An Overview of Organizational Justice: Implications for Work Motivation

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In recent years, organizational justice has emerged as a critical variable for understanding work behavior. When individuals believe they are being treated fairly, they tend to exhibit higher levels of job performance and more organizational citizenship behavior (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001), while engaging in fewer conflicts and less counterproductive activity (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Given the ubiquity of these findings, justice has become relevant to motivation, at least because it predicts the direction and energy of important work behaviors. Given these observations, this chapter will review organizational justice from the perspective of work motivation. In the opening section, we discuss some lingering issues of structure. This will provide a framework for organizing the rest of our discussion. Subsequent to the opening, we divide the justice literature into two parts. In keeping with research on work motivation (e.g., Campbell & Prichard, 1976; Kanfer, 1991), we observe that inquiry into justice has followed two related traditions: content and process. The content tradition, outlined in our second section, discusses why justice matters to individuals. The process tradition, which we take up in the third section, emphasizes the cognitive and affective processes by which individuals formulate and act upon their feelings of (in)justice. Finally, with this review behind us, we conclude this chapter with a short discourse on the relationship between justice and work motivation.

Some Thoughts on the Structure of Justice

Generally speaking, most if not all justice researchers would at least divide justice perceptions into two types - distributive and procedural. Distributive justice refers to the fairness of outcome allocations. Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the allocation
process. Bies (1987) and Bies and Moag (1986) suggest that individuals also consider the fairness of the interpersonal treatment they receive from others. They term this "interactional justice" (Sitkin & Bies, 1993). Bies (2001) recommends that interactional justice be considered a third type of fairness, while others (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2000) prefer to view interpersonal treatment as a social aspect of procedural justice (for a discussion of these issues see Bobocel & Holmvall, 2001). Finally, some scholars have gone a step further and subdivided interactional justice into two parts - informational justice, which refers to the presence of explanations and social accounts, and interpersonal justice, which refers to the dignity and respect that one receives (Greenberg, 1993). Recent evidence suggests that this four-part model is generally valid (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001), though research exploring informational and interpersonal justice is limited. As a result, our review will mostly refer to research involving distributive, procedural, and interactional justice, with the caveat that a four-type model could eventually prove to be the more useful structure.

Three Motives Underlying Workplace Justice

Intuitively, it makes good sense to postulate that employees care about their economic outcomes. Money, for example, can buy social status, health care, educational opportunities, enjoyable vacations, and a comfortable retirement. We would be stunned if people didn't care about these things! Concern over justice, on the other hand, is somewhat more enigmatic. It is not readily obvious why individuals should be concerned with things as ephemeral as ethical standards and interpersonal treatment. As we have observed elsewhere (Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001), researchers in this area have proposed three basic motives underlying the concern for organizational justice: instrumental self-interest, interpersonal relationships, and moral principles. In this section, we will briefly consider each.
Instrumental Self-Interest and Organizational Justice

Loosely speaking (and see Cropanzano, Rupp, et al., 2001, for exceptions), the instrumental model suggests that justice is motivated, at least in part, by self-interest. Justice is instrumental because in the long run people are more likely to profit from a fair system than from an unfair one (Shapiro, 1993). Hence, employees are willing to trade off a short-term cost for the long-term gains that come from organizational justice.

From this instrumental perspective, organizational justice shares much in common with theories of motivation that emphasize the pursuit of personally desirable objectives, such as valance-instrumentality-expectancy (VIE) theory (for a meta-analytic review see Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). There is, however, a difference in emphasis. Justice research focuses on (at least) two important elements (cf., Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001). First, instrumental justice highlights the long-term. Accordingly, employees care about justice because they are enlightened enough to consider their future benefits, while not becoming too absorbed in short-term losses. Second, organizational justice stresses the use of allocation processes, as well as interpersonal treatment, for divining one's future benefits. Hence, individuals use the allocation process as a forecasting device for long-term profits.

Evidence for the instrumental model can be gleaned from the fact that individuals are likely to judge a process or outcome as fair, when it is favorable to them (e.g., Conlon, 1993; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). Yet it is critical that we not overstate this point. One of the most important contributions of organizational justice research is the demonstration that economic outcomes are only partial determinants of fairness perceptions. Even when outcomes are unfavorable, individuals are likely to report just treatment, so long as procedural and/or interactional fairness are maintained (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp,
Outcome favorability is one determinant of justice perceptions, but only part - and perhaps not the most important part - of the story. To better understand the consequences of aversive outcomes, let's consider two conditions under which they tend to be emphasized.

**The two-factor model.** Both unfavorable and unfair outcomes tend to be better predictors of criteria that pertain directly to the outcome in question, while process and interactional factors seem to better predict reactions to the decision-maker or to the organization as a whole (Cropanzano & Schminke, 2001; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Sweeney and McFarlin (1993) have dubbed this the *two-factor model*. For example, in a classic study, Folger and Konovsky (1989) studied reactions to pay raises. When participants felt the size of their pay raise was inappropriately low they were especially likely to be dissatisfied with it. On the other hand, the fairness of the pay raise process was a better predictor of supervisory trust and organizational commitment.

**Interaction with process.** It is often the case that outcomes, be they unfair or unfavorable, interact with process and interpersonal treatment to predict worker reactions. Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) and Cropanzano and Schminke (2001) provide reviews of this interaction effect. Process and interpersonal treatment seem to matter most when the outcomes are less beneficial than they could have been. In other words, when outcomes are advantageous, procedural and interactional justice tend not to predict as well as they do when outcomes are disadvantageous. Most of the research to date has examined the two-way interaction either between outcome and process or between outcome and interpersonal treatment. In an extension, Skarlicki and Folger (1997) tested the three-way interaction between distributive, procedural, and
interactional justice. They found that this three-way effect contributed significantly to the prediction of workplace deviance.

**Interpersonal Relationships and Organizational Justice**

Interpersonal models of organizational justice tend to emphasize the relationships among group members. In understanding the rule of organizational justice in work behavior, scholars have analyzed fairness in view of two models of motivation: social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and the social identity theory (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

**Application of social exchange theory to organizational justice.** There are many social exchange theories (Cropanzano, Rupp et al., 2001). Generally speaking, contemporary versions of these frameworks tend to describe two types of interpersonal relationships (cf., Blau, 1964; Organ, 1988; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000). Economic exchange relationships involve relatively concrete, often monetary benefits that are exchanged in a one-to-one fashion. At the other end of the continuum are social exchange relationships. These may involve relatively abstract benefits, emotional attachments, and open-ended commitments without the necessity of immediate payback.

Organizational justice, especially procedural and interactional justice, is expected to create social exchange relationships. These relationships have been operationalized by such constructs as organizational support (Moorman, Blakely, & Niehoff, 1998), leader - member exchange (Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, in press), and trust (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994). Regardless of their operationalization, these social exchange relationships, in turn, are anticipated to engender citizenship behaviors and high job performance. Evidence of this relationship is generally supportive (Cropanzano, Rupp, et al., 2001; Rupp & Cropanzano, in press). Contemporary social
exchange research has identified three mechanisms by which fairness and social exchange relationships promote more effective work behavior.

First, contemporary social exchange approaches often emphasize the obligations engendered by different sorts of relationships (Organ, 1988). Most generally, one needs to keep whatever obligations he or she has agreed to, whether they are concrete and *quid pro quo* (for economic exchanges) or abstract and open-ended (for social exchanges). Thus, when we violate those obligations we are likely to be seen as unfair. Within contemporary social exchange theory, the most commonly discussed obligation is *reciprocity* (for a recent discussion, see Fehr & Gächter, 2000). For example, Masterson et al. (2000, p. 738) suggests that "exchanges ... yield a pattern of reciprocal obligation in each party." Not repaying someone for his or her favorable treatment of us would be considered unfair.

A second causal mechanism that has been suggested by some contemporary social exchange theorists is that of *trust*. Konovsky and Pugh (1994, p. 659) have argued that trust (which they view as one manifestation of a social exchange relationship) requires "evidence of self-sacrifice and responsiveness to another person's needs." More generally, those who are involved in close relationships are likely to "behave in ways that are ... directed toward serving the collectivity" (p. 659). In other words, when one identifies with a group, he or she is more likely to put the group's needs above narrow self-interest. Such behavior is seen as just and further engenders trustworthiness.

A third important factor is the internalization of principles. According to Cropanzano, Rupp et al. (2001) when one is committed to a group, he or she may come to internalize the moral principles and values of that collective. In other words, he or she may be socialized into genuinely accepting certain moral standards (Cropanzano, Byrne et al., 2001). Hence, people
behave fairly because they have come to believe that this is the right or ethical thing to do. The fact that people can internalize different standards brings us to the issue of moral principles, which we shall address momentarily.

**Application of social identity theory to organizational justice: The group-value/relational model.** Tyler and Lind (1992) have proposed a second interpersonal model of justice, which is based on social identity theory (Tyler & Smith, 1998). This framework has been termed the group-value (Lind & Tyler, 1988) or relational (Lind, 1995) model. According to the group-value/relational model, individuals wish to be included in important social groups. Hence, they are very sensitive to messages that pertain to their standing (Tyler & Blader, 2000, p. 90 use the term "status") within desirable collectives. Justice (especially procedural justice) is valued "because experiencing those procedures leads them to feel valued as people and as group members" (Tyler & Blader, p. 90). Injustice, on the other hand, implies low standing. There is a good deal of evidence supporting the group-value/relational model (Cropanzano, Rupp et al., 2001).

**Moral Principles and Organizational Justice**

The self-interested and interpersonal approaches are each interpretable in terms of well-known theories of motivation. For instance, the instrumental perspective could be explicated in VIE terms, whereas the interpersonal perspective has drawn closely from both social exchange and social identity theories. In the last several years a more unique approach to organizational justice has emerged. Bies (1993; 2001) and Folger (1994; 1998; 2001) have argued that individuals are often concerned with ethical standards. Thus, it is possible that employees often behave fairly and react to unfairness because they are committed to moral principles. According to this perspective, justice matters for its own sake, apart from whether it impacts one's economic
"bottom line" or maintains one's standing within a valued group. Tests of this model have generally been supportive (see Cropanzano, Rupp, et al., 2001; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, & McElreath, 2001).

Within this framework, empirical tests have generally proceeded by ruling out self-interested and interpersonal considerations (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, in press). All of the studies described in these two papers use resource allocation tasks to determine if participants will allocate less resources to teammates who have acted unfairly in the past, even if such an action would mean that they themselves would have to make a sacrifice. These studies provide participants information about the extent to which their teammates’ past resource allocation decisions were fair. The results show that individuals are willing to make monetary sacrifices to punish unfairness, even when they have no information regarding their teammates’ identities, when their teammate will not be made aware of their decision, and when they are guaranteed not to have any future contact with their teammates. Several variations of the experimental task have been used, incorporating various independent variables and experimental controls, and the results across all studies seem to suggest that people react to unfairness for reasons other than self-interest and interpersonal/relational concerns. It seems that under these conditions, participants internalize justice as an end to itself rather than a means toward a self-serving or interpersonal end (see Turrillo, et al., in press for more detail).

Process Models of Organizational Justice

Thus far, we have reviewed three classifications of justice motives: the instrumental, relational, and moral principles. What these three families have in common is that they are content theories of justice in that they seek to explain why justice is important to individuals.
However, as motivation researchers have pointed out (cf., Campbell & Prichard, 1976; Kanfer, 1991), it is also important to build *process* theories. In the present context, process theories seek to explain *how* such justice judgments are formed (Cropanzano et al., 2001; Gilliland, Benson, & Schepers, 1998). These theories explicate sundry assortments of cognitive steps and necessary environmental conditions that influence justice perceptions, affective reactions, and motivated behavior stemming from such perceptions. Due to space limitations, we will only discuss a few illustrative theories here.

**Referent Cognitions Theory**

Folger has proposed *Referent Cognitions Theory* (RCT; Folger, 1986a, 1986b, 1987; Cropanzano & Folger, 1989). RCT predicts that individuals determine the fairness of an event by evaluating the procedures that lead to the outcomes they receive. Moreover, injustice is most likely to be perceived when unjustified procedures yield unfavorable outcomes. Using RCT language, judgments of unfairness result when an individual believes an alternative procedure *should* have been used, and such a procedure *would* have lead to a more favorable outcome. Thus, rather than using other people as referents to make justice judgments, RCT maintains that individuals instead make comparisons using imagined procedural alternatives to make comparisons.

According to this model, *high referent* individuals are aware that alternative procedures would lead to a better outcome, where *low referent* individuals are not aware of such alternatives. Because of the ability to generate possible procedural alternatives, high referents are more likely to perceive injustice than low referents. Research in this area has found that referent level is less unimportant when individuals have the freedom to decide what processes will be used to make decisions (i.e., has choice). This is because, when given this freedom, they will choose a process
they feel will lead to a favorable outcome and will be unable to fault authority on procedural grounds in the event they receive an unfavorable outcome. Other factors found to interact with referent level are procedural justification (Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983), and believing that a favorable outcome will be received sometime in the future (Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, & Martin, 1983).

RCT takes into account both outcomes and processes in explaining how justice judgments are formed. Second, the model shows that referents can be both real (e.g., equity theory’s referent other) as well as imagined (e.g., RCT’s referent cognitions). Despite these extensions, questions remain unanswered in our quest to understand the justice process. Specifically, how exactly are these judgments formed (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001)? Does the process differ when socioemotional outcomes are on the line? How do moral principles related to justice impact the formation of justice judgments (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998)? Such questions led Folger to extend RCT to include such factors. This expanded theory has been termed Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano 1998; 2001).

Fairness Theory

Building on RCT, Fairness Theory seeks to identify conditions that must be met in order for an injustice to be perceived. According to this theory, something first must occur that threatens an individual’s well-being, followed by a judgment determining who is accountable for the event. Once such a situation has been established three conditions must be met in order for the event to be perceived as unfair.

First, the individual must be able to imagine alternative situations that could have arisen that would have resulted in less adversity than the one at hand. Comparing the event to these cognitions involves a comparison similar to the one laid out in RCT. However, the generation of
alternatives and the comparison process can involve both relational and economic considerations. As in RCT, this first condition is the would component because it asks the question of whether alternative actions on the part of the accountable party would have resulted in less adversity.

Second, the perceiver determines if it was in the accountable party’s power to act differently. This is termed the could component because it asks whether the responsible party could have acted differently. Research in this area has shown that the social account provided to the perceiver for the action taken often mitigates this condition (Bies, 1987, 2001; Bobocel, McCline, & Folger, 1997; Tyler & Bies, 1990). That is, when it is explained to employees why a particular action had to be taken, perceivers are less likely to imagine scenarios where those responsible for the situation could have acted any differently.

The third condition that is necessary for injustice to be perceived involves morality-based justice. In addition to believing that an alternative situation would have led to better outcomes and that those in power could have acted differently, the individual making the fairness judgment must also believe that the responsible party should have acted differently because their action violated some moral standard of interpersonal conduct. This condition, therefore, has been termed the should component.

Thus, Fairness Theory states that if an individual’s well-being is threatened and those in power would, could, and should have acted differently, the situation will be considered unfair. As Fairness Theory was formulated only recently, empirical tests of the model are only now beginning to appear. Generally speaking, they seem to be supportive (Collie, Bradley, & Sparks, 2001; Collie, Sparks, & Bradley, 2001), though more research is needed. In addition, studies exploring the power of morality-based justice provide some additional evidence supporting the should component (Kahneman et al., 1986; Turillo et al., in press).
Fairness Heuristic Theory

A third process theory has been proposed by Lind and his colleagues (Lind, 2001; van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001). Termed Fairness Heuristic Theory (FHT), this model provides a framework outlining why justice evaluations are used to regulate behavior, how such evaluations are formed, and how such judgments impact future actions and justice judgments, all within a group value/relational framework. This theory differs from the other process theories described in this chapter in that it focuses on the cognitive limitations involved in processing relational information and explains how fairness information serves as an aid in making sense of the plethora of interpersonal stimuli we must face in our daily lives.

FHT proposes that employees use fairness information to simplify these large processing demands. In other words, individuals use fairness information as a cognitive heuristic in determining their group status and whether authority figures can be trusted. The theory includes three stages by which such justice judgments are formed. In the pre-formation phase, information is gathered regarding whether or not an individual or social entity can be trusted. If explicit trustworthiness evidence is unavailable, the employee will use fairness information to make this determination. In the second phase, the formation phase, the actual justice judgment is formed. The goal of this phase is to collect information regarding the individual’s inclusion within the social group of interest. Many of the factors revealed by justice research such as voice, access, value, and respect come into play here. Also, studies have found that the information collected early in this process has a strong influence on how subsequent information is interpreted (van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). Because information about procedures is usually the first piece of information available to individuals, procedural justice is especially important in this phase, especially if the authority figure is a member of the in-group (van den
Bos et al., 2001). This finding has been used to explain the “fair process effect” found in many studies on organizational justice.

The third phase is the post-formation phase. This phase attempts to outline the process by which the fairness evaluations made in the formation phase guide behavior as well as subsequent fairness judgments. Although FHT has yet to outline exactly how this process is carried out, the empirical evidence available seems to suggest that fairness evaluations do serve as a heuristic framework in interpreting and making decisions about future events.

In summary, FHT provides a useful model for understanding how fairness information is used to make sense of the complex patterns of information received by employees in their working lives. Various studies have provided empirical support for fairness heuristic theory. For example, van den Bos and colleagues showed that information received first has a much stronger effect on fairness judgments than what comes next (van den Bos, et al., 1997). There are several important implications of these findings (Lind, 2001). First, initial fairness judgments perpetuate themselves. That is, once the initial fairness evaluation is made, it is very difficult to alter this evaluation in that one is typically “stuck” at the level of the initial fairness judgment. Second, organizations should pay special attention to the fairness of procedures employees are first exposed to when they enter the organization. These findings suggest that providing fair procedures at the onset, perhaps in interviewing and training stages, may have a strong effect on employee's subsequent reactions to organizational outcomes. A third implication has been termed the “substitutability implication” (Lind, 2001). This refers to the fact that if one type of fairness information is missing (i.e., information about procedures or outcomes), individuals will simply substitute procedural fairness for distributive fairness judgments or vice versa. The fair process
effect would be one example of this phenomenon, but it is important to realize that the opposite can occur as well.

Another important finding shows that it is sometimes difficult to assess the fairness of outcomes. This occurs because many situations lack information about the outcomes of referent others (van den Bos, et al., 1997). For example, it is often difficult to determine if you are being compensated fairly if you are unaware of the salaries made by your co-workers or those in similar positions. Van den Bos et al. showed that the fair process effect that occurs when referent information is absent is much less pronounced in the presence of this type of information.

Another empirical test of FHT showed that individuals use fairness judgments as a heuristic for evaluating situations when information such as trustworthiness is unavailable (van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). These researchers found that individuals have much less need to use procedural fairness as a heuristic substitute when direct evidence regarding the trustworthiness of the authority is available. This finding, which has been replicated in an applied setting (van den Bos & van Schie, 1998), provides yet another situation in which the fair process effect might not occur.

**Dual-Level Cognitive Processing Taxonomies**

FHT theory explicitly incorporates notions of controlled vs. automatic processing into its model. However, justice researchers have taken a closer look at all of the justice process theories (those included in this chapter and others), and have found this processing continuum useful in understanding situations where the different theories are appropriate. The dual-level processing literature is complex and has been approached in different ways within the subfields of decision making, attitude formation, and persuasion (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; for more thorough reviews of this literature, see Bargh, 1996;
Carlson & Smith, 1996, and Kunda, 1999). Defined broadly, the model states that one’s judgment about a particular event may arise via two processes. First, one might engage in controlled, conscious, systematic, or effortful processing. Such processing requires active attention and a good deal of cognitive effort. In contrast, such judgments can also be made “off-line”. This more automatic, unconscious, or mindless processing often occurs when individuals do not possess the cognitive resources to engage in effortful systematic processing. In such situations where specific details cannot be attended to, people often rely on cognitive heuristics or shortcuts to allow them to make the most accurate judgment possible given the resources they do have available.

To date, there have been a few recent justice studies that have incorporated a dual-processing framework. Bobocel et al (1997) present a model which shows how the type of cognitive processing affects how manager explanations for unfavorable events are perceived. This model shows how employee motivation and ability to process information determine whether the explanations are processed in a systematic or heuristic manner, as well as how these levels of processing effect the perceived adequacy of explanations and attitudes toward the policy being explained.

Other researchers have applied a dual-level processing framework to their conceptualizations of justice as well. For example, Goldman and Thatcher (in press) propose a social information processing model of organizational justice. Similarly, Ellard and Skarlicki (in press) present an insightful cognitive processing model explaining third party reactions to injustice and their attributions of deservingness. Their work attempts to show how the theory of just world beliefs (Lerner, 1980) is a model of automatic processing, whereas Feather’s (1999) model of deservingness applies to systematic processing.
Some Concluding Thoughts: Wherefore Organizational Justice

Amidst Theories of Work Motivation?

Our goal in this review was to provide the reader with a general introduction to an exciting research topic. We have discussed the structure of justice, three motives that underlie justice, and four processing models that seek to articulate how justice perceptions are constructed. We hoped our brief overview has piqued the reader's interest. Before parting, it is worthwhile to take one look back at organizational justice from the perspective of work motivation. Throughout this chapter, we have observed a good deal of conceptual interplay. For instance, the self-interested approach to justice is quite consistent with similar models of motivation. Of course, the borrowing of ideas does not, in and of itself, ensure that fairness should be classified as a motivational topic per se.

To make this case it is helpful to take a closer look at two definitions of work motivation and assess the extent to which research on justice conforms to each. We shall review two examples here. In the first edition of the *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, Campbell and Prichard (1976, p. 65) define motivation as "a set of independent/dependent variable relationships that explain the direction, amplitude, and persistence of an individual's behavior, and holding constant the effects of aptitude, skill, and understanding of the task, and the constraints operating in the situation." Similarly, in the second edition of that same *Handbook*, Kanfer (1990, p. 78) observes that "motivation may be defined as intra- and interindividual variability in behavior not due solely to individual differences in ability or to overwhelming environmental demands that coerce or force behavior" (italics in original).

As we have seen, organizational justice meets the criteria outlined by these definitions in at least three ways. Most obviously, justice theories have had a good deal of success in
explaining effective and ineffective work behaviors (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). Moreover, while theories of justice emphasize important elements of the situation (most notably, outcomes, processes, and their like), these stimuli are not viewed as inexorably powerful. Instead, theories of justice tend to focus on the individual’s personal understanding or construal of these elements (cf., van den Bos & Lind, 2001), as well as on the very human concerns of standing (Tyler & Smith, 1998), moral principles (Folger, 1994; 1998; 2001), and so on. Put differently, theories of justice, as is true for most theories of motivation, emphasize the active sense-making and assignment of meanings that goes on in work (and other) settings. Individual behavior results not from the stimuli themselves but from the meanings (in this case, just or unjust) that have been assigned. Finally, research on human ability and task skills are conspicuously (and perhaps a bit unfortunately) absent from most organizational justice research. Within the confines of their conceptual frameworks, justice theories view individuals as acting more upon their fairness appraisals and less upon their idiosyncratic abilities.

From the perspective of these definitions, it is reasonable to treat organizational justice as a motivational topic. Justice is clearly something that matters to workers, and as such it serves to influence their behavior and attitudes. In this vein, it should not surprise us that investigations of workplace fairness have drawn some important insights from the motivation literature, as well as from other sources. No less important are the implications of justice research for work motivation. Organizational fairness underscores the moral considerations that lie behind a good deal of motivated work behavior. Hopefully, this valuable cross-fertilization will continue.


