>7</sup> In separate models, we controlled for the level of the CEO's education and the focal manager's years of experience in top management, and the hypothesized results were unchanged.

<sup>7</sup> In separate models, we controlled for whether the firm had appointed a female or racial minority CEO in the prior 10 years, and the results were unchanged.

Since feelings of being “passed over for promotion” could play a role in white male top managers' responses to the appointment of a minority-status CEO, we also controlled for the degree to which top managers were likely contenders for the CEO position in all models using a factor score comprising four archival indicators: (1) tenure of the top manager, (2) whether the top manager was an officer of the firm, (3) whether the top manager had a board appointment at another firm, and (4) the level of top management experience (in years).<sup>8</sup> The CEO succession literature provides a strong justification for each of these indicators. In particular, this literature suggests that officers are much more likely to be selected as CEO than other top managers (Khurana, 2002; Sonnenfeld, 1988; Vancil, 1987), as are top managers who hold a board appointment at another firm (Useem, 1984; Useem & Karabel, 1986). A top manager's tenure and length of experience in top management are also significant predictors of the likelihood of selection as CEO (Khurana, 2002; Vancil, 1987). Factor analysis indicated that the four measures loaded on a single factor as expected, with acceptably high reliability ( $\alpha = .82$ ). We used the regression method to estimate factor scores, conducting the analysis on the tetrachoric correlation matrix (which is appropriate for measures that include dichotomous indicators). In separate analyses, we controlled for a survey measure that gauges top managers' beliefs about the extent to which they were a contender for the CEO position prior to the succession event, and the results are discussed below.

We also controlled for a reliable survey measure of subclinical anxiety using the anxiety portion of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Andrea, Bultmann, Beurskens, Swaen, Schayck, & Kant, 2004; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), a 7-item subscale that has been validated as a measure of subclinical anxiety for a large sample of corporate top managers (McDonald & Westphal, 2011) and for diverse samples of employees (Andrea et al., 2004). The scale also had acceptably high reliability for our sample of top managers ( $\alpha = .92$ ). Some research suggests that individuals may feel anxiety in respect of the perceived threat of the appointment of a minority-status superior (Netchaeva, Kouchaki, & Sheppard, 2015). To the extent that the threat to white male top managers from minority-status CEO appointments

<sup>8</sup> In separate models, we controlled for each of these variables separately, and the hypothesized results were unchanged.

involves threatened manhood, as might be suggested by the Netchaeva et al. (2015) study, threatened manhood theory suggests that anxiety is a key mediator of the behavioral consequences of perceived threat (Bosson & Vandello, 2011; Vandello & Bosson, 2013).<sup>9</sup> Given that a central aspect of a white male top manager's appraisal of the appointment of a minority-status CEO as threatening would be a reduced sense of job security, in the interest of thoroughness, we also controlled for a 3-item survey measure that gauged the degree to which a focal top manager was concerned about job security (e.g., "To what extent are you concerned about the possibility of losing your position?"). This measure also had adequately high inter-item reliability ( $\alpha = .90$ ).

Since top managers' responses to the appointment of a minority-status CEO could be influenced by the reactions of stock market investors, we controlled for the three-day cumulative, abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the new CEO appointment ( $t - 1$  to  $t + 1$ ) in all models (Graffin, Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013; Shen & Cannella, 2003). We also controlled for firm size (measured as the log of total sales) and firm age (logged) in all models (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Although we did not necessarily expect industry differences to impact the hypothesized relationships, as a precaution, we included industry dummies for the ( $n - 1$ ) two-digit SIC codes in the sample (coefficients are not reported, but are available from the authors). Moreover, we included year dummies in all models. All controls were measured in the year prior to the period for which the dependent variable was measured.

In models of mentoring, recommendations, and task-related help, we also controlled for the following: a multi-item survey measure of the level of social interaction between the focal executive and alter that was validated by McDonald and Westphal (2013)

( $\alpha = .86$ ,  $\kappa = .79$ ); similarity on other demographic characteristics aside from race and gender that could provide a salient basis for social categorization among executives, including age, educational specialization, and functional background (combined into a single index using principal components analysis; Bollen & Bauldry, 2011; Kolenikov & Angeles, 2009; Park & Westphal, 2013) (Finkelstein et al., 2009; O'Reilly & Main, 2010); the extent of alter's management experience, measured in years; the number of potential help recipients; and alter's status in the corporate elite, using the indicators of status described above. As previously indicated, we also included lagged values of the dependent variables.<sup>10</sup> In separate models, we controlled for similarity in status between the focal executive and alter and demographic similarity between the focal executive and the CEO on other dimensions (age, educational specialization, and functional background), and the hypothesized results were unchanged.

## Analysis

Our main analysis used ordinary least squares regression to estimate organizational identification following a CEO succession event.<sup>11</sup> There were 589 CEO succession events during the period of study (frequency information on the race and gender of CEOs and top managers is provided in the Appendix, Table A2). As noted above, the unit of analysis in models of organizational identification was the focal executive ( $n = 1,025$ ), while the unit of analysis in models of mentoring, board recommendations, and task-related help was the executive dyad ( $n = 2,101$  executive-subordinate dyads and 1,889

<sup>9</sup> For example, Netchaeva et al. (2015: 1249) examined the "anxiety and threat" experienced by men negotiating with female hiring managers. Kouchaki and Desai (2015) also showed that anxiety tended to promote self-interested or unethical behavior, and that this relationship was mediated by perceived threat. Moreover, in the wider literature on the psychology of emotions, anxiety is understood to be a main emotional correlate to situations that are consciously or subconsciously appraised as threatening (Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 1999; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Overall, this literature suggests that white male top managers will report higher levels of anxiety to the extent that they feel threatened by the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO; anxiety will go hand in hand with the appraisal of this situation as threatening.

<sup>10</sup> We tested for residual autocorrelation with the lagged dependent variable included in the models to determine whether instrumentation is required. We used the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2010), which Keele and Kelly (2006) showed is adequately sensitive to detect residual autocorrelation from lagged dependent variables for large samples. The test did not indicate the presence of residual autocorrelation in the models ( $p > .41$ ).

<sup>11</sup> In supplemental analyses, we tested the hypotheses using Heckman selection models in which CEO age was used as an instrumental variable to predict the likelihood of CEO succession for the full sample (Davidson, Nemec, & Worrell, 2006; Ocasio, 1999), and parameter estimates from the selection equation were included in second-stage regression models that estimated the dependent variables for the subsample of cases in which succession occurred. The hypothesized results were unchanged.

executive–peer dyads).<sup>12</sup> The primary models estimated organizational identification in the year following the CEO succession, controlling for identification in the year prior to the succession. Since the sample includes multiple observations from the same firm, we adjusted for non-independence of observations using a robust variance estimator for clustered data (Wooldridge, 2010). The primary models estimated mentoring, board recommendations, and task-related help over the 12-month period subsequent to the time at which organizational identification was measured. As discussed above, the hypothesized results were robust to shorter and longer time windows (e.g., six months or two years). We estimated board recommendations using logit regression. Because the dyad-wise sample includes multiple observations that involve the same executive, we again corrected for the non-independence of observations with a robust variance estimator for clustered data. We tested for mediation and moderated mediation using the first-order delta method or Sobel test (Sobel, 1986) and the bootstrapping procedure described by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007; see also Hayes, 2013). While Preacher et al. (2007: 213) indicated that the normality assumptions underlying the Sobel test are reasonable for large samples (e.g.,  $n > 1,000$ ), we nevertheless also used the bootstrapping method as a precaution. This involved drawing 10,000 bootstrap samples from the data set to estimate 95% confidence intervals for coefficients of the indirect effects (Hayes, 2013; Preacher et al., 2007).

## RESULTS

The results from regression models predicting organizational identification are provided in Table 1 (descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are provided in the Appendix, Tables A1a–A1c). These results support Hypothesis 1, which predicted that white male top managers would experience lower

levels of organizational identification following the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO (vs. the appointment of a white male CEO).<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the hypothesized effects are quite strong in magnitude: the organizational identification of white male managers declined by approximately 1.2 to 1.4 points more on a 5-point scale following the appointment of a female CEO, as compared to the appointment of a white male CEO (depending on the scale item).<sup>14</sup> There were similar reductions in organizational identification following the appointment of a racial minority CEO.

The results of the regression analysis of helping behavior are provided in Table 2a, with results of the mediation analysis included in Table 2b. The results support Hypothesis 2, which predicted that the appointment of a female or a racial minority CEO would have a negative effect on the amount of work-related help that white male top managers provided to their executive level-colleagues, and that this effect would be mediated by diminished organizational identification. The results in Table 2a show that both the appointments of female CEOs and racial minority CEOs reduced the amount of help that white males provided to their executive-level colleagues across the four forms of support that we examined: (1) mentoring to subordinates, (2) task-related help to subordinates, (3) task-related help to peers, and (4) recommendations for board seats for peers. As shown in Table 2b, Sobel tests indicated that this reduction in helping behavior was mediated by reduced organizational identification; reduced organizational identification mediated the effects both for the appointment of a female CEO and for the appointment of a racial minority CEO. These mediation effects were again significant for all four forms of help that we examined ( $z$ -statistics ranged from 2.33 to 3.30 for female CEOs and 2.21 to 3.14 for racial minority CEOs). Moreover, as shown in Table 2b, bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effects

<sup>12</sup> These samples are complete dyads in which both executives participated in the surveys throughout the time period (i.e., the year prior to CEO succession and two years after the succession; the samples exclude executives who stopped participating during this time period). As noted above, we measured organizational identification using survey responses of the focal executive, and mentoring, recommendations, and task-related help were measured with responses of the potential help recipient (alter). In separate analyses, we tested the hypotheses for the full sample of dyads (i.e., including incomplete dyads) using only responses of the focal executive, and the hypothesized results were unchanged.

<sup>13</sup> The results in Table 1 also show that the appointment of a white male CEO is negatively related to the organizational identification of racial minority and female top managers, as might be expected (the effects on identification are significant at  $\alpha = .05$  and  $.10$  for female and racial minority managers, respectively). However, Wald tests indicated that these effects are significantly weaker than the effects of the appointment of a minority-status CEO on the identification of white male top managers.

<sup>14</sup> Given the difficulty of interpreting effect sizes for factor scores, the magnitudes reported here are based on separate analysis, paralleling our main analysis, conducted for each unstandardized survey item in our organizational identification measure.

**TABLE 1**  
**Regression Analysis of Organizational Identification**

|    |  | Model 1           |
|----|--|-------------------|
| H1 | White male top manager and female CEO                    | -0.393*** (0.107) |
| H1 | White male top manager and racial minority CEO           | -0.370** (0.128)  |
|    | White female top manager and white male CEO              | -0.202* (0.100)   |
|    | Racial minority male top manager and white male CEO      | -0.227 (0.129)    |
|    | Racial minority female top manager and white male CEO    | -0.244 (0.418)    |
|    | White female top manager and racial minority CEO         | -0.169 (0.297)    |
|    | Racial minority male top manager and female CEO          | -0.187 (0.355)    |
|    | White female top manager and female CEO                  | -0.081 (0.252)    |
|    | Racial minority male top manager and racial minority CEO | -0.035 (0.298)    |
|    | Top manager contender for CEO position                   | -0.063* (0.031)   |
|    | Top manager anxiety                                      | -0.014 (0.031)    |
|    | Top manager concern about job security                   | -0.058 (0.030)    |
|    | Performance contingency of top manager's compensation    | 0.405** (0.142)   |
|    | CEO's top management experience                          | 0.007 (0.004)     |
|    | CEO's status in the corporate elite                      | 0.078* (0.034)    |
|    | Outsider CEO   | -0.116* (0.048)   |
|    | Racial minority prior CEO                                | -0.104 (0.153)    |
|    | Female prior CEO   | -0.068 (0.124)    |
|    | Firm performance   | 0.092** (0.032)   |
|    | Firm revenue (logged)                                    | -0.040* (0.019)   |
|    | Firm age (logged)  | 0.019 (0.025)     |
|    | Unrelated diversification                                | -0.193* (0.079)   |
|    | Tenor of firm's press coverage                           | 0.298*** (0.086)  |
|    | Time since CEO's appointment                             | 0.009 (0.008)     |
|    | Cumulative abnormal return surrounding CEO announcement  | 0.223 (0.464)     |
|    | Prior organizational identification                      | 0.236*** (0.032)  |
|    | Constant   | 0.528* (0.225)    |
|    | <i>F</i>   | 17.85***          |
|    | <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>                                    | 0.72              |

Notes: *N* = 1,025. Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* *p* ≤ .05

\*\* *p* ≤ .01

\*\*\* *p* ≤ .001 (two-tailed)

corroborated the Sobel tests. In particular, all of the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for coefficients of the indirect effects excluded zero, indicating that all of the indirect effects are significant at the .05 level.

Hypothesis 3 posited a moderated mediation effect, in which the indirect negative effects that the appointment of a minority-status CEO has on help giving by white male top managers through reduced organizational identification will be stronger for both those managers' racial minority colleagues and their female colleagues.<sup>15</sup> The results in Table 2b provide consistent support for this hypothesis. In particular, the 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects of female CEO appointments on the helping behavior of white male top managers toward both their female colleagues and their racial minority colleagues are larger than (and do not overlap with) confidence intervals for the indirect effects on helping behavior of white male top managers toward other white males. These differences held for all four kinds of helping behavior. The results also support the indirect effects of racial minority CEO appointments, which were proposed in Hypothesis 3, again for all four types of helping behavior that we studied. The lack of overlap in 95% confidence intervals is a relatively conservative test of statistically significant differences in coefficient estimates (Tryon, 2001). Accordingly, the results provide consistent evidence that the indirect negative effects of minority-status CEO appointments on helping behavior are stronger for helping behavior by white males toward women and racial minorities, in comparison to helping behavior by white males toward other white males.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The specific form of moderated mediation suggested by our theory is represented by Model 3 in Preacher et al. (2007: 194). Specifically, in the mediated relation  $X \rightarrow M \rightarrow Y$ , moderation occurs in the  $M \rightarrow Y$  path. Our empirical analysis is appropriate for testing this form of moderated mediation.

<sup>16</sup> Some studies in the literature on intersectionality would suggest that white males may exhibit especially strong out-group biases toward "dual minority" colleagues (i.e., female managers who are also racial minorities) (for a review, see Williams, 2014), such that the negative indirect effects of minority CEO appointments on helping behavior may be especially strong for the helping behavior of white male managers toward racial minority women. However, while we control for whether focal top managers or potential help recipients are dual minorities, as discussed above, racial minority women were too rare in top management of firms in our population during the time period of our study to make statistically meaningful comparisons between helping behavior toward racial minority women and helping toward white women or racial minority men. Nevertheless, as discussed further below, future research could examine such differences as racial minority women become more numerous in the ranks of top management.

**TABLE 2a**  
**Regression Analysis of Top Manager Helping Behavior**

|  | Subordinates |                   | Peers             |                                 |
|--|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
|  | Mentoring    | Task-related help | Task-related help | Recommendations for Board Seats |
| <b>H2 White male top manager and female CEO</b>  | -2.49**      | -2.57**           | -2.71**           | -2.47**                         |
| <b>H2 White male top manager and racial minority CEO</b>                                 | -2.41**      | -2.50**           | -2.59**           | -2.44**                         |
| Number of subordinates/peers   | -2.13*       | -2.02*            | -1.83             | -2.48*                          |
| Subordinate's/peer's management experience   | -1.19        | 1.34              | 1.70              | 1.95                            |
| Subordinate's/peer's status in the corporate elite                                       | 2.07*        | 2.15*             | 2.35*             | 2.38*                           |
| Social interaction between top manager and subordinate/peer                              | 2.38*        | 2.26*             | 2.50*             | 2.18*                           |
| Similarity between top manager and subordinate/peer on other demographic characteristics | 2.24*        | 2.39*             | 2.42*             | 2.49*                           |
| Top manager contender for CEO position   | -1.88        | -1.73             | -2.17*            | -2.06*                          |
| Top manager anxiety  | -2.37*       | -2.09*            | -2.08*            | -2.28*                          |
| Top manager concern about job security   | 2.08*        | 2.34*             | 2.50*             | 1.86                            |
| Performance contingency of top manager's compensation                                    | 2.31*        | 2.52*             | 2.86**            | 1.85                            |
| CEO's top management experience  | 0.54         | 0.40              | 0.28              | 0.13                            |
| CEO's status in the corporate elite  | 0.39         | 0.21              | 0.80              | -0.10                           |
| Outsider CEO   | -0.49        | -0.33             | 0.07              | 0.27                            |
| Racial minority prior CEO  | -0.90        | -1.09             | -0.99             | -0.57                           |
| Female prior CEO   | -1.27        | -1.37             | -1.36             | -0.62                           |
| Firm performance   | 1.98         | -1.88             | -1.65             | 2.12**                          |
| Firm revenue (logged)  | -1.29        | -1.45             | -1.67             | 1.89                            |
| Firm age (logged)  | 1.39         | 0.28              | -0.32             | 1.64                            |
| Unrelated diversification  | -1.09        | -0.40             | -2.57**           | -2.28*                          |
| Tenor of firm's press coverage   | 1.58         | 1.33              | 0.70              | 0.57                            |
| Cumulative abnormal return surrounding CEO announcement                                  | 1.08         | -1.20             | -1.49             | 1.59                            |
| Time since CEO's appointment   | -0.44        | 0.89              | 0.32              | -1.61                           |
| Prior level of mentoring/recommendations/task-related help                               | 6.39***      | 5.19***           | 7.57***           | 2.93**                          |
| <b>Top manager-CEO dyadic demographic controls</b>                                       |              |                   |                   |                                 |
| White female top manager and white male CEO  | -0.36        | -0.07             | -0.24             | -0.15                           |
| Racial minority male top manager and white male CEO                                      | -0.65        | -0.22             | -0.59             | -0.29                           |
| Racial minority female top manager and white male CEO                                    | -0.020       | -0.26             | -0.09             | -0.07                           |
| White female top manager and racial minority CEO   | -0.07        | 0.25              | -0.18             | 0.11                            |
| Racial minority male top manager and female CEO  | -0.33        | -0.37             | -0.91             | -0.43                           |
| White female top manager and female CEO  | 1.24         | 1.17              | 1.03              | 0.84                            |
| Racial minority male top manager and racial minority CEO                                 | 1.03         | 1.13              | 0.90              | 0.77                            |
| <b>Top manager-subordinate/peer dyadic demographic controls</b>                          |              |                   |                   |                                 |
| White male top manager and white female subordinate/peer                                 | -2.25*       | -2.14*            | -2.07*            | -2.47*                          |
| White male top manager and racial minority male subordinate/peer                         | -2.35*       | -2.08*            | -2.05*            | -2.51*                          |
| White male top manager and racial minority female subordinate/peer                       | -2.41*       | -2.29*            | -2.19*            | -2.65**                         |
| White female top manager and white male subordinate/peer                                 | -1.92        | -2.05*            | -1.95             | -2.07*                          |
| Racial minority male top manager and white male subordinate/peer                         | -2.01*       | -2.08*            | -2.02             | -2.30*                          |
| Racial minority female top manager and white male subordinate/peer                       | -2.11*       | -1.96             | -1.91             | -2.20*                          |

**TABLE 2a**  
**(Continued)**

|  | Subordinates |                   | Peers             |                                 |
|--|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
|  | Mentoring    | Task-related help | Task-related help | Recommendations for Board Seats |
| Racial minority female top manager and white female subordinate/peer       | -1.17        | -1.11             | -1.01             | -1.33                           |
| White female top manager and racial minority male subordinate/peer         | -1.28        | -1.36             | -1.44             | -1.26                           |
| Racial minority male top manager and white female subordinate/peer         | -0.95        | -0.82             | -1.09             | -1.50                           |
| White female top manager and white female subordinate/peer                 | 0.52         | 0.26              | 0.36              | -0.24                           |
| Racial minority male top manager and racial minority male subordinate/peer | 0.30         | 0.11              | 0.53              | -0.20                           |
| White female top manager and racial minority female subordinate/peer       | -0.57        | -0.84             | -0.66             | -0.27                           |
| Constant   | 1.43         | 1.39              | 1.37              | 1.44                            |
| <i>F</i>   | 8.51***      | 7.72***           | 9.43***           |                                 |
| <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>  | .52          | .49               | .56               |                                 |
| $\chi^2$   |              |                   |                   | 91.67***                        |

Notes: *t*-statistics are reported. *N* = 2,101 for sample of focal manager-subordinate dyads; *N* = 1,889 for sample of focal manager-peer dyads.

\* *p* ≤ .05

\*\* *p* ≤ .01

\*\*\* *p* ≤ .001 (two-tailed)

Moreover, as noted above, all of the results are robust to measuring the dependent variables over different time windows, including two years. Thus, the hypothesized effects do not dissipate after the minority-status CEO has been in their position for some time. It is worth noting that, in line with prior research (e.g., Ibarra, 1995; Ruef et al., 2003; Thomas, 1993), the results in Table 2a show a negative main effect for the provision of the various forms of help by white male managers to their minority-status colleagues, indicating that white males manifest extant tendencies to provide less help to minority-status colleagues (vs. white male colleagues). Thus, our results indicate that reduced organizational identification tends to exacerbate existing tendencies for white male top managers to provide less help to their racial minority and female colleagues.

### Additional Analyses

Our theoretical argument for Hypothesis 1 highlighted two mechanisms by which the appointment of a minority-status CEO may influence organizational identification among white male top managers. We suggested that, in the wake of the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO, white male top managers will tend to (1) hold less

positive opinions of important aspects of their organization (e.g., firm leadership, strategy, and prospects for future firm performance), and (2) feel less than adequately respected and valued by the new minority-status CEO. According to our theory, both mechanisms will contribute to lower levels of organizational identification. To test the role of these mechanisms more directly, we undertook supplemental mediation analysis using multi-item survey scales that gauged respondents' assessment of the firm's leadership, strategy, and performance prospects, and the extent to which they felt respected and valued by the CEO (see the Appendix for survey items).<sup>17</sup> This analysis showed that both measures significantly mediated the hypothesized effects of demographic differences (white male top manager and female or racial minority CEO) on top managers' organizational identification; all four mediation effects were significant at  $\alpha = .05$  using a two-tailed test.

As previously noted, in all of our primary models, we controlled for an archival measure of the degree to which an incumbent top manager was a likely

<sup>17</sup> Factor analysis indicated that the items loaded on two different factors as expected, and inter-item reliability was acceptably high ( $\alpha = .89$  and  $.93$  for the two scales).



**TABLE 2b**  
**Mediation Effects**

|    |  | Indirect Effect | Sobel test (z) | Bootstrapped Coefficients: 95% Confidence Interval |        |
|----|--|-----------------|----------------|--|--------|
|    |  |                 |                | Lower  | Upper  |
| H2 | <b>White male top manager and female CEO</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Organizational identification</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Mentoring to subordinates</b>                   |                 | -2.73**        | -0.101   | -0.353 |
| H3 | <i>Conditional on...</i>   |                 |                |  |        |
|    | White male top manager and white male subordinate  |                 | -2.28*         | -0.087   | -0.369 |
|    | White male top manager and white female subordinate  |                 | -4.72***       | -0.446   | -0.685 |
|    | White male top manager and racial minority male subordinate  |                 | -4.49***       | -0.412   | -0.677 |
| H2 | <b>White male top manager and female CEO</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Organizational identification</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Task-related help for subordinates</b>          |                 | -2.92**        | -0.121   | -0.368 |
| H3 | <i>Conditional on...</i>   |                 |                |  |        |
|    | White male top manager and white male subordinate  |                 | -2.36*         | -0.115   | -0.379 |
|    | White male top manager and white female subordinate  |                 | -5.10***       | -0.498   | -0.739 |
|    | White male top manager and racial minority male subordinate  |                 | -4.85***       | -0.472   | -0.720 |
| H2 | <b>White male top manager and female CEO</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Organizational identification</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Task-related help for peers</b>                 |                 | -3.30***       | -0.173   | -0.389 |
| H3 | <i>Conditional on...</i>   |                 |                |  |        |
|    | White male top manager and white male peer   |                 | -2.45*         | -0.140   | -0.387 |
|    | White male top manager and white female peer   |                 | -5.55***       | -0.556   | -0.765 |
|    | White male top manager and racial minority male peer   |                 | -5.06***       | -0.509   | -0.740 |
| H2 | <b>White male top manager and female CEO</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Organizational identification</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Recommendations for board seats—peers</b>       |                 | -2.33*         | -0.077   | -0.312 |
| H3 | <i>Conditional on...</i>   |                 |                |  |        |
|    | White male top manager and white male peer   |                 | -2.06*         | -0.045   | -0.301 |
|    | White male top manager and white female peer   |                 | -4.16***       | -0.427   | -0.657 |
|    | White male top manager and racial minority male peer   |                 | -4.03***       | -0.390   | -0.628 |
| H2 | <b>White male top manager and racial minority CEO</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Organizational identification</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Mentoring to subordinates</b>          |                 | -2.47*         | -0.086   | -0.333 |
| H3 | <i>Conditional on...</i>   |                 |                |  |        |
|    | White male top manager and white male subordinate  |                 | -2.04*         | -0.072   | -0.340 |
|    | White male top manager and white female subordinate  |                 | -4.52***       | -0.425   | -0.672 |
|    | White male top manager and racial minority male subordinate  |                 | -4.66***       | -0.451   | -0.692 |
| H2 | <b>White male top manager and racial minority CEO</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Organizational identification</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Task-related help for subordinates</b> |                 | -2.82**        | -0.129   | -0.364 |
| H3 | <i>Conditional on...</i>   |                 |                |  |        |
|    | White male top manager and white male subordinate  |                 | -2.18*         | -0.097   | -0.363 |
|    | White male top manager and white female subordinate  |                 | -4.97***       | -0.497   | -0.727 |
|    | White male top manager and racial minority male subordinate  |                 | -5.04***       | -0.516   | -0.751 |
| H2 | <b>White male top manager and racial minority CEO</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Organizational identification</b> $\bar{\rightarrow}$ <b>Task-related help for peers</b>        |                 | -3.14**        | -0.170   | -0.395 |
| H3 | <i>Conditional on...</i>   |                 |                |  |        |
|    | White male top manager and white male peer   |                 | -2.37*         | -0.135   | -0.393 |
|    | White male top manager and white female peer   |                 | -5.70***       | -0.578   | -0.805 |
|    | White male top manager and racial minority male peer   |                 | -5.72***       | -0.611   | -0.829 |

TABLE 2b  
(Continued)

|    | Indirect Effect  | Sobel test (z) | Bootstrapped Coefficients: 95% Confidence Interval |        |
|----|--|----------------|--|--------|
|    |  |                | Lower  | Upper  |
| H2 | White male top manager and racial minority CEO $\bar{\rightarrow}$ Organizational identification $\bar{\rightarrow}$ Recommendations for board seats—peers | -2.21*         | -0.083   | -0.304 |
| H3 | Conditional on...  |                |  |        |
|    | White male top manager and white male peer   | -2.01*         | -0.047   | -0.301 |
|    | White male top manager and white female peer   | -4.61***       | -0.470   | -0.703 |
|    | White male top manager and racial minority male peer   | -4.69***       | -0.497   | -0.718 |

Note:  $N = 2,101$  for sample of focal manager–subordinate dyads;  $N = 1,889$  for sample of focal manager–peer dyads.

\*  $p \leq .05$

\*\*  $p \leq .01$

\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$  (two-tailed)

contender for the CEO position, based on the idea that feelings of being passed over for promotion to the CEO position might play a role in white male top managers' responses to the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO. Our results are also robust to controlling for a survey measure, completed by approximately half of the managers in our sample, which measured their beliefs about the extent to which they were a contender for the CEO position prior to the succession event. The survey included the following questions: "To what extent do you have a reasonable chance of being selected as the next [CEO of the focal firm]?" (5-point scale: *not at all . . . somewhat . . . very much so*); "I have a fair chance of being selected as the next [CEO of the focal firm]" (5-point *agree/disagree* scale); "To what extent are you a candidate to be the next [CEO of the focal firm]?" (5-point scale: *not at all . . . somewhat . . . very much so*); "I deserve to be considered as the next [CEO of the focal firm]" (5-point *agree/disagree* scale).<sup>18</sup> We used responses in the year prior to succession. Factor analysis indicated that these survey items (a) loaded together on a single factor, and (b) loaded together on

the same factor with the four archival indicators of the degree to which top managers were likely contenders for the CEO position. The reliability of both measures was acceptably high ( $\alpha = .92$  and  $.85$ , respectively). All of our hypotheses continue to be supported when using either of these measures as a control for the sample of 535 top managers ( $n = 535$  top managers for Hypothesis 1;  $n = 1,109$  manager–subordinate dyads and 994 manager–peer dyads for Hypotheses 2 and 3). In support of Hypothesis 1, the hypothesized effects for the white male top manager and female/racial minority CEO dummy variables on organizational identification were both significant at  $p < .01$ . In support of Hypothesis 2,  $z$ -statistics for the indirect effects of white male top manager and female/racial minority CEO on the four forms of helping behavior through organizational identification ranged from 2.13 to 3.17, and all the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for coefficients of the indirect effects excluded zero. And, in support of Hypothesis 3, all of the 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects of female or racial minority CEO appointments on the helping behavior of white male top managers toward female or racial minority colleagues are larger than (and do not overlap with) confidence intervals for the indirect effects on helping behavior of white male top managers toward other white males. These differences held for all four kinds of helping behavior.

We also examined whether the hypotheses were supported for subsamples of top managers who were unlikely to consider themselves as candidates for the CEO position (i.e., managers for whom any reduction

<sup>18</sup> These questions were included in the surveys for approximately half the sample frame, and responses are available for 535 top managers. These managers were representative of managers in the larger sample frame with respect to race and gender (i.e., the proportion of managers who were racial minorities and women was not significantly different for this subsample), and managers in this subsample were similarly representative of the larger sample frame on each of the other manager characteristics included as archival control variables in the analyses.

in organizational identification is unlikely to be explained from being “passed over”). In particular, we conducted separate tests of the hypotheses for the following subsamples: (a) top managers who were below the median on the survey measure of potential to be selected as CEO; (b) top managers who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “I have a fair chance of being selected as the next [CEO of the focal firm]”; and (c) top managers who were below the median on the archival measure of potential to be selected as CEO. The hypotheses remained strongly supported for each of these subsamples.

We also examined whether white male top managers may have reduced the amount of help that they provided to minority-status colleagues in part because they perceived that those minority-status managers no longer needed their assistance (i.e., under the assumption that they will receive more help from the newly appointed minority-status CEO). The representative sample of 535 top managers described above completed the following 5-point scale items: “To what extent would [the subordinate] benefit from your mentoring?”; “[The subordinate] would benefit from my career-related advice?” [*agree/disagree* scale]; “To what extent would [the subordinate/peer executive] benefit from your help in dealing with management issues?”; “[The subordinate/peer executive] would benefit from my advice on how to deal with management issues?” [*agree/disagree* scale]; “To what extent would [peer executive] benefit from receiving your recommendation for a board appointment?”<sup>19</sup> White male top managers’ responses to these questions were *not* significantly affected by the appointment of a female or racial minority CEO. Specifically, the appointment of a female CEO was not significantly associated with a change in white male top managers’ perception that their female subordinates/peers would benefit from help (correlation coefficient [*r*] of only .011), and the

appointment of a racial minority CEO was not significantly associated with a change in white male top managers’ perception that their racial minority subordinates/peers would benefit from help ( $r = .013$ ). Accordingly, our survey data suggest that white male top executives do not typically perceive that their minority-status colleagues are less in need of their assistance following a minority-status CEO appointment.

## DISCUSSION

Taken together, the empirical results provided consistent support for our theoretical perspective regarding white male top managers’ unfortunate intrapsychic and behavioral responses to the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO to head their firm. The findings supported our contention that white male top managers experience lower levels of organizational identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO. Our expectation that the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO would have a negative effect on the amount of work-related help that white male top managers provided to their executive-level colleagues was also supported across the four forms of work-related help that we examined: task-related help for peers, board recommendations for peers, task-related help for subordinates, and mentoring for subordinates. The results also provided consistent evidence that the hypothesized relationships between the appointment of a minority-status CEO and helping behavior were mediated by reduced levels of organizational identification. Further results supported our expectation that this mediated relationship would be moderated by the demographic characteristics of the white male top manager’s colleagues. In particular, there was consistent evidence that the indirect negative effects of the appointments of minority-status CEOs on help giving through reduced organizational identification are stronger for the help provided by white male top managers both to their racial minority colleagues and to their female colleagues (i.e., in comparison to the effects on help provided to fellow white males).

This paper contributes to the multidisciplinary literature on racial minorities and women in corporate leadership, an area of research that has recently attracted increased scholarly attention. While there has been some limited prior study of stakeholder responses to the appointment of a minority-status CEO, the focus here has been on the responses of *external* stakeholders (e.g., shareholders). Our study

<sup>19</sup> Analysis of responses to these questions indicated a positive and statistically significant difference between white male top managers’ perception that their female subordinates/peers would benefit from help and their perception that fellow white male subordinates/peers would benefit from their help ( $p < .05$  for each of the survey questions). Similarly, there was also a positive and statistically significant difference between white male top managers’ perception that their *racial minority* subordinates/peers would benefit from help and their perception that white male subordinates/peers would benefit from their help (again,  $p < .05$  for each of the survey items).

is among the first to systematically consider how important *internal* stakeholders respond to the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO. We examined the reactions of an especially important set of insiders, other TMT members, and, in particular, the reactions of *white male* top managers. TMT members have well-recognized influence over firm strategic action and firm performance (Carpenter et al., 2004; Finkelstein et al., 2009), and white male top managers typically represent the overwhelming majority of a minority-status CEO's direct reports.

Our study advances understanding of the intrapsychic responses of top managers to the appointment of a racial minority or woman to the CEO position by theorizing how and why white male top managers become less identified with their firm following such an appointment. Supplementary analyses further showed that, consistent with our theoretical arguments, white male managers experience lower organizational identification in the wake of the appointment of a minority-status CEO because, following such an appointment, (a) they hold less positive views of important aspects of their firms and its future prospects, and (b) they feel that their contributions to the firm are less valued by the CEO.

In considering how the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO ultimately influences white male top managers' willingness to provide various forms of work-related help to the other executives at their firm, our theory and findings also advance understanding of how top managers respond *behaviorally* to the appointment of a minority-status CEO. Moreover, the results specifically indicated that a diminished sense of organizational identification among white male top managers mediates the effects of the appointment of a minority-status CEO on the provision of work-related help to fellow executives. These intrapsychic and behavioral reactions are important, since the kinds of assistance that we studied (e.g., task-related help, mentoring, and recommendations for prestigious appointments) have been linked to performance and career advancement in organizations (Allen et al., 2004; McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008; McDonald & Westphal, 2013; Stern & Westphal, 2010), and are likely to contribute to the executive leadership capabilities of the firm as a whole.

This paper also contributes to the literature on minority-status executives by examining how biased perceptions of minority-status CEOs might ultimately lead to less favorable treatment of

executives *other than the CEO*. While the nascent literature that has examined how external stakeholders respond to minority-status CEOs has considered how negative biases in external stakeholders' views of a minority-status CEO can lead them to treat that CEO less favorably (e.g., by providing less generous compensation), less consideration has been given to how biases may lead to adverse treatment of *other* individuals following the appointment of a minority-status CEO.

Another core contribution of this study is that it is among the first to systematically consider how the appointment of a minority-status CEO might impact other racial minority and female executives at the focal firm. Our intergroup relations perspective indicates that lower levels of identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO have especially negative effects on the amount of help that white male top managers provide to their racial minority and female colleagues. While it might be presumed that female and racial minority managers will ordinarily benefit from the appointment of women and minorities to prominent leadership positions, our study identifies one mechanism by which such appointments may, counterintuitively, harm the career prospects of female and racial minority managers.

On one level, our theory and results contribute to the nascent literature on social discrimination within corporate leadership (e.g., Park & Westphal, 2013), where "social discrimination" constitutes less favorable treatment based on an individual's membership in a particular social category (e.g., African American or female) rather than their individual abilities, performance, or actions (Allport, 1954; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Tajfel et al., 1971). In demonstrating how the appointment of females and racial minorities to the CEO position can reduce the access of minority-status top managers to important forms of help, our findings reveal one way in which such appointments, ironically, exacerbate social discrimination toward female and racial minority managers.

From a more sociological perspective, our findings reveal a mechanism by which organizational decisions that might appear to indicate and promote meritocracy in an organization can elicit intrapsychic and behavioral reactions from majority-status group members (i.e., white males) that, ironically, compromise meritocracy in management (Castilla & Benard, 2010). Classic sociological perspectives on status suggest that, when an individual

member of a group or salient social category acquires a prominent, high-status position, the benefits may generalize or “trickle down” to other category members who occupy lower-status positions in the hierarchy (Cole & Cole, 1973; Graffin et al., 2008). Cole and Cole (1973: 201; Cole, 1979) described this phenomenon as a kind of “generalized Matthew Effect.” This might suggest that other minority-status executives would tend to benefit from the appointment of a minority-status CEO. In this study, we present theory and evidence suggesting one way in which a kind of *reverse* generalized Matthew effect can occur, whereby the appointment of an individual to a prominent, high-status position can actually disadvantage other category members who occupy lower-status positions in the hierarchy. The findings are consistent with our theoretical argument that these social side effects or negative externalities on other category members ultimately result from intergroup biases in social perception among white male managers.<sup>20</sup>

This paper also makes contributions to other streams of research on executive leaders beyond the literature on racial minorities and women in corporate leadership. Our theory advances the emerging body of research on factors that shape corporate leaders’ willingness to provide various forms of help to other corporate leaders (e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2010), which, as previously noted, can be important both to the success of individual executives as well as the firms that they lead. Our theory and findings suggest how major decisions like the appointment of a new CEO can have unanticipated effects on executive leaders’ willingness to provide discretionary help to other executives at their firm. An important mediating mechanism here is organizational identification, which can be impacted by top managers’ evaluations of important aspects of their firm and its future prospects, and their sense that

they are valued and respected organizational members. It is worth noting that, in the nascent literature on help giving among corporate leaders, the provision of help among executives within the same firm, which was the focus of our study, has received limited systematic attention.

This paper also contributes to the considerable literature on CEO succession. This literature has given only limited systematic consideration to the consequences of succession events involving newly appointed racial minority and female CEOs. Moreover, prior research has focused primarily on the consequences of CEO succession for firm policy, strategy, and performance. There has been surprisingly little theory or systematic research on how change in CEO characteristics or CEO succession more generally affect executive-level behaviors (Finkelstein et al., 2009). One important exception is Shen and Cannella’s (2002) study of TMT dynamics following a CEO succession event. These authors argued that incumbent top executives might feel threatened by outside CEO successors, which can increase the risk of executive turnover. Although our study examines different kinds of psychological and behavioral reactions of top managers to CEO successors, Shen and Cannella’s (2002) findings parallel the results of our study in interesting ways. While Shen and Cannella (2002) examined negative reactions of top managers to outside successors, our study examines adverse reactions to a different kind of “outsider” (i.e., female or racial minority CEOs). In addition, whereas Shen and Cannella (2002) examined how CEO appointments lead executives to leave the firm, our study examines the how minority-status CEO appointments can lead to a more subtle kind of withdrawal behavior by white male top managers—namely, a reduced willingness to provide work-related help to peers and subordinates.

This paper also contributes to the small body of research on organizational identification among corporate executives (e.g., Boivie et al., 2011; Lange et al., 2015). In particular, it advances our understanding of the antecedents of executives’ organizational identification. Our study is among the first to draw from the intergroup relations paradigm in social psychology to explain variation in organizational identification among top managers. Our theory and findings suggest how salient characteristics of firm leaders that provide a basis for in-group/out-group categorization can affect organizational identification. We extend Lange et al.’s (2015) recent work on the determinants of CEOs’ organizational

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<sup>20</sup> In separate analyses, we examined how the appointment of a minority-status CEO influences the overall or “net” amount of work-related help that is available to minority-status executives from other executives at their firm. These analyses, which included help provided by a recently appointed CEO, indicated that the net effect of appointing a racial minority or female CEO on help received by minority-status executives at the focal firm is negative. Stated somewhat differently, minority-status executives tend to receive less, rather than more, total work-related help in the wake of the appointment of a minority-status CEO.

identification, by revealing how characteristics of the CEO can influence the identification of other organization members. Moreover, our findings suggest that such characteristics are a relatively strong determinant of organizational identification. Demographic differences between a top manager and newly appointed CEO, wherein the focal manager is a white male and the new CEO is a racial minority or a woman, were among the strongest predictors of organizational identification in our model, which included controls for other factors theorized or shown to influence the organizational identification of firm managers in prior research.

This study suggests a number of possible directions for future research. We focused on how reduced organizational identification following the appointment of a minority-status CEO leads white male top managers to provide less work-related help to their colleagues. Future research might consider other proximate and more distal outcomes of reduced organizational identification following the appointment of minority-status CEOs. These may include a reduced willingness to engage in other important prosocial or citizenship behaviors, such as taking on extra roles or assignments that go beyond one's normal duties. Another possible behavioral outcome of reduced organizational identification is top manager turnover: it would be interesting to examine whether white male top managers who feel less identified with the organization due to the appointment of a minority-status CEO may be more likely to leave the organization. In the Appendix, we report the results of supplemental analyses that begin to explore this possibility. As shown in Table A3, the results indicated statistically significant indirect effects of appointing female or racial minority CEOs on the rate of turnover of white male top managers (measured over the subsequent two-year period) through lower levels of organizational identification. Accordingly, this analysis provides preliminary evidence that white male top managers are more likely to leave the firm following the appointment of a racial minority or female CEO (vs. the appointment of a white male CEO) due to reductions in organizational identification following such an appointment. Studies might also examine whether reduced willingness to provide help to fellow executives ultimately tends to compromise the quality of strategic decision-making or the quality of strategy execution. Future research should also examine whether female or racial minority CEOs, ironically, tend to be blamed for these outcomes, even though

our theory suggests that they are ultimately a by-product of the out-group biases manifested by white male top managers.

Extant research indicates that people can manifest especially negative biases toward those who are different from them on two or more (vs. just one) salient demographic characteristics (see Williams, 2014, for a review), which would suggest the possibility that white male top managers may react especially negatively to the appointment of a recently appointed CEO who is both a racial minority and female. As noted earlier in the paper, there were no CEOs in our sample who were both a racial minority and female, precluding us from exploring this possibility empirically. However, to the extent that racial minority female CEOs become more numerous over time, future research should examine this issue. It might be further proposed that reduced organizational identification from minority-status CEO appointments could have especially negative effects on the amount of help that white male top managers provide to fellow executives who are both a racial minority and female. Again, while such "dual" minority top managers were too rare in the population during the time period of our study to make statistically meaningful comparisons, future research could examine such differences as racial minority women become more numerous in the ranks of top management.

It might also be suggested that the negative effects of the appointment of a minority-status CEO on white male top manager organizational identification could be weaker if the minority-status CEO is an insider versus an outsider or if pre-succession levels of organizational identification are especially high. To explore this possibility, we conducted supplemental analyses of organizational identification that included interactions between the hypothesized demographic differences (white male top manager and female/racial minority CEO) and (a) insider versus outsider status of the CEO, and (b) the focal top manager's prior level of organizational identification. While our hypothesized effects remained statistically significant, the interaction terms were not significant. Further analysis indicated that the hypothesized, negative effects of white male top manager and female/racial minority CEO on organizational identification also remained statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ) for insider CEOs, and at relatively high levels of prior organizational identification (e.g., one standard deviation above the mean). Overall, these analyses suggest that the hypothesized effects of appointing a female or racial

minority CEO are not significantly influenced by whether the CEO is an insider or an outsider, or by high pre-succession levels of organizational identification.

Given the observed negative effects of female and racial minority CEO appointments on white male managers' organizational identification, it seems especially important to consider compensatory measures that could bolster organizational identification. Results for our control variables indicate a strong positive effect for the performance contingency of top manager's compensation on organizational identification (Lange et al., 2015 found a similarly strong positive effect of performance-contingent compensation on CEO organizational identification). Thus, increasing the performance contingency of top managers' compensation appears to provide one means of offsetting the effects of female and racial minority CEO appointments on white male managers' organizational identification, and the indirect effects on helping behavior.<sup>21</sup> Future research could consider other factors that might serve to mitigate the unfortunate effects of the appointment of a minority-status CEO on white male top manager organizational identification.

As the access of women and racial minorities to positions of corporate leadership has increased over time, there is a growing recognition of the need for research on factors that inhibit the success of minorities who manage to attain these important positions. Our hope is that, by identifying counterproductive, behavioral reactions to the appointment of female and racial minority leaders, our study will prompt researchers and policy makers to identify measures that can mitigate these unfortunate outcomes.

<sup>21</sup>In separate analyses, we examined whether performance-contingent compensation moderated the negative effects of the appointment of a minority-status CEO on top managers' organizational identification, such that higher levels of performance contingency weaken these negative effects. These analyses did not indicate that performance-contingent compensation interacted with the appointment of a female or racial minority CEO in predicting white male top managers' organizational identification. Accordingly, the effects of performance-contingent compensation on organizational identification and the indirect effects on helping behavior would appear to be additive (i.e., performance-contingent compensation may offset the effects of minority CEO appointments, without moderating the effects).

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## APPENDIX

### SURVEY SCALES

#### Mentoring to lower-level executives

- (1) To what extent has [the focal executive] served as a mentor to you [over the specified time period]? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (2) How many times has [the focal executive] given you career-related advice [over the specified time period]?
- (3) [The focal executive] has regularly served as a mentor to me [over the specified time period]. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (4) [Over the specified time period], to what extent has [the focal executive] given you guidance on a career-related issue? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (5) [The focal executive] has regularly given me advice on career issues [over the specified time period]. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (6) How many times has [the focal executive] mentored you [over the specified time period]?


#### Task-related help

- (1) On how many occasions did [the focal executive] help you with a management issue [over the specified time period]?
- (2) On how many occasions did [the focal executive] give you advice on a management issue [over the specified time period]?
- (3) On how many occasions did [the focal executive] help you with a management decision [over the specified time period]?
- (4) [Over the specified time period], how many times did [the focal executive] counsel you on how to deal with a management issue that you were facing?
- (5) How many times did [the focal executive] help you develop a solution to a management issue that you were facing [over the specified time period]?
- (6) [Over the specified time period], on how many occasions did [the focal executive] help you implement a solution to a management issue?

- (7) To what extent did [the focal executive] help you deal with management issues you were facing [over the specified time period]? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (8) [Over the specified time period], [the focal executive] regularly helped me address challenges that I was facing in my job. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (9) How much time did [the focal executive] devote to helping you resolve management issues that you were facing [over the specified time period]?

#### Organizational identification

- (1) When someone criticizes [the focal organization], it feels like a personal insult. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (2) I am very interested in what people think about [the focal organization]. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (3) When I talk about [the focal organization], I often say “we” rather than “they.” (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (4) When someone makes positive remarks about [the focal organization], it feels like a personal compliment. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (5) If a story in the media criticized [the focal organization], I would feel embarrassed. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (6) This organization’s successes are my successes. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (7) Being a member of [the focal organization] is a major part of who I am. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (8) Imagine that one of the circles at the left [displayed below] represents your self-definition or identity and the other circle at the right represents [the focal organization]. Please indicate which case (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, or H) best describes the level of overlap between your self-definition and [the focal organization].
- (9) Please indicate to what degree your self-image overlaps with [the focal organization’s]. (5-point response format)



### Survey items for supplemental analysis of mediating mechanisms

- (1) I hold a very positive opinion of the leadership of [the focal firm]. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (2) To what extent are you confident in the leadership of [the focal firm]? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (3) I hold a very positive opinion of [the focal CEO's] strategy. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (4) To what extent are you confident in [the focal CEO's] strategic vision? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (5) To what extent are you optimistic about [the focal firm's] future performance? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (6) I am very optimistic about [the focal firm's] performance prospects. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (7) To what extent are your ideas on strategic issues adequately valued by [the focal CEO]? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (8) My contributions are adequately valued by [the focal CEO]. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)
- (9) To what extent do you believe that you are adequately valued by [the focal CEO]? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (10) To what extent are your opinions on strategic issues adequately respected by [the focal CEO]? (5-point scale: *Not at all ... somewhat ... very much so*)
- (11) I feel adequately respected by [the focal CEO]. (5-point *agree/disagree* scale)

**TABLE A1a**  
**Descriptive Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

|  | Mean <sup>b</sup> | SD   |
|--|-------------------|------|
| Organizational identification <sup>c</sup>                           | .00               | .93  |
| Top manager contender for CEO position                               | .00               | .95  |
| Top manager anxiety  | .00               | .96  |
| Top manager concern about job security                               | .00               | .98  |
| Performance contingency of top manager's compensation                | .42               | .23  |
| CEO's top management experience                                      | 11.31             | 7.45 |
| CEO's status in the corporate elite                                  | .00               | .97  |
| Outsider CEO   | .26               | .43  |
| Racial minority prior CEO  | .04               | .19  |
| Female prior CEO   | .06               | .24  |
| Firm performance   | .00               | .94  |
| Firm revenue (logged)  | 7.19              | 1.58 |
| Firm age (logged)  | 2.82              | 1.17 |
| Unrelated diversification  | .02               | .37  |
| Tenor of firm's press coverage                                       | .17               | .33  |
| Time since CEO's appointment   | 6.49              | 3.45 |
| Cumulative abnormal return surrounding CEO announcement              | .01               | .06  |
| Number of subordinates   | 7.43              | 5.09 |
| Subordinate's management experience                                  | 6.64              | 4.26 |
| Subordinate's status in the corporate elite                          | .00               | .97  |
| Social interaction between top manager and subordinate               | .00               | .98  |
| Similarity between focal manager and subordinate on other dimensions | .00               | 1.34 |
| Number of peers  | 6.88              | 4.75 |
| Peer's management experience   | 7.28              | 6.90 |
| Peer's status in the corporate elite                                 | .00               | .98  |
| Social interaction between top manager and peer                      | .00               | .99  |
| Similarity between focal manager and peer on other dimensions        | .00               | 1.33 |
| Mentoring to subordinates  | .00               | .98  |
| Task-related help for subordinates                                   | .00               | .97  |
| Task-related help for peers  | .00               | .97  |
| Recommendations for board seats for peers                            | .17               | .38  |

<sup>a</sup> Information on race and gender of CEOs and top managers in the sample is provided in Table A2.

<sup>b</sup> Variables with a mean of zero are factor scores or principal components (in the case of similarity between focal manager and subordinate on other dimensions), derived from factor analysis and discrete principal components analysis, respectively. The factor scores are a weighted sum of items that comprise the survey scale, with the item scores standardized and weighted by their factor loadings (Grice & Harris, 1998).

<sup>c</sup> The average unstandardized level of organizational identification among top managers in our sample is approximately 3.72 overall (averaged across the 5-point scales in our measure). Among top managers of firms with white male CEOs, the average is 3.95, while the average among top managers of firms with female and racial minority CEOs is 2.63 and 2.66, respectively. These represent very substantial differences in the level of organizational identification (i.e., a "4" indicates agreement with survey items such as "Being a member of [the focal organization] is a major part of who I am," while a "2" or "3" means disagreeing with the statement, or neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement). Moreover, there was no significant difference between the pre-succession organizational identification for managers at firms that went on to appoint a white male CEO, compared to those that appointed a female or a racial minority CEO.

TABLE A1b  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients: Model of Organizational Identification<sup>a</sup>

|   | 1    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   | 11   | 12   | 13   | 14  | 15   | 16   | 17   | 18  |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|------|-----|
| 1. White male top manager and female CEO                    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 2. White male top manager and racial minority CEO           | -.07 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 3. Top manager contender for CEO position                   | -.03 | -.02 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 4. Top manager anxiety                                      | .16  | .14  | -.03 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 5. Top manager concern about job security                   | .07  | .10  | -.08 | .31  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 6. Performance contingency of top manager's compensation    | -.01 | -.05 | .07  | .08  | .04  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 7. CEO's top management experience                          | .08  | .06  | -.04 | -.05 | -.04 | .03  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 8. CEO's status in the corporate elite                      | -.06 | -.03 | -.03 | -.03 | -.06 | .01  | .06  |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 9. Outsider CEO   | .05  | .04  | -.05 | .08  | .10  | .01  | .15  | .17  |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 10. Racial minority prior CEO                               | .03  | .06  | .01  | .01  | .03  | -.01 | -.04 | -.03 | .03  |      |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 11. Female prior CEO  | .04  | .02  | .00  | .04  | .05  | .00  | -.05 | -.05 | .03  | -.05 |      |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 12. Firm performance  | -.09 | -.06 | -.02 | -.14 | -.21 | .04  | .02  | .02  | -.04 | -.02 | -.04 |      |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 13. Firm revenue (logged)                                   | -.10 | -.14 | .04  | -.08 | -.18 | .05  | .13  | .12  | -.11 | -.09 | -.06 | .08  |      |     |      |      |      |     |
| 14. Firm age (logged)                                       | -.15 | -.13 | .03  | -.04 | -.13 | -.07 | .10  | .14  | -.08 | -.08 | -.10 | .12  | .17  |     |      |      |      |     |
| 15. Unrelated diversification                               | -.02 | -.03 | .03  | -.04 | -.02 | -.11 | .04  | .02  | .03  | -.02 | -.01 | -.15 | .25  | .19 |      |      |      |     |
| 16. Tenor of firm's press coverage                          | -.12 | -.08 | -.01 | -.07 | -.13 | .03  | .03  | .05  | .02  | -.06 | -.09 | .18  | -.06 | .05 | -.07 |      |      |     |
| 17. Time since CEO's appointment                            | .01  | -.01 | .02  | .03  | .03  | .00  | -.01 | .00  | .02  | .01  | .00  | -.02 | .02  | .00 | .01  | -.02 |      |     |
| 18. Cumulative abnormal return surrounding CEO announcement | -.06 | -.05 | -.02 | -.07 | -.05 | .03  | .11  | .08  | .07  | -.02 | -.02 | .06  | .03  | .04 | -.05 | .22  | -.01 |     |
| 19. Organizational identification                           | -.23 | -.19 | -.08 | -.02 | -.05 | .15  | .04  | .10  | -.13 | -.03 | -.02 | .17  | -.07 | .06 | -.16 | .20  | .04  | .04 |

<sup>a</sup>  $p < .05$  for correlations  $> .06$ .



**TABLE A1c**  
**Pearson Correlation Coefficients: Models of Top Manager Helping Behavior<sup>a</sup>**

|   | 1    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1. Organizational identification  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 2. Number of subordinates/peers   | .06  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 3. Subordinate's/peer's management experience   | .04  | -.02 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 4. Subordinate's/peer's status in the corporate elite   | .04  | -.03 | .11  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 5. Social interaction between top manager and subordinate/peer                                | .13  | -.06 | .07  | .10  |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| 6. Similarity between focal manager and subordinate/peer on other demographic characteristics | .10  | .02  | .03  | .04  | .20  |      |      |      |      |      |
| 7. Top manager contender for CEO position   | -.08 | .06  | .05  | .05  | -.05 | .01  |      |      |      |      |
| 8. Top manager anxiety  | -.02 | .05  | -.01 | -.01 | -.06 | -.03 | -.03 |      |      |      |
| 9. Top manager concern about job security   | -.05 | .02  | .02  | .03  | .05  | -.02 | -.08 | .32  |      |      |
| 10. Performance contingency of top manager's compensation                                     | .15  | .02  | .01  | .01  | .06  | -.01 | .07  | .08  | .04  |      |
| 11. CEO's top management experience   | .04  | .03  | .04  | .05  | -.03 | .01  | -.04 | -.05 | -.04 | .03  |
| 12. CEO's status in the corporate elite   | .09  | .05  | .02  | .06  | -.04 | .03  | -.03 | -.03 | -.06 | .01  |
| 13. Outsider CEO  | -.14 | .04  | .03  | .02  | -.01 | .01  | -.05 | .07  | .10  | .01  |
| 14. Racial minority prior CEO   | -.03 | .03  | .01  | -.02 | -.01 | -.02 | .01  | .01  | .03  | -.01 |
| 15. Female prior CEO  | -.02 | .05  | .00  | -.01 | .00  | -.02 | .00  | .04  | .05  | .00  |
| 16. Firm performance  | .17  | .05  | .01  | .02  | .04  | .03  | -.02 | -.14 | -.20 | .04  |
| 17. Firm revenue (logged)   | -.07 | .11  | .04  | .06  | -.03 | .04  | .04  | -.08 | -.17 | .05  |
| 18. Firm age (logged)   | .06  | .05  | .04  | .05  | -.01 | .03  | .03  | -.04 | -.12 | -.07 |
| 19. Unrelated diversification   | -.16 | .03  | .02  | .01  | -.02 | .00  | -.01 | -.04 | -.02 | -.12 |
| 20. Tenor of firm's press coverage  | .21  | -.03 | .01  | .01  | .02  | -.01 | -.01 | -.07 | -.14 | .03  |
| 21. Cumulative abnormal return surrounding CEO announcement                                   | .04  | -.02 | .01  | .00  | -.01 | -.02 | -.02 | -.07 | -.05 | .03  |
| 22. Time since CEO's appointment  | .04  | .02  | .00  | -.01 | .02  | .01  | .02  | .03  | .03  | .00  |
| 23. White male top manager and white female subordinate/peer                                  | -.02 | -.01 | .06  | -.08 | -.10 | -.21 | -.03 | .05  | .01  | -.02 |
| 24. White male top manager and racial minority male subordinate/peer                          | -.01 | .01  | .05  | -.09 | -.09 | -.23 | -.03 | .03  | .02  | .01  |
| 25. Mentoring to subordinates   | .18  | -.05 | -.02 | .05  | .14  | .09  | -.04 | -.07 | .05  | .04  |
| 26. Task-related help for subordinates  | .20  | -.04 | .02  | .07  | .12  | .10  | -.04 | -.05 | .08  | .05  |
| 27. Task-related help for peers <sup>b</sup>  | .25  | -.04 | .02  | .13  | .17  | .16  | -.06 | -.06 | .08  | .18  |
| 28. Recommendations for board seats for peers <sup>b</sup>                                    | .16  | -.17 | .03  | .14  | .08  | .18  | -.05 | -.06 | .04  | .05  |

<sup>a</sup> Correlations are provided for the sample of focal manager–subordinate dyads, except where indicated;  $p < .05$  for correlations  $> .04$ .

<sup>b</sup> Correlations involving this variable are for the sample of focal manager–peer dyads.

**TABLE A1c**  
**(Continued)**

| 11   | 12   | 13   | 14   | 15   | 16   | 17   | 18   | 19   | 20   | 21   | 22   | 23   | 24   | 25  | 26  | 27  |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| .06  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .16  | .17  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .05  | -.03 | .03  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .12  | -.05 | .03  | -.05 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .02  | .02  | -.04 | -.02 | -.04 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .13  | .13  | -.11 | -.09 | -.06 | .08  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .10  | .13  | -.08 | -.08 | -.10 | .11  | .18  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .04  | .02  | .03  | -.02 | -.01 | -.14 | .24  | .18  |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .03  | .05  | .02  | -.06 | -.08 | .17  | -.06 | .05  | -.07 |      |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .11  | .08  | .07  | -.02 | -.02 | .06  | .03  | .04  | -.05 | .23  |      |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| -.01 | .00  | .02  | .01  | .00  | -.02 | .01  | .00  | .01  | -.02 | -.01 |      |      |      |     |     |     |
| .02  | -.01 | .02  | .03  | .05  | .01  | -.04 | -.02 | -.03 | -.02 | -.01 | .00  |      |      |     |     |     |
| .01  | -.01 | -.01 | .04  | .02  | .02  | -.05 | -.03 | -.04 | .01  | -.02 | .00  | -.14 |      |     |     |     |
| .02  | .01  | -.02 | -.02 | -.03 | .03  | -.04 | .02  | -.01 | .03  | .02  | -.01 | -.08 | -.09 |     |     |     |
| .01  | .01  | -.02 | -.02 | -.04 | -.02 | -.06 | .01  | -.01 | .02  | -.03 | .02  | -.07 | -.06 | .19 |     |     |
| .01  | .02  | .00  | -.02 | -.03 | -.02 | -.04 | -.02 | -.15 | .02  | -.03 | .01  | -.06 | -.05 | n/a | n/a |     |
| .01  | -.01 | .01  | -.01 | -.02 | .04  | .05  | .04  | -.04 | .01  | .03  | -.03 | -.10 | -.12 | n/a | n/a | .15 |

**TABLE A2**  
**Frequency Information on Race and Gender of CEOs and Top Managers in the Sample**

| CEO Succession   | Count        |
|--|--------------|
| Racial minority male CEOs                                | 45           |
| White female CEOs  | 61           |
| White male CEOs  | 483          |
|  | <b>589</b>   |
| <b>Top managers</b>                                      |              |
| Racial minority male top managers                        | 77           |
| White female top managers                                | 125          |
| Racial minority female top managers                      | 5            |
| White male top managers                                  | 818          |
|  | <b>1,025</b> |
| <b>CEO-top manager dyads</b>                             |              |
| White male top manager and female CEO                    | 85           |
| White male top manager and racial minority CEO           | 58           |
| White female top manager and white male CEO              | 102          |
| Racial minority male top manager and white male CEO      | 59           |
| Racial minority female top manager and white male CEO    | 5            |
| White female top manager and racial minority CEO         | 9            |
| Racial minority male top manager and female CEO          | 7            |
| White female top manager and female CEO                  | 14           |
| Racial minority male top manager and racial minority CEO | 11           |
| White male top manager and white male CEO                | 675          |
|  | <b>1,025</b> |

**TABLE A3**  
**Mediated Effects on Manager Turnover**

| Indirect Effect   | Sobel test (z) | Bootstrapped Coefficients: 95% Confidence Interval |       |
|---|----------------|--|-------|
|   |                | Lower  | Upper |
| White male top manager and female CEO $\rightarrow$ Organizational identification $\rightarrow$ Manager turnover          | 3.04**         | 0.169  | 0.365 |
| White male top manager and racial minority CEO $\rightarrow$ Organizational identification $\rightarrow$ Manager turnover | 2.94**         | 0.149  | 0.361 |

Notes:  $N = 1,025$ . Two-tailed tests are reported.

\*  $p \leq .05$

\*\*  $p \leq .01$

\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$