The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices

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1. Introduction

Corporate governance took on an urgency in the aftermath of the collapse of Enron in the Fall of 2001, becoming a topic of intense media focus with a succession of corporate accounting scandals. For example, there were 426 news stories containing the term “corporate governance” in the New York Times in 2002, compared to only 69 in 2000.1 Active institutional investors such as union and public pension funds redirected their engagement in the proxy process to advance their views on what they considered to be the institutions of good corporate governance, undoubtedly in the hope that closer scrutiny of firms’ quality of governance would assist in stemming future Enrons.2 At the same time, corporations were forced to reconsider their systems of corporate governance in response to federal legislation and stock exchange listing requirements, that were enacted in reaction to Enron and subsequent accounting scandals and that emphasized corporate governance solutions.

Shortly thereafter, regulation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promoted an increased focus on corporate governance by mutual funds, an institutional investor sector not traditionally thought of as activist investors because they have not up to now sponsored shareholder proxy proposals, as the SEC required funds to adopt written policies on proxy voting and disclose their specific votes in 2003. The heightened attention accorded to corporate governance by all of these actors in turn increased the demand for corporate governance

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1 The counts are from a Lexis search in the New York Times file in the News library conducted on May 24, 2006. A search of the entire News library in Lexis found similar results, although the order of magnitude differs: there were 38,477 articles referring to corporate governance in 2002, compared to 18,205 articles in 2000.
2 The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) tracks shareholder proposals on corporate governance, submitted at over 1900 firms, including the Fortune 500 and S&P 500, and the number increased dramatically after 2001, averaging 275 over the four years before 2001 and 380 the four years after. The number of proposals tracked from 1997-2005, respectively, are: 294, 255, 288, 264, 266, 292,
governance-related services provided by third-parties, for research and advice on proxy voting
by institutional investors and by corporations for advice on how to improve their governance to
minimize possible adverse proxy voting outcomes.

The demand for governance services has not subsided with the passage of time and
regulatory initiatives. A market for corporate governance ratings now exists, with firms’
governance ratings being used in the formulation of voting recommendations by proxy advising
firms, such as the market leader with an overwhelming market share, Institutional Shareholder
Services, Inc. (ISS). The topicality of corporate governance has also not abated: in the nearly
five years since Enron’s collapse, there have been 1,342 New York Times news stories containing
the phrase “corporate governance,” whereas to reach a comparable count prior to that date, one
has to cumulate news stories over ten years to 1986 (totaling 1,388).

Shortly before the surge in media attention on corporate governance surrounding the
collapse of Enron and other accounting scandals, a team of financial economists, Paul Gompers,
Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick (GIM), had written an important paper in which they constructed
an index of the quality of corporate governance for a large number of publicly traded U.S. firms, 479, 410, and 339.

consulting services to firms, some commentators have criticized the use of its governance index in its
proxy voting advice as creating an inherent conflict of interest. E.g., id.; Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good
position is that there is no conflict because it has established “firewalls” between the divisions, as is the
practice in investment banks for mitigating conflicts across the various services they offer firms and
investors. Of course, not all providers of governance rankings are in a conflicted position, since many do
not engage in issuer consulting services or provision of proxy voting advice. In our view, reliance on
governance indices in proxy voting is problematic quite apart from whether there is a conflict of interest,
and we therefore do not address this issue.

4 The tally was obtained by a search in the New York Times database in lexis of the term “corporate
in order to examine the relation between governance and performance. GIM’s research made a valuable contribution to the law and finance literature, facilitating a large-scale and systematic approach for comparing firms’ disparate governance systems and connecting the comparative analysis to performance. Their research spawned a host of new research questions in which their governance measure was used as an explanatory variable in cross-sectional research about firms, and led other researchers to create their own governance indices in efforts to find more parsimonious combinations of governance mechanisms that impacted corporate performance.

The focus on corporate governance following Enron’s collapse made GIM’s work of great interest to a far wider audience than academics working on corporate governance. Because GIM identified a positive relation between governance and future stock performance, their paper offered intellectual support for commercial providers of governance ranking services, a connection not lost on those organizations. Although GIM were assiduously careful in interpreting their data and did not draw causal conclusions about the relation between their measurement of governance quality and performance, commercial providers of governance services and some institutional investor activists exercise no such caution.

The aim of this paper is twofold, to analyze the performance of the corporate governance

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5 Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, NBER W.P. W8449 (August 2001). The paper was presented at the NBER’s 2001 summer conference; it was not published until two years later. GIM’s research can be characterized as a response to or outgrowth of an important move in the finance literature that had become one of the more active areas of research, in which countries were classified by the quality of their corporate laws’ protection of shareholders, and correlations identified between the quality of the regime and favorable economic features, such as growth and market capitalization. The classic paper launching the field was Rafael LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998); that literature is reviewed in Diane K. Denis & John J. McConnell, International Corporate Governance, 38 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 1(2003). Because that comparative literature did not operate at the firm level in analyzing corporate governance but used laws “on the books”, GIM’s paper was both a natural, and important, extension of that literature.

6 See notes 49 & 62 infra, noting Glass Lewis & Co.’s use of academic research in the construction and marketing of its governance ranking system, and ISS’s marketing claims regarding the relation between
indices that have been created in the recent past in predicting corporate performance, and to consider the implications for public policy that follow from that assessment. The paper examines methodological issues in the construction and interpretation of governance indices not so much as to critique the foundational work of GIM, although we do that, but rather to criticize the use to which corporate governance indices such as GIM’s have been put. Because the precise construction of commercial indices is viewed as proprietary information by their owners and is thus not publicly available, our analysis focuses on the relation between corporate performance and the academic indices, some of which are, fortunately for our purposes, closely linked to commercial ones. We believe that conclusions from this analysis are equally applicable to the use of commercial indices.

Our core conclusion is that there is no consistent relation between the academic and related commercial governance indices and measures of corporate performance. In short, there is no one “best” measure of corporate governance: the most effective governance institution appears to depend on context, and on firms’ specific circumstances. It would therefore be difficult for an index, or any one variable, to capture critical nuances for making informed decisions. As a consequence, we also conclude that governance indices are highly imperfect and unsatisfactory screens for determining how to vote corporate proxies, and that investors and policymakers should exercise utmost caution in attempting to draw inferences regarding a firm’s quality or future stock market performance from its ranking on any particular corporate governance measure. If we absolutely had to make a choice between using an index and one variable, we would, in fact, select one variable, the median independent director’s stockholdings,

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7 For other commentators raising concern about the leading governance indices see Rose, supra note 3 and
which we conclude from the research that two of us have undertaken, performs better overall
with respect to evaluating corporate performance. Most important, the regulatory implication of
our analysis is that corporate governance is an area where a regulatory regime of ample flexible
variation across firms that eschews governance mandates is particularly desirable, because there
is considerable variation in the relation between different governance indices and different
measures of performance.

The first part of the paper briefly summarizes the principal mechanisms of corporate
governance and then turns to the indices that have been advanced to measure the quality of
firms’ corporate governance. Details on the indices’ construction are provided in an appendix.
The next part introduces our methodological concerns regarding the indices’ construction and
discusses recent work by two of us on the relation between governance mechanisms and
performance that calls into question findings in the academic literature concerning that relation.
In the final section, we turn to the central question for investors and policymakers of how best to
use corporate governance indices, drawing upon the earlier analysis, to suggest when, if ever,
specific governance measures might prove to be useful for decisionmaking, and, more
importantly, what direction corporate governance regulation ought to take.

2. Corporate Governance Indices

There are now a number of corporate governance indices that have been created as
measures of the quality of a firm’s governance. After identifying the principal institutions of
corporate governance from which the indices are derived, we explain the construction of the
leading indices.

Sonnenfeld, supra note 3.
A. Institutions of Corporate Governance

The key focus of U.S. corporate law and corporate governance systems is what is referred to as an agency problem, the organizational concern arising when corporate ownership and control are separated. The problem is that when managers and shareholders are not identical, managers may take actions that benefit themselves at shareholders’ expense. They may, for example, not work as diligently as they could because the increase in firm value that hard work produces is shared with the stockholders (in proportion to their equity investments) while the managers bear the full cost of their greater exertion compared to working less diligently on the job. The panoply of mechanisms by which managers are incentivized and/or constrained to act in the shareholders’ interest constitute a firm’s corporate governance. Corporate law seeks to facilitate and support those mechanisms by providing an organizing framework. The most elemental components of a corporate governance system are the board of directors, shareholder meetings and shareholder voting, and executive compensation.8

1. Key Mechanisms of Corporate Governance

Directors who are not employees of the corporation (independent or outside directors) are considered by some commentators and many institutional investors to be the crucial corporate governance mechanism for monitoring managers.9 Congress and the stock exchanges under the shadow of the SEC have codified this notion of the directors’ role, by mandating, respectively, appointment of independent directors to all of the audit committee positions, and to all of the

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compensation and nominating committee positions as well as to a majority of the board.\textsuperscript{10} In addition, investor groups identified with public pension and union funds have outlined what they consider best practices, of which a principal component is for the entire board to consist of independent directors, including the board chairman.\textsuperscript{11}

Shareholder meetings and voting rights provide owners with an opportunity to select and replace directors, to approve or reject management initiatives offered for their consideration, and to present proposals for management’s consideration and otherwise interact directly with management. Institutional investor activism in recent years has focused on this governance mechanism, through sponsorship of proposals and negotiation with management over the proposals’ substance, on a variety of governance issues, such as takeover defenses and executive compensation.\textsuperscript{12} Such activism is also connected to the governance mechanism of the board of directors, in that, shareholder proposals often seek to increase the representation of independent directors on the board, although the current emphasis has been directed at the number of votes required to elect directors.

Shareholders who own a block of stock are better able to make use of their ownership to monitor managers than small shareholders, because the cost of a blockholder’s activism is more likely to be recouped by the pro rata benefits obtained, as it is spread over more shares. Blockholders are therefore often characterized in the academic literature as a mechanism of

\textsuperscript{9} CII website, supra note 8.
\textsuperscript{10} Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 301, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 775-77 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78j-l(m); NYSE standard, supra note 8. All exchange rules, which include these listing requirements, must be approved by the SEC.
\textsuperscript{11} E.g., CII website, supra note 8.
\textsuperscript{12} Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism A Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J. on Reg 174 (2001); CII website, supra note 8.
corporate governance. The most acute example of this governance mechanism is the hostile takeover, as it typically results in the concentration of ownership that fully internalizes the costs and benefits of the agency problem. Moreover, even the threat of such action can function as a disciplinary mechanism of managers. Accordingly, institutions that not only create blocks but also facilitate control changes are often characterized as critical backstop components of corporate governance. If agency costs become too high, it will be profitable to take over the firm and concentrate control, reducing those costs. Firms that adopt defenses to takeover devices to impede control changes are thus conventionally characterized as firms with poor corporate governance, and the absence of such defenses is correlatively identified as a feature of good corporate governance. The market for control is referred to in the literature as an “external” governance mechanism – it is an institution that disciplines managers but it is external to the firm – in contrast to firms’ “internal” governance institutions, such as the board of directors, which are instruments constraining the agency problem over which firms have control.

A final important component of firms’ internal governance is executive compensation. There is a well-developed literature on the fashioning of incentives to achieve consonancy between manager’s actions and shareholders’ interest through the use of stock and stock option compensation. Until the spate of corporate scandals that came to light starting with Enron,

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14 Shareholder activism – the creation of the Council of Institutional Investors and the sponsorship of shareholder proposals by public pension funds and other institutional investors – was initiated in the 1980s in response to management efforts to thwart hostile takeovers. The bulk of investor activism has been directed at repealing firm-level defenses. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 12.
compensation in the form of stock and stock options was often emphasized as a key to improved corporate performance, and it has been the most substantial component of executive pay for well over a decade. Even Congress implicitly accepted that understanding when it eliminated the corporate income tax deduction for executive salaries in excess of $1 million, since the limitation was applicable only to non-incentive-based compensation (i.e., deductions could be taken for bonus, stock or stock options tied to market performance measures worth more than $1 million).\(^\text{16}\) Moreover, an important study by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy lent support to this view, as it documented what they considered to be trivial responsiveness of executive compensation to stock performance.\(^\text{17}\) They viewed this mismatch of incentives to be a matter of serious policy concern, and advocated increasing equity incentive compensation.\(^\text{18}\)

The tide of popular opinion turned against equity and option-based compensation, however, after Enron and other corporate accounting scandals came to light, fueled by repeated assertions in the media from journalists, commentators, and public and union pension funds, that executive compensation is unreasonably high. This turn of events is not an altogether surprising development, as executive compensation has historically been a target of populist press attacks

\(^{16}\) IRC §162(m). The provision was enacted in 1993 as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, at a time of public criticism of executive compensation. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram. "Regulating Executive Pay: Using The Tax Code To Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation," 20 J. Labor Econ. S138 (2002). Some commentators have attributed the Enron and related corporate scandals to that legislation. The contention is that, because managers could only receive substantial compensation in the form of stock and stock options, they had incentives to engage in accounting manipulation to maintain high stock prices. E.g., Bruce Bartlett, Not So Suite: Clinton Tax Law is Problem, Not Greedy Execs, National Review online (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof_bartlett/bartlett092502.asp.

\(^{17}\) Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 225 (1990). They calculated that CEO compensation changed by only $3.25 for a $1,000 change in stock value.

after market declines. The scandals of 2001-02 revived executive compensation as an issue because some scandal-ridden firms’ executives reported gains in the range of tens and hundreds of millions of dollars from stock option exercises before their firms imploded, and those gains were now a sore point to, among others, investors whose stock was worthless and employees whose jobs were lost. The phenomenon also affected managers of firms not tainted by scandal, but who had sizeable gains on option exercises while their shareholders’ investments were tanking in the market decline following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a decline that continued throughout the revelations of accounting frauds in 2002.

Managerial incentive alignment through equity ownership has not, however, been entirely discredited or jettisoned as an important mechanism of corporate governance by those who consider executive compensation “excessive.” Rather, even the most severe critics of executive compensation have advocated structural changes to give shareholders greater control in director elections, as opposed to elimination of incentive pay altogether. Similarly, the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), an association of pension funds that lobbies on corporate governance, issued a statement on executive compensation policy that recommends restrictions on the form and amount of incentive compensation, but not its abandonment.

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20 See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance 189-216 (2004). Their belief is that such institutional modifications will provide incentives to reduce compensation by facilitating the election of directors who approve either smaller compensation packages for management or the use of incentive compensation keyed to relative performance rather than general stock market movements.

the focus of institutional investor activist attention has been to require shareholder approval of
the chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation, by means of shareholder proposals sponsored
by union funds, an approach that would be mandated for all public companies under legislation
introduced by the current chairman of the House of Representatives’ Financial Services
Committee, which has jurisdiction over the SEC.22

2. Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance

The empirical literature investigating the effect of individual corporate governance
mechanisms on corporate performance has not systematically identified positive effects and is, at
best, inconclusive. There have been innumerable studies examining the impact of board
composition on performance, and the decisive balance of studies finds no relation between
director independence and performance, whether measured by accounting or stock return
measures.23 Similarly, most studies seeking to measure the impact on performance of
shareholder activism in the form of sponsoring shareholders proposals find no significant stock
price effect from that activity.24 When negotiations over proposals that result in the proposal’s

22 See, e.g., L. Reed Walton, Will Other Firms Follow Aflac?, in Institutional Shareholder Services
Governance Weekly (Feb. 23, 2007); and Potential Legislation, in id.
23 For literature reviews see, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921 (1999); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law
and Corporate Governance, 5 Indus. & Corp. Change 277, 284-90 (1996). In fact, in a few instances,
researchers find a positive impact on performance from the presence of inside, rather than outside,
directors. E.g., Bhagat & Black, supra; April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure,
41 J. L. & Econ. 275 (1998). The literature reviews by Bhagat and Black and Romano also summarize the
results of the many studies examining whether independent boards make different decisions from
nonindependent boards, and whether the outcomes benefit shareholders, and here the data are mixed, with
occasional examples of independent boards outperforming nonindependent ones. For example, studies
have found a higher probability of a CEO’s termination after poor performance when a majority of
directors are independent, and positive price effects from the adoption of poison pills when a majority of
the board is independent. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. Fin.
Econ.431 (1988); James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors and Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. Fin.
Econ. 371 (1994).
24 For literature reviews see e.g., Bernard Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the
withdrawal have been studied, the findings are all over the map with respect to statistical significance, varying with proposal and proponent type, among other factors. At the other end of the activism spectrum, however, proxy fights for board seats have significant positive price effects, whether or not challengers succeed.\textsuperscript{25} The incentive effect from having to spend more substantial resources of one’s own to engage in such challenges, and the more significant organizational consequences that result from such costly efforts, no doubt, would appear to explain the differential performance effect of this activity.

The relation between voting rights and performance has not been as extensively studied as that of board composition, at least in part because most governance activists have focused their attention on the board. With respect to the economic impact of voting rights, while differential voting rights are not particularly prevalent among U.S. firms, studies of corporations issuing dual class stock find significant premiums accorded to the voting shares (where both classes trade),\textsuperscript{26} and some evidence that firm value is positively related to the closer the fraction of insiders’ voting rights is to their fraction of economic ownership (dividend rights), i.e., the closer it approximates one-share one-vote.\textsuperscript{27}

Because voting rights and ownership are two sides of the same coin, studies investigating the relation between ownership and performance can be viewed as equivalent to examining the

\textsuperscript{25} See, e.g., Romano, supra note 12, at 182, 221.
\textsuperscript{26} E.g., Luigi Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q. J. Econ. 1047 (1995). Zingales attributes cross-country premia differentials to the protection the legal regimes offer to the public (noncontrolling) shareholders.
relation between voting rights in firms with only one class of stock and performance. Several of those studies have found nonlinear relations between insider stock ownership and performance.\(^{28}\) That is, for small-scale blocks there are positive valuation effects (presumably from monitoring), but as control increases, the benefits from blockholding decrease, either because there are no economies of scale from blockholding or, the thesis often advanced in the academic literature, because the benefits are offset by potential expropriation. In either scenario, lower firm values are the result.

A similar relation has not, however, been consistently detected for outside block ownership,\(^{29}\) and a comprehensive study of relational investing (outsiders holding large blocks for the long term) did not identify a systematic positive performance effect: the relation was positive only in the late 1980s when the level of hostile takeover activity was high.\(^{30}\) There have been other efforts at measuring the benefit of outside blockholding as a governance device that find stronger results: several studies have found positive price effects upon the formation of outsider blocks.\(^{31}\) Those studies’ findings can be reconciled with the results of the relational relation is significant in only some model formulations.

\(^{28}\) E.g., Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 293 (1988); John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 595 (1990). There is some evidence of a similar nonlinear effect for dual class firms as well. Gompers et al., supra note 27. In part 3 infra, we discuss a serious methodological issue regarding these studies’ tests, the endogeneity between inside ownership and the valuation measure used in the studies.

\(^{29}\) Morck et al., supra note 28 (similar relation); McConnell & Servaes, supra note 28 (no relation). But in a study controlling for growth opportunities, McConnell and Servaes then find a similar nonlinear relation holds for outside as for inside blockholdings. John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 131 (1995).


\(^{31}\) For a literature review see, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 49, 63 (Winter 1988) (results on block formation). These studies were of greenmail, the takeover defensive tactic in which corporations repurchase potential bidders’ shares at a premium, not available to other shareholders, to thwart a hostile
investor study, in that, the blocks whose formation was under study in the former research were held by investors with reputations for engaging in hostile acquisitions. The source of the gains in both studies, accordingly, would appear to be related to the same phenomenon, corporate restructuring: in the case of block formations, market expectations of potential takeover premiums, which incorporate gains acquirers expect to recoup from restructuring; and in the case of relational investments, blockholders “encouraging restructuring that translated . . . into better stock market performance.”

The literature on the performance effects of insider stock ownership, particularly in relation to executive compensation, is less extensive than that on board composition. A few studies have found a positive price effect from the announcement of adoption of stock option compensation plans, and other studies have found a positive relation between management compensation, particularly the equity component, and performance. Studies of the impact of director stock ownership similarly have ambiguous findings; in part the difference depends on the ownership calculation. While some studies find no significant relation between performance

bid; the positive price effects upon the announcement of the formation of the repurchased blocks outweighed the negative price effects upon the announcement of the blocks’ repurchases.

32 Bhagat et al., supra note 30, at 27.
and ownership, calculated as the percentage of shares owned by outside directors. Sanjai Bhagat and Brian Bolton find a significant positive relation, using as the governance measure, the dollar value of the stock ownership of the median director. They provide two rationales for the merits of their ownership metric. First, it is theoretically consistent with the political economy literature that identifies the median voter as the key (marginal) decisionmaker. Second, it is a more plausible benchmark for measuring the incentive effects of ownership because directors, as economic agents, are more likely to focus on policies’ impact on the dollar value of their holdings in the company rather than on their percentage ownership.

There are self-evident concerns in undertaking policy recommendations from research examining the effect on performance of only one dimension of a firm’s governance when governance mechanisms are numerous and interaction effects are quite probable. That is, no doubt, one of the principal explanations for the attention directed at governance indices, which combine multiple governance dimensions. We therefore turn now to review the literature on governance indices.

B. Aggregated Measures of Corporate Governance

The corporate governance indices that are currently in use by academics and commercial vendors vary considerably with respect to which features of firms’ corporate governance are deemed sufficiently important to be included. The initial foray into creating an index was an (positive relation between performance and total compensation).

35 E.g., Mehran, supra note 34.
36 Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance Indices, University of Colorado working paper (2007).
37 Id. The incentive effect can be illustrated by the following simple example. Suppose that Director A owns .01% equity stake in a $10 billion company, while Director B owns a 0.1% equity stake in a $100 million company. A’s stake equates to a $1 million equity ownership, whereas B’s stake equates to a $100,000 equity ownership. All other things being equal, A is likely to devote more time and attention to
academic inquiry, but this line of research has morphed into commercial products that are marketed primarily to institutional investors seeking information about the quality of firms’ corporate governance, as well as to firms wishing to signal governance quality to investors. Because our analysis of comparative performance of governance indices focuses on academic indices, we devote greater attention to those indices than to commercial products.

1. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick “G” index

The creation of corporate governance indices began with GIM’s research, which was published in 2003 but widely circulated in 2001. GIM constructed their index from data on the governance characteristics of over 1,000 firms, including most large public corporations (the Fortune 500 and Standard & Poor’s 500), compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), a nonprofit research group that serves institutional investors. As IRRC’s clients had become active in corporate governance in order to oppose takeover defenses in the 1980s, most of the governance features tracked by the IRRC are defensive tactics. These consist of 22 provisions in firms’ corporate documents (17 of which are takeover-related) and six types of state takeover statutes; because of overlaps between tracked provisions and statutes, the number of distinct items is 24. The firm-level provisions tend to cluster; that is, correlations across

her board responsibilities than B.

38 Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J.Econ. 107 (2003).

39 The specific provisions are identified in the Appendix. GIM note that they supplemented the IRRC firm-level data for coverage under takeover statutes with other sources on state statutes. Id. at 112-13. The publication years of IRRC governance data are 1990, 1993, 1995 and 1998. Id. at 110. In the analysis relating governance to performance, because index values are not available for years when no data were collected, GIM only reset the governance portfolios in the four publication years, which is equivalent to using the values from the last available IRRC volume for the missing years. Id. at 124. The IRRC obtains the governance data from public information sources, such as SEC filings, and the number of firms covered increased over the period. Id. at 111.
most of the 22 firm-level provisions are positive, and many significantly so.\textsuperscript{40}

From these data, GIM construct a governance index that they consider to reflect the “balance of power between shareholders and managers.”\textsuperscript{41} Relying on the IRRC’s judgment as to which corporate governance mechanisms investors consider to be important, for each firm they add up the number of provisions that the firm has of the 24 items, assigning one point for each provision that they view as restricting shareholder rights, and one point for the absence of either of two provisions that they view as constraining manager power and thereby enhancing shareholder rights. GIM thus equally weight the governance features tracked by IRRC in fashioning their measure of corporate governance quality. The sum of the components is the governance or “G” index.

GIM group sample firms into ten portfolios in relation to their “G” scores, approximating deciles of governance quality.\textsuperscript{42} They then examine the relation between the firms’ governance quality and several measures of performance: stock returns; Tobin’s Q; and three accounting measures, net profit margin, return on equity, and sales growth.\textsuperscript{43} The examination of the relation between corporate governance and performance focuses on a comparison between the highest and lowest G-portfolios, which they call, respectively, the “Dictatorship” and

\textsuperscript{40} Of 231 total pairwise correlations, 169 are positive and of those 111 are significant, whereas only 9 of the remaining 62 negative correlations are significant. Id. at 111.

\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 109.

\textsuperscript{42} Although the G index has a potential range of 0 to 24, the actual range is from 2 to 17, with higher scores indicating lower quality. The “G” portfolio cutoffs are (i) less than 6 (the “Democracy” portfolio, consisting of firms with the strongest shareholder rights), (ii) 6 through 13, and (iii) greater than 13 (the “Dictatorship” portfolio, consisting of firms with the weakest shareholder rights). Id. at 115-16. We use the word “approximate” deciles because the number of firms in each of the ten portfolios is not identical. Both the mean and median G score are 9.

\textsuperscript{43} Stock returns are computed using a standard four-factor model that adjusts individual stock returns for market movements, size and market-to-book factor returns, and momentum effects. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets - in practice computed from book values; ratios greater than 1 suggest that a firm is generating excess profits, and therefore is a good performer.
“Democracy” portfolios. GIM find a significant relation between the governance index and stock returns and Tobin’s Q: firms with the poorest corporate governance consistently underperform those with the best corporate governance. In particular, quantifying the effect, the impact of governance on performance appears to be substantial: an investment strategy of buying the Democracy portfolio stocks and selling the Dictatorship portfolio stocks would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent a year or a one-point increase in G is associated with an 11.4 percent decrease in Tobin’s Q by the end of the sample period.

The finding of a relation between the G index and subsequent performance does not, of itself, indicate that better corporate governance caused superior performance. GIM consider three possible explanations of their finding: (i) investors underestimated the cost of poor governance at the outset of the period under study (1990, the first year of the sample); (ii) managers expecting poor performance in the 1990s adopted governance devices in the 1980s that would restrict shareholder rights (i.e., features that GIM, along with the IRRC, consider to be poor corporate governance); or (iii) poor governance is correlated with other unspecified firm characteristics that cause the firms’ subsequent abnormal performance in the 1990s. They attempt to test which hypothesis is correct, and find some evidence supporting the first hypothesis and the third (industry classification explains between one-sixth to one-third of the abnormal performance). They conclude with an appropriately cautionary statement regarding the use of the G index that calls for further study to determine which hypothesis is correct because of the hypotheses’ “starkly different policy implications.”

2. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell E Index

The computation of Tobin’s Q and the accounting measures are industry-adjusted.
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell (BCF) advanced a competing governance index to the G index, one comprised of a subset of the factors comprising it.\(^{44}\) Accepting as the most probable explanation of GIM’s results that corporate governance positively affects performance, BCF sought to construct what they consider to be a better motivated index. To do this they selected six of the IRRC provisions concerning takeover defenses that they considered to be the most entrenching of managers, given their understanding of the operation of corporate law.\(^{45}\) These include the combination of defenses that Bebchuk has emphasized as the most potent defense in work with others (poison pills and staggered boards),\(^{46}\) and golden parachutes, a defense for which there is a scholarly literature disagreeing with BCF’s view that it hinders, rather than encourages, hostile takeovers.\(^{47}\) In construction of their index, BCF follow GIM’s approach, according equal weight (one point) to the presence of any of the six provisions. The index is called the “Entrenchment” or “E” index. BCF expect their index to outperform GIM’s as a predictor of corporate performance, because it contains provisions that, in their view, are most likely to thwart a hostile takeover.\(^{48}\)


\(^{45}\) Id. at 7. The appendix contains the details of the six provisions.


\(^{47}\) See, e.g., David Baron, Tender Offers and Management Resistance, 38 J. Fin. 331 (1983); Marcel Kahan & Ed Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871 (2002). The view that golden parachutes facilitate, rather than thwart hostile takeovers is supported by the event study literature: the adoption of golden parachutes produces significantly positive price effects, in contrast to other defenses. Richard Lambert & Donald Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. Accounting & Econ. 179 (1985).

\(^{48}\) Given the later date of their study, they have two additional years of IRRC governance data than GIM. For years when no IRRC volume was published, BCF equate firms’ index value to the value from the last published volume, as do GIM. As BCF note, this assumes that firms’ governance provisions are unchanged over the interval between IRRC publications, the practice adopted by GIM. Bebchuk et al., supra note 44.
The six provisions that BCF identify as most entrenching also turn out to be the only ones of the 24 components of the G index that are statistically significant in regressions on performance when the estimation is separately undertaken for each component. Accordingly, BCF conclude that the correlation between governance and performance in GIM’s study is driven entirely by the subset of governance factors in the E index.

Examining the relation between the E index and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and stock returns (the same performance measures as used by GIM but with a longer time frame of available data), BCF reconfirm the correlation between governance and future performance found in GIM’s study. They also reconfirm GIM’s finding that a portfolio of low entrenchment/good governance (GIM’s Democracy) firms outperforms a portfolio of high entrenchment/poor governance (GIM’s Dictatorship) firms.

BCF conclude that the E index is preferable as a measure of the quality of a firm’s corporate governance to the G index. It is more parsimonious, better motivated and outperforms the G index. Although GIM’s governance index has been extensively used in the academic literature while BCF’s index has not, BCF’s index has made some commercial inroads. Glass Lewis & Company, which provides research and advisory services to institutional investors, markets a governance ranking, termed the “Board Accountability Index,” that is derived from BCF’s research. It uses five of the six components of the E index, and markets that product as derived from the “fact” that “good governance can improve shareholder returns.”

Glass Lewis describes its governance index, whose use it advocates for formulating an investment strategy, as follows:

“Investing in companies with good governance can improve shareholder returns, as many have suspected for years. This is no longer just a matter of intuition. It’s a fact. A study by Harvard Law School professor Lucian Bebchuk and his colleagues identified a statistically significant and strong correlation, over a long period of time, between stock performance and the degree to
more cautious regarding the use of their results than Glass Lewis, however. They do not conclude that they have demonstrated causation; rather, they state that the evidence is “suggestive” that the set of entrenching governance provisions that they have identified effect performance.\textsuperscript{50}

3. \textit{Brown and Caylor Gov-Score Index}

Lawrence Brown and Marcus Caylor created a more extensive governance index than the G and E indices, using firm-level governance information obtained from ISS.\textsuperscript{51} Their index, which they call “Gov-Score,” is a sum of 51 factors (of 61 factors and 3 combination measures collected by ISS), nine of which are in the G index, and a tenth, incorporation in a state with a takeover statute, which is a composite of the four state takeover statute components of the G index.\textsuperscript{52}

The Gov-Score index has the potential advantage, recognized by its creators, of providing a superior measure of firms’ governance quality because it includes a broader set of components of corporate governance than takeover defenses, which comprise the bulk of the G and E indices.

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\textsuperscript{50} Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 40.
\textsuperscript{52} Id. at 9. Gov-Score thus can range from 0 to 51, but as with the G index, the actual range, from 13 to 38, is substantially narrower than the theoretical range. The mean score of sample firms is 22.50, with a standard deviation of 3.45. Brown and Caylor use a point system that is the opposite of GIM and BCF, assigning one point to “good,” as opposed to “poor,” corporate governance practices, and consequently, a higher Gov-Score signifies higher quality corporate governance, in contrast to G and E index values. The appendix details the composition of the Gov-Score index.
It is also derived from a larger database than the other two indices (over 2,000 firms). But it
does have a comparative disadvantage, that it is constructed from only one year of data, 2003
(the first year in which ISS began collecting the information), in contrast to the multiple years of
IRRC data available for the G and E indices. On the other hand, because it is derived from 2003
data, it does measure firms’ corporate governance in a post-Enron environment, in contrast to the
other two indices, which makes analyses based on it arguably more relevant for current policy
considerations.53

Brown and Caylor examine correlations between the Gov-Score and several accounting
performance measures (some overlapping with the measures examined by GIM), Tobin’s Q,
dividend payouts and share repurchasing. They do not adjust performance measures by industry,
as do GIM and BCF, nor do they examine stock returns. They find significant correlations
between Gov-Score and many of the performance measures, with superior performance being
associated with higher Gov-Scores (higher quality governance).54

One major difference between Brown and Caylor’s findings and those of the other two
studies is the relation between takeover defenses and performance. Brown and Caylor find that
the executive and director compensation category of governance factors in their index is more
highly associated with good performance than are takeover defenses, the category of Gov-Score
factors that contains virtually all of the provisions that overlap with those in the G and E indices.
Moreover, they find that takeover defenses are significantly correlated in the right direction only

53 The commercialization of governance ratings, discussed later in this section, has led both the IRRC and
ISS to compile governance data more frequently: the IRRC data available online have been biennially
updated, and the ISS data are annually updated, and have been backfilled for 2001, for its proprietary
product.
54It should be noted that these are univariate tests. While a multivariate analysis is undertaken for the
Gov-Score, most of the analysis involving the association between performance and the Gov-Score,
with Tobin’s Q; they are significantly correlated in the wrong direction with four other performance measures (that is, firms with more defenses, or poorer governance, are associated with superior performance).\(^55\) Undertaking a comparative performance evaluation of governance indices, they find that Gov-Score is more highly correlated with firm performance than the G index; it is significantly correlated with more of their performance measures (and insignificant when the sign of the correlation is wrong) than is the G index, which is often insignificant or significant in the wrong direction.\(^56\) Brown and Caylor are careful not to attribute causation to their findings in drawing conclusions from their results. But they do conclude that it is preferable to use as a measure of governance quality, an index that consists of more dimensions than takeover defenses.

Finally, Brown and Caylor further refined their analysis of the relation between governance by identifying a subset of seven components of the Gov-Score that are the key drivers of all of the significant results relating the Gov-Score and performance, paralleling BCF’s parsing of the G-index into a subset of significant components in the E index. They call this smaller index Gov-7.\(^57\) Only two of the factors in Gov-7 are takeover defenses, while the other five are unrelated to defenses and are instead related to executive compensation and boards of directors. Brown and Caylor therefore interpret their results as partially confirming BCF’s

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\(^55\) Id. at 23-24, 30.

\(^56\) Id. at 25-26.

\(^57\) Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=754484. The appendix identifies the seven factors. This study was undertaken in response to implicit criticism by BCF of the Gov-Score as being too inclusive in construction. Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 40 (“Looking beyond the set of IRRC provisions, our analysis cautions against the ‘kitchen-sink’ approach of building ever-larger indexes of governance measures. … adding more provisions to an index is not harmless; in this area, less can be preferable to more.”)
analysis: staggered boards and poison pills are negatively related to performance, and only a subset of governance factors matters (BCF’s principal finding). But they emphasize that what distinguishes their research is the finding that internal governance mechanisms, such as the board and executive compensation, are as important for firm value as external mechanisms (the market for corporate control), in contrast to the focus on external governance of both BCF and GIM, whose indices are tallies of takeover defenses.

4. Proprietary Governance Indices

The commercial indices ranking public corporations’ governance quality, which are provided by proxy advisory services, differ distinctively from the academic ones on some dimensions. First, firms’ scores on the proprietary indices do not consist of summations of equally-weighted factors. Rather, commercial index providers vary the weights accorded different governance factors, using either their discretion regarding the importance of the factor or quantitative analyses to determine the appropriate weights. Second, commercial indices deemphasize takeover defenses, in contrast to the indices constructed by GIM and BCF. Some

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58 Commercial providers or proxy services whose governance measures are jointly summarized are ISS, Egan-Jones Proxy Services, GovernanceMetrics International and The Corporate Library (TCL). Details on the specifics of these governance indices are in the appendix. The proxy services offered by the firms vary, including research and recommendations on proxy voting, automated vote execution, recordkeeping and disclosure reporting for institutional investors. Some firms, and in particular the dominant market player, ISS, also provide governance and proxy consulting services to issuers.

59 E.g., TCL’s “Board effectiveness score” is a weighted average of seven governance components and an analyst adjustment that takes into account a personal assessment of governance quality, see http://www.thecorporatelibor.com/special/misc/OfficeMax.pdf (hereafter TCL Rating Explanation); GovernanceMetrics’ overall rating is derived from a sophisticated statistical algorithm assigning weights to various individual metrics in relation to other firms in its universe, see http://www.gmiratings.com/hgwaa055h0jivi055scbird45/about.aspx#methodology; and ISS assigns weights to the components of its Corporate Governance Quotient as a function of their correlations with several measures of firm performance, see http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGQOverviewChanges.pdf (hereafter ISS Overview).

60 Indeed, the governance index of the newest entrant into the market, Egan-Jones, does not even contain an express reference to takeover defenses. See http://www.ejproxy.com/about.aspx. Glass Lewis’ index,
do not even include defenses as a governance factor while those that include defenses place higher weights on the non-takeover-related factors (internal governance measures such as board and executive compensation attributes). Third, some commercial indices are relative rankings of firms in relation to other firms in their industry, market or geographic region, whereas the academic indices are absolute rankings of governance quality independent of the practices of comparable firms. Finally, the leading provider by far of this type of service, ISS, updates the factors in its index to capture trends in corporate governance. For example, it recently incorporated two items that have become the focus of activist institutional investor attention: majority voting for directors and option backdating, while eliminating option expensing (since expensing is now required).

The difference in index construction across academic and commercial creators can be best explained as a function of expertise, which commercial providers believe they possess, and a differing analytical approach to governance. The academic index constructors intentionally sought not to make choices regarding the weights assigned to governance attributes and the rationale for the financial economist-index creators is twofold: first, they do not hold themselves out to be experts in assessing governance quality, compared to the vendors from which they acquired the data; and second, there is an understandable desire to immunize their work from potential charges of “stacking the deck” for favorable results, compared to what would appear to

which is derived from BCF’s work and therefore not summarized in this section, is the one exception.

61 This is true of the ratings provided by GovernanceMetrics and ISS.
62 Institutional Shareholder Services Releases New CGQ Ratings Criteria, ISSmarketing@proxy.com (Nov. 13, 2006). The constant tweaking of the index could explain why ISS’ website discussion of the “performance metrics” used to determine the weights in the corporate governance quotient suggests that many of the correlations between its’ index’s components and firm performance measures are high, see ISS Overview, supra note 59, in contrast to Brown and Caylor’s finding that only a few of the ISS attributes were highly correlated with their performance measures, see note 57, supra.
be a more plausibly neutral approach, equal weighting of a large number of attributes identified by third-party governance experts. By contrast, commercial vendors are actively marketing governance expertise and therefore would be expected to exercise judgment on the weights accorded to the different components of an index as well as across firms.

Expertise is, in fact, a differentiating marketing strategy used by The Corporate Library (TCL). TCL provides both a board effectiveness rating (a governance quality assessment that follows a proprietary formula along the lines of the principles noted above, with varying weights that are higher for internal governance features and a discretionary component) and a compliance rating (constructed along the lines of academic indices by tallying the presence or absence of numerous specified good governance factors). But it contends that the effectiveness rating is the preferred metric for assessing quality, and discourages use of the compliance rating for that purpose (which rating is provided for comparative purposes, to “evaluate compliance with traditional measures of corporate governance” and which is not factored into the board effectiveness rating).63 TCL faults the compliance rating for being a “best practices list” that takes a “one-size-fits-all approach” to governance, an approach that in its judgment is too limited to measure the quality of a firm’s governance.64

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63 TCL Rating Explanation, supra note 59, at 29.
64 See id. at 8. TCL provides as evidence of the superiority of its effectiveness rating over the best practices approach that informs the academic indices’ construction that the Enron corporation received a low effectiveness rating but a high compliance rating. Id. at 29. Paul Rose, who agrees with the concern expressed by TCL that good corporate governance is not served by forcing uniformity in firms’ governance practices -- as occurs when a governance quality metric depends on the presence of a set of specific governance mechanisms -- considers the subjectivity of TCL’s effectiveness ranking to be one of its more attractive features, compared to the “objective” quantitative approach of other indices. See e.g., Rose, supra note 3. Rose further suggests a subtle explanation for the difference between TCL’s subjective approach to governance and other commercially provided measures’ more objective, checklist approach: the fact that TCL does not offer consulting services to corporations and the other vendors (such as Glass Lewis and ISS) do. In his view, commercial vendors opt for an objective ranking in order to mitigate the potential conflict of interest in providing both ranking and consulting services, since by using
C. Single Governance Mechanisms versus Indices as a Measure of Governance Quality

As we have elaborated, the dominant approach to evaluating the quality of a firm’s corporate governance today is to construct an index comprised of multiple dimensions of a firm’s governance structure. The endeavor is thought by many of its proponents to be of utmost importance, grounded in the belief that corporate performance is a function of good governance. Some governance scholars, however, consider specific board characteristics to be the critical determinants of corporate governance, and board factors are emphasized by the providers of commercial indices over the takeover-related governance factors emphasized in most academic indices. This raises the fundamental question whether a single board characteristic could be as effective a measure of corporate governance as indices that consider multiple measures of corporate charter provisions and board characteristics? While this is ultimately an empirical question, it is plausible on both theoretical and methodological grounds for a single board characteristic to be superior or as effective a measure of corporate governance as an index. If a single board characteristic could dominate an index as a proxy for good governance, then it could be useful for predicting performance.

Under what theory of the firm could one characteristic be preferred to many to describe a firm’s quality of governance? Corporate law provides the board of directors with the authority to make, or at least ratify, all important firm decisions, including decisions about investment policy, objective criteria, it could be easier to support the “claim that [the] governance analysis is not affected by the provision of other services.” Id. at 27.

65 Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 36 (directors’ stock ownership); James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles & Gregg Jarrell, Leadership Structure; Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board, 3 J. Corp. Fin. 189 (1997) (board duality, which refers to the positions of CEO and chairman being occupied by different individuals); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Evidence 9 Econ. Policy Rev. 7 (2003) (director independence).
management compensation policy, and board governance itself. The board’s pivotal role suggests focusing on its attributes in order to identify a single governance variable that might serve as an alternative to an index. It is theoretically possible, and intuitively plausible, that an independent board, or board members with stock ownership, will have adequate incentives to provide effective oversight of important corporate decisions and monitoring of management action implementing those decisions. According to board independence or outside board members’ stock ownership are excellent candidates for a single characteristic that could best an index as a proxy for overall good governance.

Evaluating the quality of a firm’s governance from a single board characteristic rather than a multi-factor index might be justified on econometric grounds as well. The measurement error in computing a single variable such as a board’s stock ownership, for instance, might well be lower than that of an index, which requires accurate identification of a multitude of board processes, executive compensation practices, and firm charter and bylaw provisions. Namely, the more numerous the attributes of governance that must be tracked to identify the quality of a firm’s governance, the greater the possibility of error in recording the value of any one component and hence, in measuring overall quality. And the greater the imprecision in the calculation of the proxy for firms’ governance quality, the higher the probability that the statistical analysis of the relation between governance and performance will be misspecified.

For economic models in which outside directors have incentives to build reputations as expert monitors see Eugene Fama Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980); Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. Law & Econ. 301 (1983). The legal literature has long held this view of independent directors, e.g. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation (1976), and of the incentives provided by directors’ stock ownership, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995). For an economic model that suggests that equity compensation for outside directors will increase board monitoring see Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their
This is not to say that there are no analytical problems presented by single governance variables. There are. For example, the independence of the board is conventionally identified by the proportion of directors who are neither employed nor affiliated (i.e., have material relations with) a firm, but there are data indicating that not all such independent directors are equal with respect to monitoring effectiveness, findings suggesting that using board independence alone as a proxy for governance may result in misspecification of statistical analyses. Rather, we simply think that the identification and measurement problems are even more problematic with respect to indices.

For instance, construction of an index requires that all of the variables in the index be weighted. The weights a particular index assigns to individual board characteristics and other governance features are critical. If the weights are not consistent with the weights used by market participants in assessing the relation between governance and firm performance, then

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67 See, e.g., Eliczer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 61 J. Fin. 689 (2006) (finding less monitoring by boards with a majority of independent directors who serve on multiple boards, since CEO turnover following poor performance with such boards is indistinguishable from that for insider-dominated boards, in contrast to prior research finding majority independent director boards were more likely to replace CEOs of poorly performing firms than insider boards), and the following studies, among others, that find that with respect to audit committee composition, it is not director independence, but independent directors with appropriate financial accounting expertise, that improves firm value, e.g., Mark L. DeFond, Rebecca N. Hann & Zuesong Hu, Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors? 43 J. Accounting Res. 153 (2005); Andrew J. Felo, Srinivasan Krishnamurthy & Steven A. Solieri, Audit Committee Characteristics and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis (2003); Roman L. Weil, Douglas J. Coates & M. Laurentius Marais, Audit Committee Financial Literacy: A Work in Progress, CRSP Working Paper no. 605 (2005). Similarly, computation questions can arise for another governance variable that is often investigated singly, equity ownership of management. Whether the relevant ownership for incentive purposes is the percentage of outstanding shares or the dollar value of the shares held by the manager depends on how the manager’s actions that outsiders cannot monitor are expected to affect firm value. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 F.R.B.N.Y. Econ. Policy Rev 27, 31 (2003).
incorrect inferences would be drawn regarding the relation between governance and firm performance, even if the governance components in the index are correctly measured.

A further critical problem with a weighting system for an index of governance quality is that good governance features may well be substitutes and the interactions may also be complex and subtle. If that is the case, then it would be incorrect to treat them as complements, as is the effect of assigning positive weights to all of the good governance attributes of an index -- the approach of the academic indices – and such an index ranking will provide an inaccurate measure of the relative quality of firms’ governance. Although hardly any modeling of corporate governance has been undertaken, so that there is no satisfactory theory of when or whether different aspects of good governance should be understood to be substitutes or complements, empirical research indicates that at least several such mechanisms are, in fact, substitutes. This finding severely complicates an assessment of good governance practices using a simply constructed index.

In particular, in an important recent paper, Stuart Gillan, Jay Hartzell and Laura Starks (GHS) find that measures of high quality internal and external governance are inversely correlated. GHS examined the corporate governance features of over 2,000 firms from 1997-}

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68 For example, comprehensive reviews of key governance mechanisms -- boards of directors and outside blockholders -- emphasize that the theoretical modeling of these devices is extremely limited to nonexistent. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 F.R.B.N.Y. Econ. Policy Rev. 7 (2003); Clifford G. Holderness, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, 9 F.R.B.N.Y. Econ. Policy Rev. 51 (2003).

69 Stuart Gillan, Jay Hartzell & Laura Starks, Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence form Board Structure and Charter Provisions (manuscript 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917544. As they note, most studies of corporate governance investigate a single governance mechanism and do not examine the interaction of different devices. Id. at 4. A few other papers also find different attributes of good governance are substitutes, e.g., Mehran, supra note 34 (finding blockholding substitutes for use of executive incentive compensation); David Mayers, Anil Shivdasani & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Board Composition and Corporate Control, 31
2000 to investigate the relation between board attributes and charter provisions relating to takeover defenses, which comprise the G and E indices. Their aim was to determine whether a strong independent board is a substitute or complement for the external governance of the market for corporate control. If firms with independent boards adopt few defenses (have low G values), then internal and external governance mechanisms are functioning as complements, whereas if firms with such boards adopt many defenses (have high G values), then the mechanisms are substitutes.

In addition to univariate comparisons of board features with defenses, GHS use two statistical techniques to determine the clustering of different attributes of boards that relate to their independence, such as composition, size, committee characteristics, and separation of the positions of CEO and board chairman, in relation to defenses.70 No matter which methodology employed, they find that the strength of the independence of the board is positively correlated with the number of defenses (high G index values), that is, internal and external governance mechanisms are substitutes. They further find that such correlated sets of governance features are correlated with other characteristics of firms (such as firm age, institutional ownership, R&D

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Evidence from the Insurance Industry, 70 J. Bus. 33 (1997) (finding mutuals employ more outside directors than stock insurance companies, consistent with independent boards being substitutes for market for control); Morris G. Danielson & Jonathan M. Karpoff, On the Uses of Corporate Governance Provisions, 4 J. Corp. Fin. 347 (1998) (finding firms with poison pills have low inside ownership, high institutional ownership and high proportion of outside directors). We only discuss the Gillan, Hartzell & Starks (GHS) paper in the text not only because it is the most recent but also because it is the most comprehensive, with the largest data set, and the most closely related to our concerns. GHS examine the interaction of the G index with governance variables not included in it, while undertaking extensive statistical analyses, including a simultaneous equations estimation that takes into account the methodological concerns with the index literature that we discuss in part 3.B. concerning the endogeneity of governance choices.

70 The two techniques identify commonalities across firms’ governance characteristics: a cluster analysis that groups firms by their board and charter choices (so that within each four groups of sample firms the homogeneity of governance is maximized while across the groups heterogeneity is maximized) and a principal components analysis that groups board governance attributes into summary structure measures,
expenditures, tangible assets, capital expenditures). Thus, a conventional metric of good corporate governance— independent boards -- is associated with a conventional measure of poor corporate governance— entrenched management -- as well as the specifics of firms’ operating environment. These associations strongly suggest that evaluating firms according to how they do with respect to a specific governance index is problematic and likely to produce an inaccurate understanding of the operation of corporate governance mechanisms. Governance choices vary with specific characteristics of firms, and high quality governance on one dimension may offset a need for what are conventionally thought to be best practices on another governance dimension.

3. Is there a Relation between Governance and Performance?

Although the development of academic governance indices has given vitality to, if not sparked, the flourishing of a commercial market for indices, the academic literature which introduced indices has not satisfactorily answered the question whether there is a causal relation between governance and performance. Namely, although GIM, BCF and Brown and Caylor find positive associations with their indices’ rankings of firms’ governance quality and performance, correlations are, obviously, not causation, and subsequent work has even questioned whether a positive association truly exists. After reviewing key research that indicates the findings associating governance quality as measured by the academic indices with performance are not robust, we discuss econometric issues that complicate investigation of the relation between governance and performance. We then summarize the findings of a study by two of us that shows that when those econometric issues are addressed, the relative performance of governance indices is not always superior to single governance variables in predicting corporate

whose relation to the G index across firms is then explored. Gillan et al., supra note 69, at 13, 19-20.
A. Robustness of the Relation Identified by Academic Index Creators

GIM’s findings of a significant correlation between governance and performance attracted a great deal of attention, at least in part because the overwhelming balance of the literature on individual governance characteristics up to then did not find a systematic relationship with performance. In addition, it appeared as though one could make money by trading on firms’ publicly-disclosed governance characteristics, which would be inconsistent with market efficiency, a central concern of financial economics. Not surprisingly, financial economists sought to test the robustness of GIM’s finding and of their explanation of the data. Several of these studies found that the relation and the explanation do not hold up when more closely examined. We review three of the more important studies, to convey a sense of the fragility of GIM’s (and their progeny’s) findings of a significant connection between governance indices and performance, and consequently, to inject an element of realism into policy discussions relating to the adoption of an index-like approach to corporate governance regulation or investment decisionmaking.

1. Lehn, Patro and Zhao: Causation runs from performance to governance

Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro and Mengxin Zhao investigated the issue of causality concerning GIM’s finding of a correlation between governance and performance, by examining the relation between firms’ performance in the 1980s, a period before the takeover defenses

71 For example, although published in 2003, the article has already been cited in 50 articles in the Social Sciences Research database available in Westlaw (searched June 3, 2006). On the SSRN electronic database, it has over 4,000 downloads and is that database’s 113th most downloaded paper. The article also won the 2002 Geewax, Terker & Company Prize in Investment Research for the best working paper that year, a prize awarded by the Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.
comprising the G index were adopted, and performance in the 1990s, the period of performance that GIM find is correlated with the G index. The idea is that because governance mechanisms preventing takeovers were not in place in the early 1980s, valuation measures from that time period could not be affected by those governance devices.

Lehn et al. find that after controlling for performance in the 1980s, the relation between governance and Tobin’s Q in the 1990s identified by GIM disappears. The 1980s valuations are correlated with both the 1990s governance measures and valuation. Moreover, a regression to explain the G index is run on both lagged and leading values of Tobin’s Q, and the lagged valuations from the 1980s explain the governance rating but the lead valuations from the 1990s do not. These findings are replicated if they use BCF’s E index instead of the G index.

Lehn et al. interpret the data as supporting the hypothesis that causation runs from performance to governance, and not the other way around. Namely, firms with low valuations (poor performers) in the early 1980s adopted defensive tactics in the late 1980s, and continued to have low valuations thereafter in the 1990s. They suggest two possible explanations for the association: low valued firms may be poorly managed and therefore more likely to become takeover targets, or low valued firms have fewer growth opportunities than other firms, and low growth firms may be more likely to become takeover targets than other firms. In either scenario, the low-valued firms would be more likely to adopt takeover defenses, which would affect the value of the G index, as opposed to an explanation working the other way around, from G index to performance.

73 Id. at 12. This is the hypothesis that GIM rejected of the three hypotheses that they proposed to explain their data.
2. Core, Guay and Rusticus: Market anticipation of relation between governance and performance

John Core, Wayne Guay and Tjomme Rusticus also question GIM’s explanation of their findings and the issue of causation. Core et al. investigated what they consider a puzzle in GIM’s study, the finding of a significant relation between governance and performance as measured by stock returns but not by accounting earnings. They hypothesize that if the explanation for the findings is, as GIM suggest, that investors misperceived the relation between governance and performance at the start of the period under study, then the market should be surprised if earnings are higher (lower) than expected for good (poor) governance firms or if takeover probabilities are higher (lower) than expected for good (poor) governance firms.

Using operating return on assets, which Core et al. note the accounting literature considers to be the “more powerful measure” of operating performance, rather than GIM’s accounting measure of return on equity, they document a significant negative relation between operating performance and the G index, in contrast to GIM. Next, to determine whether the abnormal stock returns are due to investor surprise that firms with poor governance have lower performance, they examine the relation between the G index and analyst forecasts as well as earnings announcements. The hypothesis is that if investors misunderstand the effect of governance on performance, then they will be surprised when the earnings of poorly (well) governed firms are low (high) relative to forecasted earnings. Over a variety of intervals (one quarter to five years), they find that analysts’ forecasts predict the poor performance of high G

75 Id. at 656.
index (poor governance) firms. They also find no difference in stock returns surrounding earnings announcements of both poor and well governed firms (low and high G index firms). These results suggest, Core et al. contend, that neither analysts nor investors are surprised by the performance of firms in relation to their governance. They are therefore disconfirming the investor misperception hypothesis suggested by GIM in explanation of their data.

Core et al. further conclude that differences in the probability of takeover, based on completed takeovers for their sample firms, do not explain the abnormal returns in GIM’s study across the two extreme G index portfolios (the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios). In fact, the Dictatorship portfolio firms have a higher takeover probability in the mid 1990s than the Democracy portfolio firms, which have a higher takeover probability in the early and late 1990s. Moreover, the differences in annualized probabilities over the entire period are too small to explain the difference in abnormal returns that GIM report. Lastly, eliminating the acquired firms from the analysis does not eliminate the return differential across the two portfolios.

What do they propose, then, as the explanation? They provide data suggesting that the GIM result might be time-specific. In examining the returns on the investment strategy hedging the two extreme portfolios (shorting the poor governance firms and buying the good governance ones) both over the period studied by GIM (1990s) and four subsequent years (2000-04), they find that all of the significant abnormal returns to the trading strategy occur from 1997-99, and that the relation does not hold up in the later interval, 2000-04. In fact, the value of the hedge

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76 Id. at 668.
77 Id. at 671.
78 Id. at 674-76.
79 Id. at 677.
portfolio sharply declines in that period (compared to its increase in GIM’s period of study). This is because the returns to the Democracy portfolio (good governance firms) decreased in the four later years. Core et al. therefore conclude that the data do not support the hypothesis that poor (good) governance causes poor (good) performance.\textsuperscript{80}

3. \textit{Cremers and Nair: Effect of interaction of governance mechanisms on performance}

Finally, Martijn Cremers and Vinay Nair also find that the relation between the G index and performance is not robust. They study the relation between the G index, which they emphasize is a score of external governance mechanisms (exposure to the market for corporate control) and internal governance represented by institutional block ownership, building on the governance literature that considers blockholding to be an important monitoring mechanism.\textsuperscript{81}

They construct portfolios of firms sorted according to their rank on the G index as well as their rank with regard to block ownership, and examine the relationship between firms’ governance and their performance. Cremers and Vinay find that the relation between governance and performance identified by GIM is no longer independently significant when the internal governance variable related to block ownership is included in the analysis.

In particular, they find that neither governance mechanism alone affects performance but specific combinations do so, an interaction effect implying that the mechanisms are complements

\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 685.
\textsuperscript{81} K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60 J. Fin. 2859 (2005). Block ownership is measured as either the percentage of shares held by the largest institutional blockholder, or the percentage of shares held by public pension funds considered to be activist investors. They also construct an alternative takeover index (“ATI”) that consists of a subset of G index factors that are the takeover defenses they consider the more effective mechanisms for preventing hostile bids from their reading of the legal literature (blank check preferred, staggered boards, and either restrictions on shareholders’ right to call shareholder meetings or to act by written consent), in order to minimize any concern that the G index is not properly characterized as solely proxying for external governance. The results are unchanged when firms are ranked by the ATI index rather than the G index.
not substitutes.\textsuperscript{82} Namely, blockholder ownership is important only for firms without takeover defenses (lowest quartile G index firms), and the absence of takeover defenses is important only for firms with an active blockholder (highest quartile of block ownership); those complementary portfolios are the only portfolios that can be used to create trading strategies that generate abnormal profits. With more years of performance data, in contrast to GIM, they find no effect on performance from takeover defenses alone (the G index), and conclude that both forms of corporate governance matter for future performance.

They consider several explanations for their finding in addition to the investor learning explanation offered by GIM, that investors did not understand the impact of corporate governance in 1990, at the outset of their data period. The alternatives include whether the trading strategy’s abnormal returns are (i) unrelated to fundamental performance and instead derived from the market’s view of corporate governance; (ii) due to abnormal returns accruing to future targets or acquirers on the acquisition announcement dates; (iii) or the premium associated with an omitted risk factor that may or may not be related to governance.\textsuperscript{83} To test these hypotheses, they examine the relation between their two governance variables and other performance measures (accounting measures and Tobin’s Q). The findings using the accounting measures duplicate those for stock returns, which they view as inconsistent with the first alternative, that governance is unrelated to changes in performance, although they note that this does not demonstrate causality. They also reject the second hypothesis because when targets and acquirers are removed from the portfolios the findings are unchanged.

\textsuperscript{82} It should be recalled that as discussed in the text and accompanying note 69 supra, GHS find that a different internal governance mechanism, the board of directors, substitutes for the market for control, as opposed to the internal governance device examined by Cremers and Nair and found to be a complement, institutional blockholding.
The results involving Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. While they find that firms with only one high quality governance mechanism (high block ownership or low takeover defenses) do not exhibit abnormal stock returns, they find that those firms have higher Tobin’s Q valuations. Cremers and Nair interpret these findings as evidence that investors “price the importance of individual governance mechanisms correctly,” and hence as the explanation for why there are no abnormal returns.\(^{84}\) Considering the findings regarding trading strategies of the complementary portfolios and the Tobin’s Q valuations, they winnow down the plausible explanations of the data to two, GIM’s learning hypothesis, or the third alternative involving unspecified risk factors. To shed some light on which alternative hypothesis might be correct, they examine the relation between the different combinations of governance portfolios and the variability of performance, as a proxy for risk. They find that the complementary portfolios (those comprised of firms with high quality governance on both dimensions) are indeed associated with more variable performance measures than portfolios where only one such mechanism of good governance is present.\(^{85}\)

Cremers and Nair interpret these data as providing support for the omitted risk factor explanation of their results, that is, that the abnormal returns from trading on the governance portfolios are an artifact of the higher discount rate investors applied to these firms because of their greater risk. They conclude, similar to Brown and Caylor’s conclusions derived from the use of a far more complicated measure of governance quality, the 51 factor Gov-Score, that it is the combination of the quality of a firm’s internal and external governance devices that is associated with superior performance, and not a firms’ defenses alone (what GIM and BCF

\(^{83}\) Id. at 2883-89.

\(^{84}\) Id. at 2889.
B. Econometric Issues: Performance and Governance are Endogenous

A core and knotty econometric problem in the literature examining the relation between governance quality and performance is that the two are not independent. Some governance features may be motivated by incentive-based economic models of managerial behavior, which also affect performance. Broadly speaking, these models fall into two categories, agency (also referred to as moral hazard) and adverse selection models. In agency models, a divergence in the interests of managers and shareholders causes managers to take actions that are costly to shareholders. Such actions are most often characterized as the consumption of perquisites on the job (such as lavish office equipment), but also refer to other means by which managers may exercise discretion to benefit themselves at the shareholders’ expense, such as shirking (lack of effort) or selecting inferior projects from among those available (i.e., projects with too little risk). Contracts cannot preclude this activity if shareholders are unable to observe managerial behavior directly, but ownership by the manager may be used to induce managers to act in a manner that is consistent with the interest of shareholders.86

Adverse selection models are motivated by the hypothesis of differential ability across managers that cannot be observed by shareholders. In this setting, ownership may be used to induce revelation of the manager's private information about cash flow or her ability to generate cash flow, which the shareholders cannot observe. Performance provides information to the

85 Id. at 2888-89.
principal about the ability of the manager, and is therefore reflected in managerial payoffs, which may include dismissal for poor performance.87

In both settings, a manager has information that shareholders do not possess, although shareholders are aware of their informational disadvantage. The contracting problem, similarly, is to write a contract that mitigates the information asymmetry. In either of the two scenarios, some features of corporate governance may be interpreted as a characteristic of the contract governing shareholder-manager relations. Governance is affected by the same unobservable features of managerial behavior or ability that are linked to ownership and performance; it is in this sense that governance and performance are endogenous. Different statistical techniques are necessary to analyze the relation between governance and performance if the variables are endogenously related, than if they are exogenous (that is, than if the relation is one-way, with governance affecting performance, and not bi-directional), the shared assumption of the literature on governance indices that we have reviewed.

In order to lay out the alternative methodology, we need to better specify the potential two-way relationships between different governance attributes, firm characteristics and performance. At least since Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’ classic 1932 work identifying the potential agency problem in U.S. public corporations, economists have emphasized the costs of diffused share ownership; that is, the impact of ownership structure on performance.88 But as Harold Demsetz argues, because we observe many successful public companies with diffused share ownership, clearly there must be offsetting benefits, such as, better risk-bearing, rendering it difficult to assert that concentrated ownership should be positively associated with

Moreover, performance could determine ownership for reasons related to performance-based compensation and insider information. For example, superior firm performance leads to an increase in the value of stock options owned by management which, if exercised, would increase their share ownership. Further, if there are serious divergences between insider and market expectations of future firm performance then insiders have an incentive to adjust their ownership in relation to the expected future performance. Finally, Charles Himmelberg, Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia contend that ownership structure may be endogenously determined by the firm’s contracting environment which differs across firms in observable and unobservable ways. For example, if the scope for perquisite consumption is low in a firm then a low level of management ownership may be the optimal incentive contract.

In addition to ownership, leverage (debt in the capital structure) is a firm characteristic, related to governance in the form of monitoring by creditors, that may be endogenously determined with performance. In a seminal paper, Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart considered the ex ante efficiency perspective to derive predictions about a firm’s financing

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91 Michael Jensen provides another explanation of how debt reduces agency problems: because it must be repaid to avoid the threat of bankruptcy and loss of control of the firm, debt reduces free cash flow – cash in excess of the projects available to the firm that generate positive net present value transactions -- that managers would otherwise waste on negative present value projects rather than return to shareholders, as they would prefer. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
decisions in an agency setting. An initial entrepreneur seeks to maximize firm value with some disciplinary mechanism forcing the entrepreneur to choose the value-maximizing level of debt. Extending that idea, Walter Novaes and Luigi Zingales show that the optimal choice of debt from the viewpoint of shareholders differs from the optimal choice of debt from the managers’ perspective.

The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders over financing policy arises because of three reasons. First, shareholders are much better diversified than managers who besides having stock and stock options on the firm have their human capital tied to the firm. Second, as suggested by Michael Jensen, a larger level of debt pre-commits the manager to working harder to generate and pay off the firm’s cash flows to outside investors. Third, Milton Harris and Artur Raviv and Rene Stulz hypothesize that managers may increase leverage beyond what might be implied by some “optimal capital structure” in order to increase the voting power of their equity stakes, and thereby reduce the likelihood of a takeover and the resulting possible loss of employment.

While the above research focuses on capital structure and managerial entrenchment, a different strand of the literature has focused on the relation between ownership and capital structure. Grossman and Hart and Oliver Hart and John Moore consider an incomplete contracting environment – where it is difficult to specify all possible future states of nature and
relevant decisions in a contract that can be enforced in a court.\textsuperscript{97} In such an incomplete contracting environment, the allocation to management of control rights through stock ownership, rather than provision of contractual payments under compensation agreements, can be used to provide incentives to the managers to make necessary investments (such as investing in firm-specific human capital) that maximize the value of the firm.

This brief overview of the inter-relationships among corporate governance, including capital and ownership structure, and corporate performance, suggests that, from an econometric viewpoint, to study the relationship between corporate governance and performance, one would need to formulate a system of simultaneous equations that specifies the relationships among the above mentioned variables. In recent work, two of us have specified and estimated the following system of four simultaneous equations that capture the interrelationships among these variables that have been proposed in the literature:\textsuperscript{98}

\[
\text{Performance} = f_1(\text{Ownership, Governance, Capital Structure, } Z_1, \epsilon_1), \quad (1a)
\]
\[
\text{Governance} = f_2(\text{Performance, Ownership, Capital Structure, } Z_2, \epsilon_2), \quad (1b)
\]
\[
\text{Ownership} = f_3(\text{Governance, Performance, Capital Structure, } Z_3, \epsilon_3), \quad (1c)
\]
\[
\text{Capital Structure} = f_4(\text{Governance, Performance, Ownership, } Z_4, \epsilon_4), \quad (1d)
\]

where the \( Z_i \) are vectors of control variables and instruments influencing the dependent variables and the \( \epsilon_i \) are the error terms associated with exogenous noise and the unobservable features of


\textsuperscript{98} Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 36.
managerial behavior or ability that explain cross-sectional variation in performance, ownership, capital structure and governance.\footnote{Id.}

Most of the extant literature that we have discussed, such as GIM’s and BCF’s studies, that has analyzed the relation between governance and performance, has just considered the first equation in the above system. This is equivalent to estimating the above system using ordinary least squares (OLS), instead of two-stage least squares (2SLS) or three-stage least squares (3SLS), which are econometrically more appropriate for estimating a system of simultaneous equations.

What happens if one estimates a system of simultaneous equations using OLS? Let us assume for the sake of exposition, that the truth is that there is no relationship between (a certain measure of) governance and (a certain measure of) performance. It is possible for the OLS estimates of the relationship between governance and performance to be statistically insignificant, significantly positive, or significantly negative. On the other hand, if the truth is that there is, say, a positive relationship between governance and performance, it is also possible for the OLS estimates of the relationship between governance and performance to be statistically insignificant, significantly positive, or significantly negative.\footnote{This is a fundamental econometrics point; for example, Kennedy notes, “In a system of simultaneous equations, all the endogenous variables are random variables – a change in any disturbance term changes all the endogenous variables since they are determined simultaneously…As a consequence, the OLS estimator is biased, even asymptotically.” Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics 180 (5th ed 2003). In addition, Maddala observes, “…the simultaneity problem results in inconsistent estimators of the parameters, when the structural equations are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS).” G.S. Maddala, Introduction to Econometrics 383 (2d ed. 1992).} In other words, OLS estimates
of the above system of equations cannot allow us to make any econometrically defensible
inferences about the relationship between governance and performance.\footnote{The economics literature has numerous examples of the inappropriateness of using OLS when the underlying set of relationships suggest a need to estimate a system of simultaneous equations. A good example is a study by Allyn Strickland & Leonard Weiss, Advertising, Concentration, and Price-Cost Margins, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 1109 (1976). This research attempted to address the concern of regulators and policy-makers whether companies in more concentrated industries enjoyed higher profit margins. Like previous researchers they first estimate the impact of industry concentration (C) on price/cost margin in that industry (M) using the following equation where A denotes advertising expenditures.  
\[ M = h_1(C, A, \text{control variables}). \]
When this equation was estimated using OLS, the coefficient on C was significant and positive giving credence to the notion that companies in more concentrated industries enjoyed higher profit margins. However, these authors correctly pointed out that the above equation was but one equation in a system of simultaneous equations. The other two equations in the system are:
\[ A = h_2(C, M, \text{control variables}). \]
\[ C = h_3(A, \text{control variables}). \]
When the above three equations were estimated as a system of equations, there was no significant relation between concentration and profit margin.}

In the next section we illustrate that this general econometric wisdom is correct in the context of estimating the relation between governance and performance: findings regarding the relationship between various governance measures and performance identified in the literature using OLS are not always robust when those relationships are estimated in a system of simultaneous equations. But it should be noted that estimating simultaneous equation systems has its own problems. To estimate a system of simultaneous equations, the researcher must identify exogenous instrumental variables that explain one of the endogenous variables but not the other(s), and with multiple endogenous variables as in the system of equations represented by 1a-1d, an instrument is needed for each of the endogenous variables in an equation.\footnote{E.g., Kennedy, supra note 100, at 188. Technically, an instrument is an explanatory variable that is uncorrelated with the residual or error term of the regression, but correlated with the endogenous variable for which it is an instrument. Id. at 159.}

Identification of such instruments can be exceedingly difficult, because when two variables’ values are integrally connected, it is likely that most explanatory variables affecting one will also


directly affect the other. Thus researchers might use OLS rather than the more appropriate simultaneous equation technique on the rationale that the latter system cannot be estimated properly either.

C. Comparing the Relative Performance of Governance Indices and Single Attributes of Governance in Predicting Future Performance

Bhagat and Bolton undertook a comprehensive comparative analysis of the relationship between governance indices, single attributes of governance, and performance, using the simultaneous equation setup described in equations 1a-1d. Table 1 summarizes their results regarding the relationship between governance and performance. While previous studies have used both stock market- and accounting-based measures of performance, Bhagat and Bolton rely on accounting performance measures, and consider a sample of the largest 1500 U.S. corporations over the period 1998-2002. They emphasize accounting measures rather than stock returns as the appropriate performance measure for this analysis because, if investors anticipate the effect of corporate governance on performance, then long-term stock returns will not be significantly correlated with governance even if a significant correlation between performance and governance indeed exists. Accounting measures, by contrast, do not suffer from an anticipation problem.

Table 1 does not include Tobin’s Q as a performance measure although prior studies, notably those by GIM and BCF, have treated it as a key performance measure. This is because

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103 Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 36.
Tobin’s Q has two serious shortcomings, even though it does not suffer from the anticipation problem of stock returns. First, if a firm has a high fraction of its assets as intangibles rather than tangible assets, and if monitoring intangible assets is difficult for shareholders, then shareholders are likely to require a higher level of managerial ownership to align incentives in such a firm. Because the firm has a high fraction of its assets as intangibles it will have a high Tobin’s Q as the numerator (market price) will impound the present value of the cash flows generated by the intangible assets, but the denominator usually does not include the investments a firm may have made in intangible assets. (This is because, under current accounting conventions, the denominator will not include the replacement value of these intangible assets.) As a consequence, these intangible assets will generate a positive correlation between ownership and performance, but this relation is spurious – due to the calculation of Tobin’s Q -- not causal.

Second, a higher Tobin’s Q might be reflective of a firm’s greater market power (which is an intangible asset that affects the numerator and not the denominator of the ratio). Shareholders, cognizant of the fact that this market power shields the management from the discipline of the product market, will, in all probability, require managers of such a company to own more stock. That is because greater managerial ownership will be expected to tend to align managers’ incentives better and offset the effect of the reduced discipline of the product market. In that scenario we would again observe a spurious relation between performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and managerial ownership.

The results in Table 1 suggest a significant negative correlation between the G index and next year’s return on assets (ROA).\textsuperscript{105} Given that lower G index numbers reflect fewer defenses

\textsuperscript{105} The accounting measure of performance in Table 1 is return on assets because a comprehensive study comparing accounting performance measures by Brad Barber and John Lyon provides evidence favoring
and thus more exposure to the external governance mechanism of the market for control, these findings are consistent with a positive relation between good governance, as measured by GIM, and operating performance. Results using the contemporaneous operating performance are similar. However, this relation is insignificant, albeit the sign is still negative, when we consider the operating performance of the next two years. These findings are consistent with GIM’s finding of a positive relation between good governance and performance for the period 1990-99, and extends their findings to 2000-04.

However, it is important to note that GIM’s finding of a positive relation between good governance and performance is based on long-term stock returns as the measure of performance, and their analysis does not take into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, performance, capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. As previously noted, if investors anticipate the effect of corporate governance on performance, long-term stock returns will not be significantly correlated with governance even if a significant correlation between performance and governance exists. Indeed, as documented by Bhagat and Bolton and summarized in Table 2, there is no significant or consistent relation between GIM’s measure of governance or any other measure of governance and contemporaneous, next year’s or the next two years’ stock returns.

106 Consistent with the findings reported here, Core et al., supra note 74, also find a positive relation between the G index and next year’s ROA, although they also do not take into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, performance, capital structure, and corporate ownership structure.

107 These findings are consistent with those of John Core, Robert Holthausen and David Larcker, who conclude that their governance measures related to board structure (size, director composition, age and tenure, and identity of chairman) and ownership structure (blockholdings) “more consistently predict future accounting operating performance than future stock market performance.” John E. Core, Robert W.

Table 2 here

Table 1 indicates that there is a significant negative correlation between the E index and next year’s ROA. Similar to the G index, lower E index numbers reflect better governance; hence, these results are consistent with a positive relation between good governance, as measured by BCF, and operating performance. Results using the contemporaneous and next two years’ operating performance are similar. But, again, paralleling GIM’s analysis, BCF’s finding of a positive relation between good governance and performance is based on long-term stock returns, and Table 2 indicates that there is no significant relation between BCF’s measure of governance and contemporaneous, next year’s or the next two years’ stock returns.

Single governance variables related to the board of directors also exhibit significant relationships with accounting performance. There is a significant and positive relation between the dollar value of the median director’s stock ownership and contemporaneous, next year’s and next two years’ operating performance. Table 3 and Figure 1 provide additional characterizations of the univariate relationship between board ownership and future operating performance.

Table 3 and Figure 1 here

Similarly, the separation of the positions of CEO and board Chairman (referred to in the literature as CEO-Chair duality) is negatively and significantly related to contemporaneous, next year’s and next two years’ operating performance. This finding, along with the results for the G and E indices, suggests that greater managerial control may lead to worse future operating performance.

Holthausen & David F. Larcker, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. Fin. Econ. 371 (1999).

108 Having an independent (i.e., non-CEO) chairman is frequently included as one of the components indicating the strength of a board’s independence. The governance variable CEO-Chair duality equals 1 if the CEO is Chair and 0 otherwise. Hence, a negative relation between CEO-Chair duality and performance is equivalent to a positive relation between separation of the positions of CEO and Chair and...
performance. It is also in sharp contrast to the previous literature that has generally found no significant relation between CEO-Chair duality and future performance.\textsuperscript{109} Board independence, however, is negatively and significantly related to contemporaneous, next year’s and next two years’ operating performance. This result is surprising, especially considering the recent emphasis that has been placed on board independence by the stock exchanges’ amended listing requirements post-Enron; however, it is consistent with prior literature on boards.\textsuperscript{110}

Table 1 also contains some evidence probative on commercial indices. The TCL compliance rating is unrelated to next year’s and next two years’ operating performance, and its relation with contemporaneous operating performance is negative but only marginally significant.\textsuperscript{111} Furthermore, Brown and Caylor’s Gov-Score (which uses ISS’s assessment of acceptable governance practices) is unrelated to contemporaneous and next year’s operating performance. These findings highlight the problems of constructing a governance index using multiple indicators of board structure and processes, charter provisions, and management compensation structure. As noted earlier, while these features do characterize a company’s governance, construction of a governance index requires the extremely difficult task of properly

\textsuperscript{109} E.g., Ram Baliga, Charles Moyer, & Ramesh Rao, CEO Duality and Firm Performance: What’s The Fuss? 17 Strategic Mgmt J. 41 (1996); James A. Brickley, Coles & Greg Jarrell, Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board, 3 J. Corp. Fin. 189 (1997); Maria Carapeto, Meziane Lasfer, & Katerina Machera, Does Duality Destroy Value? Cass Business School working paper (2005). One possible explanation for the disparity may be that these earlier studies did not control for the endogeneity of performance and governance. In addition the sample sizes in those studies are much smaller than that in Bhagat and Bolton.

\textsuperscript{110} The NYSE and NASDAQ required independent nominating and compensation committees, and majority board independence after the enactment of SOX, see note 10, supra. Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 68, review the literature suggesting a negative, and not positive, relation between the proportion of a board that is independent and performance, in addition to the earlier literature reviews cited in note 23.

\textsuperscript{111} Bhagat and Bolton analyze TCL’s benchmark compliance rating and not its effectiveness rating in their study. The compliance rating is more comparable to the other indices they study, but TCL does not
weighting the variable components. The failure to find a relation between these multiple
dimension indices and performance may well be a function of inapposite weights on the
components, rather than the true absence of a relation between performance and governance.

Finally, Bhagat and Bolton find that the G-index and median director ownership are
uncorrelated. This suggests that a composite measure of governance that combines the
information contained in the G-index and median director ownership might be a more powerful
predictor of operating performance than either measure by itself. For each year, all firms are
ranked from best to worst governed with respect to each of the two governance variables, and the
sum of these two ranks provides a composite governance score (Composite G-Ownership index)
for each year for each sample firm. Consistent with their hypothesis, the combined measure of
governance outperforms either of the two measures taken separately. They find that a 1 percent
improvement in governance as measured by the composite index leads to a 1.874 percent change
in operating performance in the current period, a 1.567 percent change in next year’s operating
performance, and a 1.520 percent change in the next two years’ operating performance. (The
respective changes per 1 percent governance improvement for the G index alone are 0.854
percent, 0.763 percent and 0.287 percent.)

In summary, these findings suggest that certain complex measures of corporate
governance – the G and E indices – and certain simple measures – director ownership and CEO-
chair separation – are positively associated with current and future operating performance. This
further suggests that there is not an obvious benefit to using those more complex measures.
Indeed, governance indices that are comprised of more dimensions than the G and E indices and
are therefore closer in form to indices marketed by commercial vendors such as TCL and ISS,
consider it to be an appropriate measure of governance quality, see text and accompanying note 63, supra.
are not even related to future performance. The combination of only one of those dimensions, outside director ownership, with the G index appears to have a greater impact on future operating performance than any of the governance indices alone.

D. Comparing the Relative Performance of Governance Indices and Single Attributes of Governance in Predicting Management Turnover after Poor Performance

Although the analysis up to now has focused on the relation between governance and overall performance, it is possible that governance matters most, or only, for a firm experiencing a crisis situation, or needing to make a critical decision, such as the decision to change senior management. In this regard, governance may be more important for imposing discipline and providing fresh leadership when the corporation is performing poorly than in the ordinary course of events.112

To investigate this possibility, Bhagat and Bolton examined the impact on management turnover following poor performance of the academic governance indices and single board governance attributes. They estimate a multinomial logit regression in which the dependent variable is equal to 0 if no turnover occurred in a firm-year, 1 if the turnover was disciplinary, and 2 if the turnover was non-disciplinary.113 Using the past two years’ stock return as the performance measure, they estimate the following baseline equation:

\[ \text{Turnover} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{no turnover} \\ 1 & \text{disciplinary turnover} \\ 2 & \text{non-disciplinary turnover} \end{cases} \]

\[ \text{Prob}(\text{Turnout} = 1 | \text{Performance}) = \frac{\exp(X \beta_1 + \text{G Index} \alpha_1)}{\sum_{i=0}^{2} \exp(X \beta_i + \text{G Index} \alpha_i)} \]

\[ \text{Prob}(\text{Turnout} = 2 | \text{Performance}) = \frac{\exp(X \beta_2 + \text{G Index} \alpha_2)}{\sum_{i=0}^{2} \exp(X \beta_i + \text{G Index} \alpha_i)} \]

\[ \text{Prob}(\text{Turnout} = 0 | \text{Performance}) = 1 - \frac{\exp(X \beta_1 + \text{G Index} \alpha_1)}{\sum_{i=0}^{2} \exp(X \beta_i + \text{G Index} \alpha_i)} - \frac{\exp(X \beta_2 + \text{G Index} \alpha_2)}{\sum_{i=0}^{2} \exp(X \beta_i + \text{G Index} \alpha_i)} \]

\[ X = \text{Performance}, \text{G Index}, \text{Other Attributes} \]

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112 See, e.g., Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 68, at 17.

113 Bhagat and Bolton’s criteria for classifying a CEO turnover as disciplinary or non-disciplinary is similar to that of Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 241 (1989); Mark R. Huson, Robert Parrino & Laura T. Starks, Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective, 56 J. Fin. 2265 (2001); and Kathleen A. Farrell & David A. Whidbee, Impact of Firm Performance Expectations on CEO Turnover and Replacement Decisions, 36 J. Accounting & Econ. 165 (2003). CEO turnover is classified as “non-disciplinary” if the CEO died, if the CEO was older than 63, if the change was the result of an announced transition plan, or if the CEO stayed on as chairman of the board for more than a year. CEO turnover is classified as “disciplinary” if the CEO...
Type of CEO Turnover = \( g_i(Past\ 2\ years’\ stock\ return, Z_1, \varepsilon_1) \) \hspace{1cm} (2a)

The \( Z_1 \) vector of controls includes CEO ownership, CEO age, CEO tenure, firm size, industry return and year dummy variables.\(^{114}\) The baseline results indicate that a firm’s stock market returns during the previous two years, CEO stock ownership, and CEO tenure are significantly negatively related to disciplinary CEO turnover; these findings are consistent with the prior literature. Bhagat and Bolton further find that the prior two years’ returns of firms in the industry is significantly positively related to disciplinary CEO turnover. In other words, if the prior industry performance has been good this increases the probability of disciplinary CEO turnover, regardless of the particular company’s performance. Similarly, if the prior industry performance has been poor this decreases the probability of disciplinary CEO turnover, regardless of the particular company’s performance.

To determine the role that governance plays in CEO turnover, Bhagat and Bolton create an interactive variable that is the product of the past two years’ stock return and the governance variable. The reasoning behind this construct is that if the firm is performing adequately, good governance should not lead to CEO turnover; only when performance is poor would we expect to find better governed firms to be more likely to replace the CEO. To measure this effect, they estimate the following modified version of equation 2a:

\(^{114}\) These control variables are motivated by a substantial literature on performance and CEO turnover. See, e.g., Huson, Parrino & Starks, supra note 113 (CEO age and year dummies); Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes \& Xue Wang, CEO Turnover and Properties of Accounting Information, 36 J. Accounting \& Econ. 197 (2003) (CEO age, industry adjusted returns); Farrell \& Whidbee, supra note 113 (CEO tenure, firm size, industry adjusted performance); Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 432 (1988) (CEO share ownership).
Type of CEO Turnover = $g_2(\text{Past 2 years’ stock return, Governance, (Past 2 years’ stock return} \times \text{Governance}), Z_1, \varepsilon_2$) \tag{2b}

As summarized in Tables 4 and 5, Bhagat and Bolton find that when the governance variables are included, the prior return variable is not significant in five of the seven cases, suggesting that poor performance alone is not enough to lead to a change in senior management. In addition, the governance variable by itself is statistically not significant in most cases.\textsuperscript{115} This suggests that good governance \textit{per se} is not related to disciplinary turnover (or that the literature’s definition of good governance is misplaced, at least with respect to disciplinary turnover).

Tables 4 and 5 here

However, the key variable for determining whether governance is related to disciplinary turnover for poorly performing firms is the interactive term. The interactive term when governance is measured by either the percentage of the board that is independent or the dollar value of the median outside director’s stock ownership is positive and significant. These findings suggest that good governance as measured by those single board attributes increases the probability of disciplinary turnover for poorly performing firms.\textsuperscript{116} The interactive term is significantly negative for CEO-Chair duality, which means that when the CEO is also the Chairman, he is more likely to experience disciplinary turnover given poor firm performance.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{115} The exception is that when the CEO is also the Chairman, he is less likely to experience disciplinary turnover.
\textsuperscript{116} The finding that the probability of disciplinary CEO turnover (given poor prior firm performance) increases with greater board independence is consistent with similar findings in Weisbach, supra note 114.
\textsuperscript{117} This result is counterintuitive, given that a CEO-Chairman is thought to be more powerful, hence more entrenched, than a CEO who is not Chairman. One speculative explanation of this finding is that if the board is actively engaged in policy-making when the CEO is not the chair, it is possible that it does not have to replace the CEO to implement a new strategy to improve performance. This result would also
Moreover, both the GIM and BCF measures of good governance are negatively related to the probability of disciplinary turnover for poorly performing firms. This suggests that better governed firms as measured by the G and E indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.

Finally, both the TCL compliance rating and Gov-Score measures of good governance are unrelated to the probability of disciplinary turnover for poorly performing firms. These findings would again appear to underscore the hazard of constructing a governance index using multiple indicators of board structure and processes, charter provisions, and management compensation structure. Accordingly, of all of the measures of governance quality evaluated by Bhagat and Bolton, only the outside directors’ stock ownership measure is related to both measures of performance, firms’ future accounting profitability and disciplinary management turnover upon poor performance. This indicates more convincingly than the findings regarding accounting performance that the more complex measures of firms’ governance quality generated by index construction need not be superior to a single governance variable.

4. More General Lessons Gleaned from the Literature

The initial lesson that should be drawn from the corporate governance literature is that there is at present no best governance index with which to identify a firm’s governance quality. The best measure of governance varies with the context for which it is to be used, as different
measures of good governance are correlated with different performance measures. It is, as a consequence, not a simple or straightforward matter to provide investors who wish to use governance to predict performance with an appropriate proxy. For example, if accounting measures of performance are of concern, then the G and E indices could be sensible measures to use. However, those measures are inappropriate if the performance criterion is whether top management will be replaced following poor performance. Indeed, the single governance variable of outside directors’ stock ownership is related to both of those performance measures and thus that governance measure would serve investors better than any of the indices.

Moreover, if future stock returns (the conventional performance measure of concern to investors) are the focus, then none of the academic indices, nor the related commercial ones, are helpful. In short, consumers of indices need to be aware of the indices’ considerable limitations, as most consumers’ investment purposes will, no doubt, not be as narrowly focused as any one index’s possible value-added. The danger for investors, particularly the more poorly informed, is that indices can create the illusion of certainty regarding an assessment of firms’ governance quality, when reality is, in fact, quite muddy.

A further important implication of contextually-valuable governance measures concerns the appropriate form of governance regulation: it should be selected so as to maximize the flexibility afforded to adoption of standards. That is because, when the benefits from a particular governance mechanism are dependent upon the context, regulation must be sufficiently flexible to permit variation in governance requirements to suit the situation. Governance regulations that are mandates decidedly do not meet such a criterion.

In particular, the corporate governance index literature most definitely does not support a
“one-size-fits-all” approach to governance, which has been the preferred approach post-Enron to governance by Congress with the passage of SOX, and by the stock exchanges, whose rules are adopted under the aegis of the SEC, in their implementation and expansion of SOX requirements. Because there is no one best governance index -- as we have discussed, none of the indices are correlated with many relevant measures of performance and by construction they do not take into account the complex relations among governance institutions -- shoe-horning firms into a uniform set of governance institutions would generate potentially serious costs for investors.

More specifically, the data indicating that good governance measures are substitutes suggest that what is good governance for one firm need not be good governance for another. Given such a relationship, it would, in fact, be undesirable for firms to fulfill all components in a good governance index, since for some firms the provisions will be working at cross purposes. Yet governance mandates do precisely that. For example, the independent director mandates of SOX and the stock exchanges permit no exceptions, and this requirement prevents firms from adapting their governance institutions to fit their needs. Namely, firms can no longer engage in the governance tradeoff identified by GHS that firms often chose before the adoption of those mandates, replacing independent boards with the market for corporate control as the monitor of management and thereby presumably obtaining operational benefits from the expertise provided by non-independent (affiliated) directors.

The same issue arises when activist institutional investors and their advocacy organizations, such as the CII, advance the adoption of uniform governance practices. Such a “best practices” approach is equivalent to a regulatory mandate, in that the aim is to have all
firms adopt identical governance institutions. The difference is that those investors can only seek their preferred governance regime’s effectuation by shareholder proposals and other forms of pressure on individual firms (such as withholding votes from directors or engaging in media campaigns against management), versus compliance across the board by fiat. An example of the problematic aspect of this private sector version of governance mandates is the policy position of many activist investors that firms should repeal defensive tactics. GHS’ finding that firms with strong, independent boards adopt numerous takeover defenses suggests that those efforts to remove defenses may well be misguided by disregarding the need for governance tradeoffs: for some firms board monitoring would appear to substitute for the market for control, with takeover defenses being adopted, as GHS speculate, to obtain the benefit of avoiding myopic behavior, such as underinvestment, by managers concerned about takeover threats.\textsuperscript{118}

The parallelism noted between regulatory mandates and institutional investor activists’ best practices approach leads to a further question regarding the efficacy of “comply or explain” governance regimes, which are usually characterized in the literature as the alternative to the United States’ mandatory approach.\textsuperscript{119} Comply or explain is the approach to governance taken by regulators in Canada, the United Kingdom, and many nations of the European Union. Under this regulatory approach, firms must either comply with a list of best practices or disclose the reason for any noncompliance.

Best practices lists are, in essence, governance indices, in which each item on the list is

\textsuperscript{118} For a model of managerial myopia in response to takeovers see Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 61 (1988).

equivalent to one of the components in an equally-weighted index. The regulator expects firms to comply with all of the approved practices on its list, or put in index terms, all firms will have the maximum value or rating. Because non-compliers have the burden of explaining away their decisions, noncompliance can have a chilling effect, dissuading management from adopting governance mechanisms that would otherwise be beneficial (i.e., the requirement of an explanation for noncompliance implies that something is awry).120 If no one index is associated with better governance objectives in all contexts – as we have seen, for instance, in the reversal of the effectiveness rankings of the G and E indices going from operating performance to disciplinary management turnover – then that is no doubt also true of adherence to any one best practices list. Accordingly, requiring firms to justify noncompliance is inappropriate and may be imposing needless costs. Consistent with this view, the bulk of the empirical studies investigating whether firms in compliance with the best practices of comply or explain regimes are superior performers than non-fully compliant firms find that compliers do not outperform noncompliers.121

120 Iain MacNeil and Xiao Li contend that the explanations offered by noncompliers are completely uninformative. Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or Explain”: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code, 14 Corp. Governance: An Int’l Rev. 486 (2006). They find that the share prices of noncompliers with the U.K. combined code outperformed the market and hypothesize that it is simpler for investors to not seek to understand the reasons for noncompliance but rather to require proof that noncompliance “works.” In their understanding of the regime’s operation, it is difficult to evaluate the merits of compliance with code features, and hence of noncompliance, and therefore investors simply use performance as a proxy. If investors, as they posit, do not accept management’s judgment of what is appropriate governance when performance is poor, then poorly performing firms will conform to the code, even if doing so is not beneficial.

The upshot is that, in selecting a governance regulatory regime, a disclosure regime without references to a comparative benchmark would appear to be a more appropriate regulatory framework, as it would be most consistent with the spirit of the findings of the governance literature that we have surveyed. That is because a straightforward disclosure approach does not attempt to identify best practices, and thus avoids the illusion that we are in possession of knowledge that we obviously do not have. In a governance disclosure regime, firms would not have to explain why they followed a different governance practice from other firms, they would only have to disclose their governance structures and investors would be able to draw their own conclusions from the information. Such a regime would, no doubt, impose informational costs on investors, since it is altogether conceivable that it would be more difficult to compare firms on governance dimensions as the disclosures will not reference a benchmark, the hallmark of the “comply or explain” approach. But that is the precise advantage of a disclosure-only regime. It would eliminate the false premise that is embodied in a best practices list or governance index, that a set of known practices exists against which all firms should be benchmarked.

Are there any further lessons to be drawn by institutional investors who, at present, are
the primary consumers of proprietary governance indices? Stock ownership of directors appears to offer a more effective method of ranking firms’ governance quality than the more complex governance indices, and it is cheaper to acquire (it can be identified by self-help without much difficulty). Because investors purchasing governance services are sophisticated, and often for-profit, institutions, it would not be sensible to conclude that they have been unduly persuaded by the marketers of the indices (although we do think that some marketers are far too optimistic regarding the value added of their products\textsuperscript{122}). Rather, it might be a relatively inexpensive way of handling fiduciary obligations to be able to refer to an externally-generated governance index for investment or, more importantly, proxy voting decisions, even if its use might lead to incorrect decisions in a sizeable number of cases. In our view, the information gleaned about a firm from its ranking on an index should be treated as merely one of many potential pieces of information relevant for fiduciaries’ investing or voting decisions.

Finally, we offer the following cautionary note for courts. We are not aware of governance indices having been a subject of judicial notice. But it would seem plausible to expect the plaintiff’s bar in shareholder litigation in due course to seek to employ the evidentiary power of low governance ratings (given marketers’ emphasis on a link between indices and performance). Plaintiffs, that is, could attempt to bolster fiduciary breach claims with reference to firms’ governance failures as identified by commercial indices, and scholarly articles that find some relation between performance and an index. In that eventuality, we would suggest that courts should view such claims with more than a few grains of salt, and to consider, for instance,

\textsuperscript{122} Both Glass Lewis and ISS, for example, assert that their indices are positively correlated with performance, see note 49 supra (quoting Glass Lewis’ website) and ISS Overview, supra note 59.
whether the alleged breach can be related to a context in which the governance measure to which
the plaintiff refers is associated with better performance, or whether the firm rates low on all
governance indices, including single dimensions that have been found to be of equal or superior
value to an index. Such considerations would make for a more plausible claim that the firm’s
quality of governance is poor. But even then, we question whether it should be probative for
determining directors’ negligence or trumping the applicability of the business judgment rule.
Rather, we would think it to be more appropriate for a court to require the plaintiff to be able to
establish a nexus between the governance failure (the low score’s source) and some action or
inaction of the board producing the harm at issue.

5. Conclusion

The renewed focus on corporate governance following the collapse of Enron and other
financial scandals has hastened the creation of governance indices, marketed primarily to
institutional investors, as measures of firms’ governance quality that can be used to inform
investment and proxy voting decisions. The notion animating index construction is that because
corporate governance operates on many dimensions, it is of value to combine the numerous
elements of a firm’s governance system into one number representing the quality of the firms’
governance. The effort to construct a good index – by academics as well as commercial
providers of governance services – is considered urgent by many in the belief that corporate
performance is a function of good governance.

While identifying a measure of governance quality is a commendable idea in theory, in
practice, the existing indices fail to capture the diverse ways in which governance operates in
firms for two reasons. First, no one index can predict a firm’s performance on all of the performance measures that are thought to be important to investors. Indeed, a simple single governance variable, outside directors’ stock ownership, performs better than the leading academic indices, as it is positively correlated with more performance measures. Second, indices are constructed so as to treat all component governance mechanisms as complements, when the data suggest that several such mechanisms are actually substitutes for, and not complements to, each other. Good governance is therefore best understood as highly context-specific, something that even the best-constructed index simply cannot capture and convey.

These serious limitations on the effectiveness of an index have two broad policy implications. First, the most widespread forms of governance regulation need to be rethought because they mimic the approach of indices: both prescriptive mandates (the U.S. approach post-Enron) and comply or explain regimes (most other developed economies’, including the Canadian, U.K. and European approach) identify governance institutions that all firms are expected to adopt. A more appropriate approach, in our view, is a straightforward governance disclosure regime, which is fully cognizant of the costs and benefits of disclosure. Such a regime acknowledges that there is no one best benchmark or set of best practices that is appropriate for all, or even most, firms. Second, investors should treat indices for what they are, one of a multitude of pieces of information of interest about firms’ quality, that cannot predict future stock market performance.
Appendix
1. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (GIM) Governance or “G” Index

Groupings of IRRC governance provisions:

1. “Delay.” Four provisions intended to delay hostile takeover bidders (the presence of blank check preferred stock or a classified board, and restrictions on shareholders' ability to call special meetings or to act by written consent).

2. “Voting.” Six provisions dealing with shareholder voting rights (the presence of cumulative voting, confidential voting, supermajority voting for business combinations, dual class stock, and limitations to shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws or certificate of incorporation).

3. “Protection.” Six provisions protecting directors and officers from legal liability or job termination (limited liability provisions, indemnification provisions in charters or bylaws, indemnification contracts, golden parachutes, severance contracts not conditioned on control changes, and compensation plans with changes-in-control provisions).

4. “Other,” The six remaining provisions related to takeover defenses (the presence of antigreenmail provisions, fair price provisions, other constituent provisions, poison pills, silver parachutes, and pension parachutes).

5. “State.” Six state takeover laws (antigreenmail, business combination freeze, control share acquisition, fair price, other constitutencies and redemption rights statutes).

Note that these groupings can be questioned for lack of internal coherence. For example, blank check preferred, which they classify in the “delay” category is used in the creation of poison pills, yet poison pills are placed in the “other” category.
2. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF) Entrenchment or “E” Index

Subset of G index used (GIM's group classification in parentheses):

1. Classified boards (Delay)
2. Limitations to shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws (Voting)
3. Supermajority voting for business combinations (Voting)
4. Supermajority requirements for charter amendments (Voting)
5. Poison pills (Other)
6. Golden parachutes (Protection)

3. Brown and Caylor Gov-Score

ISS groupings, factors ordered by proportion of firms with minimally accepted standard
(factors in G score are in italics):

1. Audit. Four factors: audit committee consists solely of independent outside directors; auditors ratified by shareholders at most recent annual meeting; consulting fees paid to auditors less than audit fees paid; company has formal policy on auditor rotation
2. Board of directors. 17 factors: managers respond to shareholder proposals within 12 months of meeting; CEO serves on no more than two other public corporation boards; all directors attended at least 75% of board meetings or had valid excuse for non-attendance; size of board between 6 and 15; no former CEO is a director; no CEO related-party transactions listed in proxy; board has more than 50% independent outside directors; compensation committee comprised solely of independent outside directors; CEO and Chairman positions are separated or lead director is specified; shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies; annual director elections; shareholder approval to
change board size; nominating committee comprised solely of independent outside directors; governance committee meets at least once a year; cumulative voting rights; board guidelines in proxy statement; policy requiring outside directors to serve on no more than five additional boards

3. Charter/bylaws. Seven factors: majority vote for merger; no poison pill or shareholder approved pill; shareholders can call special meetings; majority vote to amend charter or bylaws; shareholders may act by nonunanimous written consent; no blank check preferred stock; board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can do so only under limited circumstances

4. Director education. One factor: at least one director has participated in ISS-accredited director education program

5. Executive and director compensation. Ten factors: no interlocking directors on compensation committee; non-employees do not participate in pension plans; no option repricing in past three years; shareholder approval of stock incentive plans; directors receive all or part of fees in stock; no corporate loans to executives to exercise options; last time shareholders voted on a pay plan ISS did not deem the cost to be excessive; average options granted in past three years as percentage of basic shares outstanding no more than 3 percent (“option burn rate”); prohibition on option repricing; expenses stock options

6. Ownership. Four factors: all directors with more than one year of service own stock; officers’ and directors’ stock ownership at least 1 percent and not over 30%; executives subject to stock ownership guidelines; directors subject to stock ownership guidelines
7. Progressive practices. Seven factors: mandatory retirement age for directors; board performance regularly reviewed; board-approved CEO succession plan in place; board has outside advisors; directors must submit resignation upon change in job status; outside directors meet without CEO and disclose number of times they meet; director term limits

8. State of incorporation. One factor: incorporation in state with no takeover statutes

Note that all of the factors in ISS's charter/bylaw grouping are also in the G index; the remaining G index components included in Gov-Score are in the board of directors category. In addition, while Brown and Caylor do not identify the state of incorporation factor as in the G index, and so it is not in italics in the above list, it is essentially a composite of the four components in GIM's “state” grouping.

The seven factors that Brown and Caylor identify in their 2005 paper as driving the original results and the grouping (in parentheses) into which they fall are as follow (italicized provisions also in BCF’s E index):

1. *annual director elections* (Board of directors)

2. *no poison pill or shareholder approved pill* (Charter/bylaws)

3. no option repricing in past three years (Executive and director compensation)

4. average options granted in past three years as percentage of basic shares outstanding no more than 3 percent (Executive and director compensation)

5. all directors attended at least 75% of board meetings or had valid excuse for non-attendance (Board of directors)

6. board guidelines in proxy statement (Board of directors)

7. directors subject to stock ownership guidelines (Ownership)
4. Proprietary Governance Indices

a. The Corporate Library (TCL) Board Effectiveness Rating

The Corporate Library (TCL), an investor research firm established by Nell Minow, an investor activist and that produces research reports and commentary on corporate governance, has developed a proprietary measure of the quality of firms’ governance, called the “Board Effectiveness” rating, which is a letter grade from A to F, representing a weighted average of an assessment of the effectiveness of seven governance components and an eighth personal assessment of the TCL analyst of the company’s governance quality.

Components in the rating:

1. Board Composition. Described as the only component not based primarily on board actions and decision-making, and related to an analysis of the historical governance patterns of firms that experienced governance failures, it consists of screens on director tenure, age, and independence, the number of active or former CEOs on the board, and whether a past CEO is chairman, and director “over-commitment” (sitting on more than four other boards)

2. CEO Compensation. Depends on the balance of fixed and variable pay, how much variable pay is in the form of stock, with numerical red flags, such as base salary over $1 million, “excessive” options and high perquisite payments, and disclosure practices.

3. Shareholder Responsiveness. History of board's response to successful shareholder proposals (those receiving a majority of the votes).

4. Litigation & Regulatory Problems. Based on the incidence of litigation and assessed fines, includes an evaluation of the amount of disclosure of current or potential liability
exposure, and the existence of repeated regulatory infractions or fines.

5. Takeover Defenses. Detailed information provided on defenses, with better ratings assigned for unidentified “more shareholder friendly” defenses.

6. Accounting. Screen compares current quarter reports against prior four quarters for indicators of potential earnings management or other accounting concerns.

7. Strategic Decisionmaking. Focuses on board approval of mergers and acquisitions (with lower ratings assigned to approvals of mergers resulting in significant loss of shareholder value).

8. Analyst Adjustment. Analyst may adjust the board rating up or down for reasons that fall outside the regular scoring system.

The first two components, board composition and CEO composition, comprise half of the overall rating, with equal weights applied to the other five governance components. The analyst adjustment is described as “determined on an individual basis.”

TCL also reports a Best Practices Compliance score or benchmark, developed from other organizations’ guidelines, that ranges from 0 to 100. It considers the effectiveness rating, and not the compliance score, as the preferable metric of a company’s governance quality.

TCL’s Best Practices Compliance Score is based on the following factors: whether the firm has a classified board, majority outside directors, independent chairman or lead director, audit committee of only independent directors, formal governance policy, and the number of directors who are over 70 years old, serve on more than 4 other boards and have more than 15 years of service.

b. GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) Market and Industry Indices
GovernanceMetrics International is an international governance rating organization, founded by individuals experienced in the investor relations and advising industry, that markets research and analyses principally to institutional investors. It provides advisory services to a variety of nonprofit organizations, such as stock exchanges, as well as to investors, but it does not provide proxy voting advisory services. Its “overall rating” governance score, which ranges from 1 to 10 and is derived from a statistical algorithm assigning numerical values to individual metrics falling within six general governance areas, is computed as a comparative score based on the governance practices and policies of other firms in the rated company’s home state or region (the “home market” rating) or all firms in GMI’s universe (the “global” rating).

**Governance Areas (“Research Categories”):**

1. Board Accountability
2. Financial Disclosure and Internal Controls
3. Shareholder Rights
4. Executive Compensation
5. Market for Control and Ownership Base
6. Corporate Behavior and Corporate Social Responsibility Issues

6. *Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Corporate Governance Quotient*

ISS is the market leader in the provision of proxy advisory and corporate governance services to institutional investors. It also provides governance and proxy consulting services to issuers. It has been in the advisory business for over two decades, during which it acquired competitors and expanded its services (acquiring most recently the proxy research firm, IRRC, in 2005, before it was itself acquired in 2006.) ISS rates companies according to a “Corporate Governance
Quotient,” which is derived from 63 governance factors (also referred to as governance criteria) that are grouped into four key governance areas, combining eight governance categories on which companies are evaluated. The weights assigned to the individual components are a function of their correlations with performance measures. The ratings are calculated as percentages indicating where a firm stands in relation to other firms in its industry or market. (For example, a value of 97.5 means that the company outperformed 97.5% of firms in its industry or stock market index, according to ISS’ statistical algorithm combining governance factors.)

**Governance Areas and Weights**

1. Board of directors - 40%
2. Compensation - 30%
3. Takeover defenses - 20%
4. Audit - 10%

The eight most important governance variables that enter into the rating, in order of their weighting are:

- audit committee with all independent outside directors; average options granted in past three years as percentage of basic shares outstanding no more than 2 percent or less or within one standard deviation of industry mean (“option burn rate”); all audit committee members are financial experts; board controlled by supermajority (over 90%) of independent outside directors; board has only one non-independent director; directors subject to stock ownership requirements; board controlled by supermajority (between 75 - 90%) of independent outsiders; incorporation in state with no takeover statutes
The sixteen performance measures ISS used to test its governance rating factors, which are divided into four categories of performance, are as follow:

1. Risk. Two measures: Volatility; Altman's Z score (probability of bankruptcy)
2. Market. Two measures: Total Shareholder Return; Tobin's Q
3. Valuation. Three ratio measures: Price to Book; Price to Cash Flow; Price to Earnings
4. Profitability. Nine measures: Dividend; Return on Invested Capital; Return on Equity; Return on Investment; Cash Flow Return in Investment; Net Profit Margin; EBITDA Margin; Sales Growth; Free Cash Flow to Sales

The factors that ISS use change over time, reflecting changing trends in corporate governance. For example, it no longer includes a factor for whether firms expense options, because that accounting treatment is now required and no longer voluntary. In addition, it now includes a factor for whether the company has majority vote director elections, a governance issue that first appeared on activist institutional investors agenda in any serious form in 2005, and a factor for whether the company has backdated options, an accounting issue – some would call it a scandal - - that first came to light in 2006.

d. Egan-Jones Proxy Services Corporate Governance Ratings

Egan-Jones Proxy Services provides assistance in proxy voting, offering research, recommendations and voting services (such as automated vote execution, recordkeeping and vote disclosure reporting). Although its affiliated business has provided credit rating analysis for many years, it began to offer proxy recommendations commercially in 2003 (in conjunction with the increased emphasis on corporate governance and particularly the new SEC regulations regarding disclosure of mutual funds' voting). In addition to offering general voting evaluating
the impact on “shareholder value,” it provides voting guidelines tailored to certain labor union funds’ needs, that ensure that “the rights and interests of labor are respected.” Egan-Jones provides an “overall” rating and specific ratings on the following five factors:

1. Voting process
2. Board independence
3. Board skills
4. Financial performance
5. Disclosure/controls

How, if at all, it combines the five factors into an overall rating is not publicly disclosed. All six ratings are in the form of letter grades (with pluses and minuses).

e. Glass Lewis & Company

Glass Lewis & Company, which provides research and advisory services to institutional investors, was established in 2003 by Lynn Turner, chief accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission during Arthur Levitt’s chairmanship. It markets a governance ranking, termed the “Board Accountability Index,” that is derived from BCF’s research, and which it considers a “governance-enhanced” S&P 500 index. It uses a “modified market-cap weighting algorithm” that adjusts an S&P 500 index company’s weight by the presence or absence of five of the six components of BCF’s entrenchment index. The component that Glass Lewis excludes is the supermajority requirement for charter amendments.
Table 1: Performance-Governance Relationship, Performance Measured by Return on Assets

This table presents the coefficients on the governance variable from equation (1a) estimated from the following system (p-values are in parentheses):

(1a) \[ \text{Performance} = f_1(\text{Ownership, Governance, Leverage, Log(Assets), Industry Performance, (R&D and Advertising Expenses)} / \text{Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Treasury Stock / Assets, } \varepsilon_1) \]

(1b) \[ \text{Governance} = f_2(\text{Performance, Ownership, Leverage, (R&D and Advertising Expenses)} / \text{Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Median Director Ownership Percentage, Percentage Independent Directors, } \varepsilon_2) \]

(1c) \[ \text{Ownership} = f_3(\text{Performance, Governance, Log(Assets), Leverage, (R&D and Advertising Expenses)} / \text{Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, CEO Tenure / CEO Age, } \varepsilon_3) \]

(1d) \[ \text{Leverage} = f_4(\text{Performance, Governance, Ownership, Industry Leverage, Log(Assets), (R&D and Advertising Expenses)} / \text{Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Altman’s Z-Score, } \varepsilon_4) \]

Operating performance (“ROA”) is considered for three time periods: contemporaneous (ROAt), next year (ROAt+1), and next two years (ROAt+1 to t+2). The following governance variables are considered: the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) G-Index, the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) E-Index, The Corporate Library (TCL) Benchmark score, the Brown and Caylor (2004) GovScore (data is available only for 2002), the dollar value of the median director’s stock holdings, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chair of the board, 0 otherwise, and, the percent of directors who are independent. The sample consists of about 1500 of the largest U.S. corporations for the period 1998-2002; in some cases data constraints allow for consideration of only a shorter period.

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Table 2: Performance-Governance Relationship, Performance Measured by Stock Return

This table presents the coefficients on the governance variable from equation (1a) estimated from the following system (p-values are in parentheses):

(1a) Performance = \( f_1 \) (Ownership, Governance, Leverage, Log(Assets), Industry Performance, (R&D and Advertising Expenses) / Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Treasury Stock / Assets, \( \varepsilon_1 \)),

(1b) Governance = \( f_2 \) (Performance, Ownership, Leverage, (R&D and Advertising Expenses) / Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Median Director Ownership Percentage, Percentage Independent Directors, \( \varepsilon_2 \)),

(1c) Ownership = \( f_3 \) (Performance, Governance, Log(Assets), Leverage, (R&D and Advertising Expenses) / Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, CEO Tenure / CEO Age, \( \varepsilon_3 \)),

(1d) Leverage = \( f_4 \) (Performance, Governance, Ownership, Industry Leverage, Log(Assets), (R&D and Advertising Expenses) / Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Altman’s Z-Score, \( \varepsilon_4 \)).

Stock return ("RETURN") is considered for three time periods: contemporaneous (RETURN\(_t\)), next year (RETURN\(_{t+1}\)), and next two years (RETURN\(_{t+1 \text{ to } t+2}\)). The following governance variables are considered: the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) G-Index, the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) E-Index, The Corporate Library (TCL) Benchmark score, the Brown and Caylor (2004) GovScore (data is available only for 2002), the dollar value of the median director’s stock holdings, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chair of the board, 0 otherwise, and, the percent of directors who are independent. The sample consists of about 1500 of the largest U.S. corporations for the period 1998-2002; in some cases data constraints allow for consideration of only a shorter period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Measure</th>
<th>Governance Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GIM G-Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETURN(_t)</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETURN(_{t+1})</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETURN(_{t+1 \text{ to } t+2})</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Relationship Between Dollar Board Ownership And Return on Assets for the Subsequent Two Years

The sample consists of about 1500 of the largest U.S. corporations for 2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership Quartile</th>
<th>Mean Dollar Value of Median Director’s Ownership</th>
<th>Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets for the Subsequent Two Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowest Ownership Quartile</td>
<td>$94,366</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>$462,758</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>$1,267,629</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Ownership Quartile</td>
<td>$7,185,716</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Multinomial Logit Model for Disciplinary CEO Turnover

This table presents the results from multinomial logistic regressions estimating the probability of CEO Turnover. The dependent variables are type of CEO turnover: 1 = Disciplinary turnover, 2 = Non-disciplinary turnover, 0 = no turnover. No turnover is the baseline category. The following control variables are included but not shown in the table: Firm’s stock market returns during the previous two years, CEO stock ownership, CEO tenure, firm size, industry returns during the previous two years, year dummy variables. p-values are in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Variable</th>
<th>GIM G-Index</th>
<th>BCF E-Index</th>
<th>TCL Benchmark Score</th>
<th>BC GovScore</th>
<th>$ Value of Median Director’s Holdings</th>
<th>CEO-Chair Duality (=1 if Dual)</th>
<th>% of Directors Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>-0.790</td>
<td>-0.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Return, Last 2 years x Governance)</td>
<td>-0.480</td>
<td>-0.877</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
<td>-1.381</td>
<td>-4.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>2,036</td>
<td>2,036</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>3,166</td>
<td>3,228</td>
<td>3,228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Multinomial Logit Model for Non-disciplinary CEO Turnover

This table presents the results from multinomial logistic regressions estimating the probability of CEO Turnover. The dependent variables are type of CEO turnover: 1 = Disciplinary turnover, 2 = Non-disciplinary turnover, 0 = no turnover. No turnover is the baseline category. The following control variables are included but not shown in the table: Firm’s stock market returns during the previous two years, CEO stock ownership, CEO tenure, firm size, industry returns during the previous two years, year dummy variables. p-values are in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Variable</th>
<th>Baseline Performance</th>
<th>GIM G-Index</th>
<th>BCF E-Index</th>
<th>TCL Benchmark Score</th>
<th>BC GovScore</th>
<th>$ Value of Median Director's Holdings</th>
<th>CEO-Chair Duality (=1 if Dual)</th>
<th>% of Directors Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-1.133</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance (Return, Last 2 years x Governance)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>-0.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years Included</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-02</td>
<td>3,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000, 2002</td>
<td>2,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000, 2002</td>
<td>2,036</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>2,195</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-02</td>
<td>3,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-02</td>
<td>3,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-02</td>
<td>3,228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Relationship Between Dollar Board Ownership By Quartiles And Return on Assets for the Subsequent Two Years

**Adjusted ROA\(_{t+1 \ to \ t+2}\) - Sorted by Governance**

- Q1 - Low
- Q2
- Q3
- Q4 - High

The chart illustrates the relationship between dollar board ownership quartiles and adjusted return on assets for the subsequent two years.